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On the classical liberal view, constitutional rights protect the indi-
vidual from certain kinds of interference with basic liberties by the state.
The theoretical concern informing such rights is of course the familiar
anxiety about abuse of government power. In order to check this con-
cern, centered particularly around state interference in private moral-
ity, liberalism has developed the notion of the state’s role as a neutral
facilitator of a ‘marketplace of ideas,’1 within which citizens may freely
debate competing notions of the good life, with the state favoring no
one view over another. Closely tied to this view is the idea that equal-
ity among citizens is to be thought of as almost interchangeable with
state neutrality – what it means for the state to treat its citizens equally
is for the state to treat its citizens neutrally. 
However, this traditional view of the relationship between the market-
place of ideas, equality, and neutrality seems to be in crisis today, as 
it has become clear that contemporary society is by no means operat-
ing as classical liberal theorists had envisioned – as a free marketplace
of ideas, where diverse views are considered openly and in a spirit of
genuine inquiry. On the contrary, our systemically racist, sexist, and
homophobic society has had the effect that certain dominant racist,
sexist, and homophobic views have become so deeply held as not to be
amenable to rational discussion, with the effect that minorities’ and
women’s voices are not heard fairly in the marketplace. 
If this is indeed the case, then our culturally oppressive society, by
which I mean a society that permits the unchecked cultural formation
of attitudes and beliefs about inequality,2 calls into question the typical
liberal remedy of equality as neutrality, and seems to demand a new
approach in the interest of ensuring a more robustly equal society. 
Put another way, through the lens of a cultural oppression frame-
work, beliefs about inequality have the potentially devastating effect of so
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undermining their recipient’s self-respect and understanding of her equal
moral worth as to preclude that recipient from having access to the 
liberal ideal of forming her own conception of the good life. As Andrew
Kernohan (1998: 88) presents the problem in his book Liberalism, Equality,
and Cultural Oppression:
To come to know the good, people require a cultural environment
free of practices that would enculturate false and undermining
beliefs about value…. In an inegalitarian culture, many of the beliefs
that people take up from their cultural environment are based on
beliefs about the moral inequality of persons…. If people base their
ends in life on these false evaluations, their highest-order interest in
coming to know the good will have been harmed. 
If Kernohan’s scenario describes our contemporary condition, then the
liberal ideal of state neutrality as facilitating each citizen’s conception
of the good would be ineffective, as it would in fact facilitate con-
ceptions of the good that deny the equal worth of persons. In a cul-
turally oppressive society, if the liberal state is indeed committed to
facilitating each citizen’s ability to realize her good, then the state must
take steps to remedy the conceptions of the good that deny the equal
moral worth of persons, rather than maintain neutrality about such
conceptions.
This book will examine two paradigmatic cases of harms caused by
culturally oppressive speech – the harm to women in general in the case
of pornography, and the harms to racial, religious, and sexual minorities
(both to the particular targets of the speech and to the affected group as a
whole) in the case of hate speech. These harms, I will argue, accrue
because the proliferation of pornography and hate speech in the market-
place of ideas has three deleterious consequences: First, the dominant
culture comes to believe what I will argue is the message of pornography
and hate speech – that women and minorities have inferior moral worth.
Second, women and minorities themselves come to believe this message.
Finally, if women and minorities believe this message, they will be 
less likely to attempt to rebut it in the marketplace, or their attempted
rebuttals will be disregarded by the dominant culture.
Speaking very broadly, the targets of pornography and hate speech 
– women and minorities – claim that their right to equality or their right
to freedom of expression is being violated by the speech in question,
because pornography and hate speech are limiting their opportunity to
enter into the marketplace of ideas. Conversely, the speakers claim that
2 The Cost of Free Speech
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to limit their speech is a violation of their own rights to equality and
to freedom of expression. 
Several questions arise from the issue of how to resolve the conﬂict
between these two claims. How are competing rights claims best adju-
dicated and how are they in fact adjudicated? How can one concept-
ualize the nature of the harm caused by cultural oppression? Can such
a conception be accommodated by liberalism, or is remedying the harms
of cultural oppression too much of a departure from the liberal principle
of state neutrality? These issues form the major lines of inquiry of this
study.
I will argue that the harms of cultural oppression ought to be 
remedied by the state, and that such a remedy in fact follows from 
the core principles of egalitarian liberalism. This argument is intended
as a twofold critique of the value of state neutrality. The ﬁrst line of 
critique comes from the ﬁrst three chapters, which offer a critique of
neutrality from within the egalitarian liberal tradition, albeit not within
the dominant line of thinking within that tradition. The thrust of this
critique is that state neutrality is undesirable for the reason that it allows
a culturally oppressive culture to ﬂourish, unchecked by the state, and
that such a culture is anathema to the fundamental goals of liberalism
itself. 
Chapters 4, 5, and 6 offer a critique of state neutrality from outside
of the liberal tradition, from contemporary continental political philo-
sophy. The core of the arguments here will be to the effect that state
neutrality is not merely undesirable but impossible in principle. It is
my hope that these two arguments – from within liberalism and from
outside of it – can be taken together to form a critique of liberal state
neutrality to which liberals will be receptive, either from the angle of
the undesirability of neutrality, or from the angle of its impossibility.
In either case, my aim is always sympathetic to the egalitarian liberal
project, and I hope that my arguments concerning the weaknesses 
of state neutrality will ultimately lead to a more robust, and activist,
liberalism, better able to meet its commitments to its own core value 
of treating its citizens with equal concern and respect.3
In Chapter 1, I will set out three strands of egalitarian liberal theory,
which, taken together, provide a background set of views amenable to
discussing cultural oppression. These views are: J.S. Mill’s harm prin-
ciple, Joseph Raz’s view of rights as in part justiﬁed by the common
interest, and Ronald Dworkin’s notion of rights as correctives for the




In Chapters 2 and 3, I will argue that while the framework articu-
lated in Chapter 1 provides a starting point for the justiﬁcation of state
intervention in cases of cultural oppression, neither Mill nor Dworkin
goes so far as to contemplate active state intervention for the pro-
motion of equality at the direct expense of freedom of expression. Both
Mill’s and Dworkin’s views on this question will be discussed in these
chapters, as well as criticisms of their views, especially as offered by
feminists and critical race theorists who ﬁnd fault with the effects of
state neutrality. 
I will conclude this discussion by arguing, ﬁrst, that both Mill and
Dworkin have important but overlooked lines of thinking that would
actually facilitate an activist liberalism, and secondly, that the crit-
icisms offered by feminists and critical race theorists reveal that the
liberal state’s delimiting of the scope of the right to freedom of expression
does not in all cases preserve the state’s core commitment to equality;
and that in some cases, particularly in cases of cultural oppression, the
state’s deployment of rights operates to promote oppression. 
Given this, the central question for the egalitarian liberal becomes
how to ensure that the state’s granting of a particular right in a parti-
cular circumstance will in fact promote equality, as opposed to promoting
oppression. In Chapters 4, 5, and 6, I will argue that this question is illu-
minated by three strands of thought not normally considered by Anglo-
American political philosophy but which I believe offer very fruitful
critiques of the very possibility, let alone desirability, of state neutrality.
Instead of seeing the state as neutral, all three of these lines of thought
see the state as a powerful actor in the marketplace of ideas. In Chapter 4,
I will undertake an analysis of the nature and operation of speech acts, 
as articulated by J. L. Austin and contemporary interpreters of his work.
Through this analysis, the state’s speech, particularly in its judicial deci-
sions, will come to be seen as illocutionary speech acts, which carries the
implication that state speech contains a great deal of power normally
overlooked in mainstream liberal discourse.
In Chapter 5, the idea of state speech as bound up with state power
becomes more explicit, and the consequences of this view are given
more nuance by an analysis of the nature of power and discourse as
articulated by the leading continental theorist of power, Michel Foucault.
I argue in Chapters 4 and 5 that these two theories – speech act theory
and power as discourse – taken together, reveal that rights themselves
are to be seen as instruments of state power. This insight is crucial to
the central argument of the book: that the state as a neutral facilitator
of private ideas is untenable and must be dropped if the liberal state is
4 The Cost of Free Speech
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to fulﬁll its goal of equal concern and respect for all of its citizens. I argue
that Foucault and Austin demonstrate that judicial decisions of the state
are a paradigmatic instance of authoritative state speech and state power,
which is entirely unavoidable and anything but neutral. Given that, the
best option for the egalitarian liberal state is to acknowledge its role as
speaker, and aim to use its speech in the service of equality.
This argument is further developed in Chapter 6, which addresses
the traditional reasoning given by liberals for resisting state activism 
in the service of equality: fear of censorship. In recent years, theorists
from the continental tradition, led by Judith Butler, have argued that
censorship is in fact a much more pervasive and thoroughgoing phe-
nomenon than the liberal account has admitted. If Butler’s ‘new’ cen-
sorship is in fact the correct way of understanding the phenomenon,
then the state is implicated in censorship at a much deeper, and indeed
unavoidable, level than had previously been theorized. Again, the thrust
of this argument is to demonstrate that the liberal ideal of neutrality is,
of necessity, untenable, and ought to be abandoned in the service of
the central liberal goal of the promotion of equality.
The ﬁnal two chapters of the book examine how a liberal state no
longer tied to neutrality might act in the service of equality. Chapter 7
conceives of how what I will call an ‘activist’ liberal state might operate
to remedy the harms of cultural oppression. My argument here will be
twofold. First, the state may engage in legally non-binding activist speech
in the marketplace, in the form of state resources being expended to
model and encourage discourse about diversity, such as through public
service announcements on television and other media. The aim of such
measures would be to remedy the oppressive speech of private actors 
in the marketplace with liberatory state speech. Second, and more con-
troversially, the judiciary may render decisions about freedom of expres-
sion in ways that are guided by the value of equal concern and respect,
rather than being guided by the perceived imperative to retain neutrality.
Chapter 8 will demonstrate that the idea of an activist liberal state 
in the service of equality may already be working in practice, and not just
in theory. I will analyze the leading United States, Canadian, and Euro-
pean cases on pornography and hate speech to demonstrate that a more
egalitarian result has in fact been reached in these cases in Canada and
Europe than has currently been reached in the US jurisprudence. Equality,
here, implies protection for individuals and groups both against a hostile
background of societal cultural oppression and against the background of 
the power wielded by the state itself. Unconsciousness of the workings of
both cultural oppression and state power, I believe, has led to inegalitarian
Introduction 5
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results in these cases in the US. However, Canada and Europe – on both
the state and international levels – provide compelling examples of
egalitarian jurisprudence guided by the very principles for which I am
arguing.
The arguments in this book attempt to demonstrate – both from within
the liberal tradition and from outside of it – that neutrality is not a
salve for inequality, but is rather in many instances an enactor of it;
the arguments serve to highlight the role of state power in the hopes
that a liberal state more aware of its own power will curb its unwitting
inegalitarianism when given the tools and responsibility to engage in
activism on behalf of equality. It is my hope that this book will clarify
liberalism’s core commitments and make clear that the liberal com-
mitment to neutrality, if there even is one, is merely instrumental in
nature, and ought to be jettisoned in our current culturally oppressive
climate in the hopes of making our culture one amenable to the laudable
and classical liberal goals of a vigorous, robust, and diverse discussion of
the good life.
6 The Cost of Free Speech
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Harm, Equality, and the Common
Interest: Towards a Framework for
an Activist Liberalism
1.1 An uneasy triad: Liberty, equality, and neutrality
On most egalitarian liberal accounts,1 constitutional rights are seen as
protecting the individual from certain kinds of interference with basic
liberties by the state. The theoretical concern informing such rights is
of course the familiar anxiety about abuse of government power. In
order to check this concern, centered particularly around state inter-
ference in private morality, liberal theorists – both classical and con-
temporary – have developed the familiar, even clichéd, notion of the
state’s role as a neutral facilitator of a ‘marketplace of ideas,’ within
which competing notions of the good life may be articulated freely,
with the state favoring no one view over another. If the state’s role is
conﬁned to neutral facilitation of private citizens’ ideas, then the
state’s conﬁnement in that role is apt to render it benign. 
Further, such a marketplace is thought to preserve our constitutional
right to freedom of expression – what could better facilitate freedom of
expression than an unregulated forum? – and many egalitarian liberal
theorists believe that it preserves our constitutional right to equality 
as well. The state’s guarantee of equality among citizens – in the US,
the guarantee of ‘equal protection of the laws’ enshrined in the Four-
teenth Amendment (see Appendix B for the text of the First and Four-
teenth Amendments) – can be understood as being facilitated by state
neutrality in the marketplace of ideas. In other words, what it means to
be treated equally by the state is to be treated neutrally by the state. 
This traditional concern about abuse of state power and its remedy
in the marketplace, however, seems to be in crisis today, as it has 
become clear to many theorists that contemporary society is by no means
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operating as classical liberal theorists had envisioned – as a free market-
place of ideas, where diverse views are considered openly and in a spirit
of genuine inquiry. On the contrary, our systemically racist and sexist
society has the effect that certain racist or sexist views have become so
proliﬁc as to ﬂood the marketplace, and so deeply held as not to be
amenable to rational discussion. Thus, the views of racial minorities
and women are not heard in the marketplace, posing a threat to their
rights of both liberty, especially the liberty of freedom of expression,
and equality. It is the project of this book to try to resolve this crisis of the
marketplace in terms friendly to the egalitarian liberal. In other words,
I believe the challenges posed to the marketplace from systemic racism,
sexism and homophobia are not insurmountable for egalitarian liberal-
ism, but they will require a reframing of egalitarian liberal priorities,
which I shall outline.
Another way to cast this is to say that our current situation as a society
which practices cultural oppression – by which I mean a society which
permits the unchecked cultural formation of attitudes and beliefs about
inequality – calls into question the liberal insistence that equality is being
facilitated if neutrality is maintained by the state, and seems to demand
that the egalitarian liberal state take a new approach in the interest of
ensuring a more robustly equal society.
A particularly problematic consequence of cultural oppression for the
egalitarian liberal is that the proliferation of racist and sexist opinions 
– which are, at bottom, opinions about inequality – have the effect of 
so undermining their targets’ self-respect and sense of equal moral worth
as to preclude the targeted group from having access to their highest-
order interests in knowing the good. 
If this is indeed the consequence of cultural oppression, and I argue
in what follows and in Chapter 2 that it is, then the egalitarian liberal
ideal of state neutrality as facilitating each citizen’s ability to formulate
their own conception of the good – through equal access to the market-
place of ideas – would be ineffective. I argue that the egalitarian liberal
state is fundamentally committed – through the values underlying its
core constitutional obligations – to treating its citizens with equal con-
cern and respect, and only committed to neutrality instrumentally,
insofar as it serves the goal of facilitating equal concern and respect. Since
the egalitarian liberal state is committed to facilitating each citizen’s
ability to realize their good, which presupposes treatment with equal
concern and respect, then in an inegalitarian culture, the state must
take steps to remedy that inequality, rather than remaining neutral
concerning it.
8 The Cost of Free Speech
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There are two traditional, highly inﬂuential, liberal arguments against
state intervention in the liberty of citizens in order to protect equality,
and both make use of the notion of state neutrality. These two argu-
ments, far from settling the issue in favor of neutrality in preference to
intervention, instead show that the roots of the conﬂict between liberty
and equality run as deep as the idea of neutrality itself. Very generally,
since this is well-worn territory,2 one argument for state neutrality holds
that all citizens ought to receive ‘neutral concern’ from the government,
which means that they shall receive concern equal to that given to
others, regardless of their conception of the good life, as long as their 
conception does not violate the rights of others. They will receive this
equal – that is, neutral – concern from the state regardless of whether
their conception of the good life is shared by others or not – in other
words, whether or not their lifestyle is a minority position. 
According to this view, neutral concern is the best way of promoting
equality among citizens; it is the purpose of neutrality to ensure that
citizens are not discriminated against by the government by virtue of
their holding minority lifestyles. Thus, this view of neutrality sees it as
the very mechanism for enhancing the equality of citizens in the ﬁrst
instance; consequently, a departure from neutrality in the name of
equality is seen as nonsensical. Articulated in this way, state neutrality
appears to be of a piece with the aims of egalitarian liberalism in securing
equal treatment of citizens.
However, the traditional justiﬁcation of neutrality, from Mill onwards,
also makes use of another argument, to the effect that the reason to
afford different, competing, visions of the good life equal, or neutral, con-
cern, is that at present we as a culture are ignorant about what constitutes
the good life or lives. Thus, any or all of these visions of the good life,
articulated freely in the marketplace, may be true or valuable to the com-
munity as a whole, and the undecided individual is best served by a state
which allows her to sample all of these diverse visions in making 
up her own mind about her own lifestyle. The state’s function, then, is 
to ensure that its citizens are afforded an environment wherein they may
have maximal opportunity to freely choose their own lifestyles, or ideas
of the good life, from all of the available options. In other words, the
state’s role is to maximize the liberty of its citizens to choose how to live
their lives. On this view, then, neutrality, rather than equality, is justiﬁed
as a necessary condition for liberty. Equality is instrumental for liberty,
on this view, rather than an end in itself.
This second argument, then, may be at odds with my argument about
the desirability of state intervention in the elimination of harms caused
Harm, Equality, and the Common Interest 9
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by cultural oppression. If the state’s role is to facilitate neutrality in the
service of liberty, then intervention to prohibit cultural oppression
may have the effect of violating the liberty of the oppressors, not 
to mention the liberty of their potential listeners, who may be deprived
of hearing their version of the good, and are thus less at liberty to adopt 
it for themselves. This raises the traditional problem of the tension
between liberty and equality in liberal theory, and I aim to offer a 
potential resolution of it in the later chapters of this study through 
an analysis of social power. For now, however, it must sufﬁce to say 
that the idea of the neutrality of the liberal state already betrays a 
tension in its justiﬁcation – between liberty and equality – and thus 
it is not altogether to depart from the notion of state neutrality to argue,
as I will, on the side of equality rather than on the side of liberty in 
particular cases.
I will argue for such a departure from state neutrality in particular
cases, for particular groups of people – cases where cultural oppression
is operative and where current egalitarian liberal thinking has been
thus far unable to take such discrimination on board. In so doing, 
I will rely on three inﬂuential and current egalitarian liberal theories
which, taken together, set up a viable framework within which a 
liberal interventionist state is intelligible and defensible. These three
theories are John Stuart Mill’s harm principle, and his corollary right 
to liberty of self-determination; Joseph Raz’s view – joined by Owen
Fiss’s and Cass Sunstein’s readings of the United States’ freedom 
of expression jurisprudence – of rights as properly seen as protective 
of the common interest as well as protective of the individual; and 
the egalitarian liberalism of Ronald Dworkin. In this chapter, I will
present and defend these three theories, and in subsequent chapters 
I will attempt to work out criteria to determine when the liberal 
state, thus conceived, ought to intervene to prevent harm to its 
citizens. 
1.2 J. S. Mill: Rights, interests, and the activist state
Mill’s On Liberty (1978; ﬁrst published 1858) provides the most inﬂuen-
tial framework for the contemporary egalitarian liberal understanding
of the relation between the state and the citizen. I will treat the book
more thoroughly, especially with regard to its arguments about free-
dom of expression, in Chapter 2, but at this point it is worth discussing
Mill’s liberalism and his characterization of rights in quite general and
brief terms. 
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The central subject at issue in On Liberty is of course the issue of civil
liberty – the nature and limits of the power that can be legitimately
exercised by society over the individual, where the primary concern is
abuse of state power over individuals. Historically, the issue of the rela-
tionship between the state and the individual was preoccupied with a
concern that the monarch, established to protect the weakest people,
may abuse that power; and so rights, guaranteeing certain key civil 
liberties, were needed as a sphere of immunity that the monarch could
not legitimately infringe upon. 
Although we have of course replaced the monarchy with democracy,
the same concern of abuse of power remains, according to Mill – only
now it is put in terms of the ‘tyranny of the majority’ of citizens over the
minority, and so we need the same rights to guard against such tyranny.3
In other words, the majority, in principle, has the same ability to infringe
upon the civil liberties of the minority as monarchical power does, and 
so the issue of the necessity of rights remains untouched in these two
systems of government. This characterization of the need for rights 
as arising out of concern about the tyranny of the majority is echoed in
Dworkin’s contemporary formulation of the necessity of rights in a liberal
democracy, which I will turn to later in this chapter.
It is important to note, however, that in this formulation of concern
about the tyranny of the majority, Mill is not only concerned with the
power of the state over individuals, but with the power of some indi-
viduals over others as well. The discussion in On Liberty raises the
general question of what to do when liberty in a matter of individual
freedom interferes with someone else’s pursuits, and the notion of the
tyranny of the majority refers not only to a democratically elected
majority government, but also to the harms that a majority of private
citizens can inﬂict upon other citizens. The scope of Mill’s concern 
in this regard is of interest to the argument of this study because it im-
plicitly premises an activist liberal state insofar as Mill sees it as the state’s
task to prevent not only its own interference with private individuals
in certain cases, but also its task to prevent private citizens from inter-
fering in certain cases. 
For Mill, then, the question is how to justly limit the power of the
majority – government or citizen – from tyrannizing the minority. Mill
(1978: 9) proposes the answer in his articulation of his famous harm
principle:
[T]he sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or
collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their
Harm, Equality, and the Common Interest 11
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number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power
can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized com-
munity, against his will is to prevent harm to others.
Mill justiﬁes this notion of maximal liberty consistent with the pre-
vention of certain harms on utilitarian grounds, based on the ‘per-
manent interests of man as a progressive being’ (p.10) – our collective
interest in progress would be compromised, at too great a cost, if we
were to forgo the harm principle and instead allow thoroughgoing
liberty. I will return to the notion of our collective interest in progress
later in this chapter, to argue that Mill’s conception of rights, in oppo-
sition to that of Dworkin but similarly to Raz, sees our individual and
collective interests as dovetailing at a certain point. But for now, it is
important only to note that our interest in progress as a society and as
a species, then, authorize on utilitarian grounds the subjection of indi-
vidual ‘spontaneity,’ as Mill puts it, to external control only in respect
to those actions which concern other people. The idea here is that if
we are harming others through our actions, society cannot progress
optimally, and our progress as individual human beings is necessarily
an urgent interest of ours as a collective. 
Of course a central question applied to Mill’s formulation is what
kind of harms are sufﬁcient to warrant interference with individual 
liberties, and Mill concedes that there is always a certain degree of
interference with others in any action at all, and thus ‘harm’ in the
sense which warrants state intervention cannot merely mean any kind
of interference. To avoid such an over-broad application of the harm
principle, Mill limits it to covering only such harms that constitute 
an interference with a certain vital interest. Thus, only harms to vital
interests, which Mill deems to be synonymous with rights, are sufﬁcient
to warrant an interference with liberty:
Everyone who receives the protection of society owes a return for
the beneﬁt, and the fact of living in society renders it indispensable
that each should be bound to observe a certain line of conduct toward
the rest. This conduct consists, ﬁrst, in not injuring the interests of 
one another, or rather certain interests that, either by express legal 
provision or by tacit understanding, ought to be considered as rights.
(1978: 73)
So the harms that the state ought to intervene to prevent are not simply
any case where one person’s action interferes with another person’s
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interest, but rather only those cases where the action interferes with 
an interest of such magnitude that that interest is protected legally
through the imposition of a right by the state. 
This formulation, now commonplace in modern liberal society, 
thus narrows the question of when the state is justiﬁed in interfer-
ing in private life, or must tailor its own, otherwise interfering actions,
to the question of what interests ought to be considered important
enough to be deemed rights, and thus worthy of protective action by 
the state. I will turn to the question of what these interests are shortly,
ﬁrst by investigating Chapter V of Utilitarianism, where Mill discusses 
the fundamental interest in security, and then by discussing what 
Mill says about our fundamental right to liberty or autonomy in On
Liberty. The discussion of his most famous right, to freedom of expression,
which is a corollary of the right to liberty, however, will be taken up in
Chapter 2. 
Thus far in Mill’s formulation, though, the harm principle can be
understood to mean that the state must intervene to prevent actions,
either of its own or of others, which violate rights. Everything turns,
then, on the question of what ought to be considered a right, since
(1978: 73): ‘[t]he acts of an individual may be hurtful to others or
wanting in due consideration for their welfare, without going to the
length of violating any of their constituted rights,’ in which case 
the state should not intervene. There is a fair amount of harm allow-
able in Mill’s liberalism, then, but it is only allowable insofar as it falls
short of the threshold of an interest sufﬁcient to be deemed a right;
there is only an obligation to prevent harm when there is a positive
and identiﬁable duty owed to that person (1978: 80):
…[W]ith regard to the merely contingent or, as it may be called,
constructive injury which a person causes to society by conduct which
neither violates any speciﬁc duty to the public, nor occasions 
perceptible hurt to any assignable individual except himself, the
inconvenience is one which society can afford to bear, for the sake
of the greater good of human freedom.
It is interesting to note the utilitarian justiﬁcation offered for the
allowing of harms that fall short of rights violations. It is not that Mill
thinks that such harms are too trivial to merit the attention of the
state, but rather that the cost of the harm is, on balance, worth the
beneﬁt of increased freedom. Thus, for Mill, the state’s task is to strike
the correct balance between prevention of harm and maximization of
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freedom or liberty most consistent with the utilitarian aim of maxi-
mizing happiness for the greatest number of citizens.
Respect for liberty is important, according to Mill, in that it provides
one with the opportunity to deﬁne one’s own style of life, which Mill
considers the basis of his liberalism. He writes, famously (1978: 12):
No society in which these liberties are not, on the whole, respected
is free, whatever may be its form of government…. The only
freedom which deserves the name is that of pursuing our own good
in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of
theirs or impede their efforts to obtain it.
Thus, Mill sees the liberty to deﬁne one’s own good as a presupposition
of freedom, and the only societies which offer the true possibility of
freedom are those which guarantee maximal liberty consistent with
the prevention of certain harms. Societies where this fundamental
freedom of deﬁning one’s own good is respected are societies that will
offer their citizens the greatest possibility of happiness, on the pre-
supposition that happiness is best facilitated by an individual’s ability
to choose the lifestyle that they believe will make them happiest.
This ability of the individual to choose the lifestyle that they believe
will make them happiest is fundamental to understanding not only
what Mill understands the right to liberty to be, but what he under-
stands liberalism itself to be. For Mill, the underpinning of both is 
the value to the individual and to society in diversity of opinion and
lifestyle. Mill’s notion of our permanent interests as progressive beings,
which was his chief concern, ﬂourishes under conditions of diversity 
of opinion and lifestyle, as it is necessarily an empirical question which
opinions are true and which lifestyles are most conducive to hap-
piness; thus, we need a society where conditions are such that we can
experiment and ﬁnd out the best of a diverse range of options. Thus, a
liberal society is one where such conditions obtain, and the right to
liberty is the mechanism by which such conditions are secured.
The right to liberty, then, is key to understanding Mill’s political and
ethical theory, and very pertinent to the question of the legitimacy of
state intervention in cases of cultural oppression. Many commentators
have cashed out Mill’s fundamental right to liberty in terms of a right
to liberty of self-development (see Donner 1992), as opposed to a right
to autonomy (Gray 1996 argued for the autonomy view), and I will fol-
low the former line of interpretation in my discussion of Mill. This under-
standing of the right to liberty runs as follows: Mill’s chief departure
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from Benthamian utilitarian theory was in his rejection of Bentham’s
crude feliciﬁc calculus for happiness, and his insistence on a hierarchy of
goods. Once this hierarchy is premised, Mill needs to establish how it is
that agents can come to know and to access this hierarchy and make
choices based upon it for their lives. In order that agents may come to be
in a position to judge the true value of the various goods presented to
them by their culture, they must be broadly educated – intellectually,
emotionally, and ethically – such that they may develop the critical
capacity to discern the higher goods from the lower. Such educated indi-
viduals are Mill’s famous ‘competent judges,’ and it is this process of 
education that can be said to be realized through the right to liberty 
of self-development. For Mill, the function of society is to train all of 
us, to one degree or another, depending on our natural capacities and
talents, to become such judges of the good, and it is our right to be given
access to this developmental process. 
The justiﬁcation behind this schema of self-development is, of course,
utilitarian: what it is to be a competent judge is to be able to weigh the
good to society overall of a particular choice, rather than merely the good
to the particular agent. Thus, overall welfare is increased by the existence
of these judges making choices in its interest. For the purposes of this
study, the right to the liberty of self-development is of use as an entry
into discussing the harms of cultural oppression as a violation of this
right. For instance, when members of a minority population are the
targets of a discriminatory admissions policy, one way of characterizing
the harm done to them is to say, for example, that their ability to access
the resources available for self-development is impeded. 
Another way of casting the harms of cultural oppression in terms of
denial of the right to liberty of self-development is to maintain that
when a woman or minority receives views of their unequal moral
worth from the majority culture, their internalization of those views
causes them to be unable to come to know their true good. Since 
the content of the culturally oppressive view claims that they are
unequal, their internalization of this view would cause them to feel
unworthy of their true good, or even unable to formulate many poss-
ible goods, because they would see themselves as precluded from them.
As Kernohan puts it (1998: 66), views of the unequal moral worth of
women, for example, can undermine a particular woman’s knowledge
of the good:
… if she depends on them in her deliberations about the good and
they lead her into mistaken beliefs about her good. Domestic work
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carries a social meaning that makes it seem obligatory to many
women and optional to most men. Suppose a woman accepts this
assumption and builds a vision of her life on this basis. If domestic
work had carried a more egalitarian social meaning, she would have
made another choice about her life. Suppose also that this life is 
in fact wrong for her; devoting her life to her professional career
would have been a better choice for her. An inegalitarian distri-
butional assumption has directly undermined her knowledge of the
good.
The discussion in Chapter 2 will reveal that this formulation is strikingly
compatible with Mill’s own characterization of the plight of women 
in The Subjection of Women (1997; ﬁrst published 1869), offering ano-
ther reason to believe that the present project of a state that is activist 
in ﬁghting the harms of cultural oppression would meet with Mill’s
assent.
Mill’s discussion of what interests are sufﬁcient to be deemed rights
continues in Utilitarianism (1977; ﬁrst published 1861), and it is useful
to examine brieﬂy that text. In Chapter V, Mill explicitly deals with the
question of the reconciliation of rights with utilitarian theory, and he
famously writes (1977: 1013):
To have a right, then, is, I conceive, to have something which
society ought to defend me in the possession of. If the objector 
goes on to ask why it ought, I can give him no other reason than
general utility. If that expression does not seem to convey a
sufﬁcient feeling of the strength of the obligation, nor to account
for the peculiar energy of the feeling, it is because there goes to 
the composition of the sentiment, not a rational only but also 
an animal element – the thirst for retaliation; and this thirst 
derives its intensity, as well as its moral justiﬁcation, from the 
extraordinarily important and impressive kind of utility which is 
concerned.
This grounding the justiﬁcation of rights in the interests of utility is, as
many commentators from Mill’s own time and since have noted, some-
what unsatisfying; or, to put it perhaps more generously, it is as satisfying
as the notion of utility itself is satisfying. As the discussion in Chapter 3
will reveal, it is perhaps this unsatisfactoriness that leads Dworkin to 
posit quite the opposite justiﬁcation of the necessity of rights: as trumps
against utility.
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Mill is well aware that the utilitarian justiﬁcation of rights does not
quite have a bedrock sort of appeal, and devotes much of his argu-
ment in Chapter V to an indirect defense of utility – essentially, that
deontological theories do not do any better in justifying rights. He
writes (1977: 1013–14):
If the preceding analysis, or something resembling it, be not the
correct account of the notion of justice – if justice be totally inde-
pendent of utility, and be a standard per se, which the mind can recog-
nize by simple introspection of itself – it is hard to understand why
that internal oracle is so ambiguous, and why so many things appear
to be either just or unjust, according to the light in which they are
regarded. We are continually informed that utility is an uncertain
standard, which every different person interprets differently, and that
there is no safety but in the immutable, ineffaceable, and unmistak-
able dictates of justice, which carry their evidence in themselves and
are independent of the ﬂuctuations of opinion. One would suppose
from this that on questions of justice there could be no controversy….
So far is this from being the fact that there is as much difference of
opinion, and as much discussion, about what is just as about what is
useful to society.
Of course, this debate is as yet unresolved, and I will turn shortly to
Dworkin’s opposing view of rights as trumps on utility, rather 
than indicators of it. However, it is noteworthy that nothing for my
purposes turns on the question of whether or not rights are best under-
stood as instruments of utility or checks on it; all that is needed is for
rights to be justiﬁed by reference to a fundamental interest, which is
compatible with either Mill’s or Dworkin’s characterization.
Mill claims that rights are such because they are of paramount utility,
and he of course recognizes that such a characterization entails that 
they cannot be considered to be absolute – ‘particular cases may occur 
in which some other social duty is so important as to overrule any 
one of the general maxims of justice.’ (1077: 1019). I will return to 
this caveat shortly, but so far in his account in Utilitarianism, Mill has 
not revealed which interests are of such paramount utility as to merit 
the standing of right, though On Liberty reveals that a chief interest 
is liberty of self-development. In that work as well, as Chapter 2 will
show, Mill famously highlights liberty of expression as worthy of right-
status, because of its utility in furthering the interests of a democratic
society.
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In Utilitarianism, however, he enumerates two other interests that he
ﬁnds sufﬁciently important to general utility to enshrine as rights. The
ﬁrst is our interest in security, which is
…to everyone’s feelings the most vital of all interests. All other
earthly beneﬁts are needed by one person, not needed by another;
and many of them can, if necessary, be cheerfully foregone or
replaced by something else; but security no human being can poss-
ibly do without; on it we depend for all our immunity from evil and
for the whole value of all and every good, beyond the passing
moment; since nothing but the gratiﬁcation of the instant could be
of any worth to us, if we could be deprived of anything the next
instant by whoever was momentarily stronger than ourselves. (Mill
1977: 1013)
Security here seems to mean the ability of the individual to rely on the
continued efﬁcacy of established expectations; the right to security is
the right to faith in a certain regularity of societal norms and rules. In
part, this is achieved by having a consistently enforced system of laws,
but it also seems to refer to less formal social and ethical norms. That
such an interest is of sufﬁcient import to the general utility to be given
status as a right should be obvious: if we were not assured of the regu-
larity of societal norms, we would be in a constant state of anxiety, and
spend all of our time guarding our property and bodies. Such an inter-
est seems logically prior to the interest in liberty of self-development;
having a basic level of security in the regularity and predictability of
social life seems a precondition to any other endeavor we undertake,
including the project of self-development.
Mill then enumerates another interest belonging to the select group
worthy of state protection: our interest in equality. He writes that: ‘All
persons are deemed to have a right to equality of treatment, except
when some recognized social expediency requires the reverse.’ (Mill
1977: 1019, emphasis in the original). This is an interest that Dworkin
will adopt and develop as primary, though, notably, without Mill’s
caveat. I will take up the right to equality in much more detail in my
discussion of Dworkin, so I will leave it unelaborated for now. 
For Mill, then, our interest in security is paramount; our interest in
liberty of self-development guaranteed except when it harms the rights
of others; and our interest in being treated as an equal also qualiﬁes as
of sufﬁcient value to general utility to be considered a right. All three
of these interests are relevant to my discussion of the harms suffered by
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women and minorities as a result of cultural oppression: the right to
security is violated when, for example, hate speech is not consistently
protected under the law; the right to liberty of self-development is viol-
ated when, for example, higher education admissions policies are dis-
criminatory; the right to equality is violated when, for example,
pornography is upheld as free expression in spite of its role in circulat-
ing views about women’s inequality.
Thus, if state intervention in cases of cultural oppression is going to
accord with Mill’s formulation, the problem with cultural oppression
must be formulated not merely with respect to its harm to our interests
in general or to its harm to the welfare of its victims, but rather in
terms of its harm to a particular right. Therefore, I will maintain that
the harms of cultural oppression are such that they ought to warrant
the protection offered by the harm principle, for three reasons. First,
there is a primary, positive right to equality that is violated in the case
of cultural oppression. Second, independently of any such right to
equality, and even allowing that such a right is controversial enough
not to be granted, there is still a case consistent with Mill for prevent-
ing the harms caused by cultural oppression because those harms
prevent those affected by them from enjoying what is certainly a fun-
damental right – the right to liberty of self-determination. Finally,
there is a reason to consistently address and resolve these hard cases
through the legal system, because a failure to do so is a violation of the
right to security.
For my purposes, then, given this brief look at Mill, I need only note
that Mill’s articulation of the liberal state is by no means a neutral state
– rather, the state can and must depart from its neutrality whenever a
right is violated and do what is necessary to restore the right. The state,
then, for Mill, is activist in preventing those harms that are seen as
pressing enough interests to be considered rights. Both Mill’s harm
principle – in delineating the sphere of interests sufﬁcient to merit
state interference with individual liberty – and the rights to security,
liberty of self-development, and equality, in more fully explicating what
our primary interests are, are consistent with my argument that the
liberal state ought to take the harms of cultural oppression more 
seriously. Further, these arguments lend the weight of one of liberal-
ism’s most formidable thinkers to the argument.
Before turning to Raz, Fiss, and Sunstein, and then to Dworkin, there
is one further point about Mill worth addressing, because it highlights
both an important contrast to Dworkin and an important afﬁnity with
Raz, Fiss, and Sunstein, and more importantly because it speaks to a
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conception of rights as part of a system of community values, rather
than at odds with them, as Dworkin would have it. This understanding
of rights may be a welcome consequence of Mill’s utilitarianism, in
that a conception of rights as against the community interest would
be, if not impossible, then at least difﬁcult to justify within a utilitarian
framework, for the reason that a mere individual’s interest would be
insufﬁcient to overwhelm the interest of the rest of the community. 
I will argue, along with Mill and later with Raz, Fiss, and Sunstein,
who echo this viewpoint – that this conception of rights as of a piece
with community interests is compatible with the view of the activist
liberal state that I am advocating: if rights exist in order to further the
community interest, it is much easier to justify an activist state, so long
as that state is acting in the community interest. Further, it is more
plausible to envision a genuine community interest in a society free 
of cultural oppression than it is to envision a society with a genuine
community interest in such discrimination. 
That said, it is worth brieﬂy investigating Mill’s view of rights as 
supportive of the community’s overall welfare. As Mill’s discussion of
rights has just illuminated, he often invokes a caveat in the same breath
that he enumerates a right: ‘All persons are deemed to have a right to
equality of treatment, except when some recognized social expediency
requires the reverse’; ‘particular cases may occur in which some other
social duty is so important as to overrule any one of the general maxims
of justice.’ Such exceptions are of course vital to the consistency of Mill’s
utilitarian account of rights, but more importantly, they seem to indicate
an understanding of the relationship between individual and community
interests as reciprocal.
Mill’s understanding of the nature of this reciprocity is seen at several
points throughout On Liberty. One such place is found in a passage seen
earlier in this chapter:
Everyone who receives the protection of society owes a return for
the beneﬁt, and the fact of living in society renders it indispensable
that each should be bound to observe a certain line of conduct toward
the rest. This conduct consists, ﬁrst, in not injuring the interests 
of one another, or rather certain interests that, either by express
legal provision or by tacit understanding, ought to be considered as
rights. (Mill 1978: 73)
On this formulation, rights are embedded in the very fabric of our lives
as a society as much as they are embedded in the conception of the
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individual; we exist as individuals in a society, and there is no way of
discussing the interests of one without discussing the interests of the
other. The reciprocity here is that we receive, as individuals, certain
beneﬁts from society (the protection of the law, for example) – and 
in return for these beneﬁts, we owe society a guarantee that we will
behave in such a way that does not violate the interests that have been
deemed important enough both to other individuals and to society as a
whole, to be considered rights. Our respect for rights here arises out of
our duties as citizens of a society, rather than in spite of them. As well,
this passage reveals the close relationship between such an understand-
ing of rights and utilitarianism – the mention of the respect for rights
as indispensable, presumably to the general welfare, highlights their
connection to utility. 
Put in this way, the corollary that rights are not ultimate, but rather
instrumental, features of our attempt to strike a balance between indi-
vidual and societal interests seems more palatable. Indeed, it has been
taken up as a way of justifying the relatively progressive contemporary
Canadian Charter jurisprudence, which I will take up at greater length
in Chapters 7 and 8. Keeping this Millian formulation ﬁrmly in mind
throughout this study will help to ground my argument regarding the
legitimacy of the state’s use of rights as part of a campaign of activism
in the interest of equality, rather than viewing rights as an impediment
to such a campaign.
Further, it is worth concluding from the preceding discussion of the
rights that Mill sees as fundamental – the rights to security, to liberty of
self-development, and equality – that the beneﬁts that these rights confer
are as much societal as they are individual: the right to security cashes out
as a right to a smoothly running society – one with stable laws and expec-
tations; the right to liberty of self-development relies on a societal system
of education wherein individuals are raised to learn to make the decisions
about beliefs and lifestyles that best beneﬁt society as a whole; and the
right to equality can be seen as of a piece with the right to security – we
can have no security, in Mill’s sense of the term, if we are not assured that
the rules of the society apply equally to each of us. So at every turn, in
Mill’s framework, we have justiﬁcations of rights being offered both in
terms of beneﬁts to individuals as well as beneﬁts to society.
This understanding of the relationship between individual and society
as reciprocal is further evidenced in the following passage from On Liberty:
There are also many positive acts for the beneﬁt of others which he
may rightfully be compelled to perform; such as, to give evidence in
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a court of justice; to bear his fair share in the common defense, or 
in any other joint work necessary to the interest of the society of
which he enjoys the protection; and to perform certain acts of indi-
vidual beneﬁcence, such as saving a fellow-creature’s life, or inter-
posing to protect the defenseless against ill-usage, things which
whenever it is obviously a man’s duty to do, he may rightfully be
made responsible to society for not doing. A person may cause evil 
to others not only by his actions but by his inaction, and in either case
he is justly accountable to them for the injury. The latter case, it is
true, requires a much more cautious exercise of compulsion than the
former. To make any one answerable for doing evil to others, is the
rule; to make him answerable for not preventing evil, is, comparatively
speaking, the exception. Yet there are many cases clear enough and
grave enough to justify that exception. (Mill 1978: 10–11)
This passage emphasizes that the relationship between the individual and
the society is quite a strong one, and one that should not be understood as
an imposition on the individual’s freedom.4 On the contrary, Mill views
our obligations to each other in a much more holistic way – as much as we
are individuals, we are members of society, and ideally, neither of these
identities is at odds with, or hierarchically related to, the other.
This kind of understanding of the relationship between the individual
and the society is more compatible with an activist liberal state than an
account that sees the individual and the society as pitted against one ano-
ther, for the reason that if society and the individual are mutually sup-
portive of one another, state activism is less apt to be thought of as an
encroachment into individual liberty, but rather as ultimately supportive
of it. To this end, Mill can be read with Raz, Fiss, and Sunstein as support-
ive of a liberal framework of reciprocity, rather than a liberal framework
of adverse interests, which theorists such as Dworkin and Nozick support.
Interestingly, though Mill’s view of the reciprocity between state and
individual in the justiﬁcation of rights seems deeply tied to his utilitarian
outlook, Raz articulates a similar view that could be read independently
of any commitment to utilitarianism.5 I will now turn to discuss Raz’s
viewpoint of the relationship between the state and the individual, as
well as the role of rights in that relationship. 
1.3 Joseph Raz: Rights and the common interest
In ‘Rights and Individual Well-Being’ (1992), Raz sets out to dispute the
idea that rights are about protecting individual interests against those
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of the community. According to Raz, it is a mistake to characterize
rights as representing the individual’s interest as against the interests of
others, though this has certainly been the prevailing contemporary
view, as exempliﬁed in Dworkin’s inﬂuential account. Rather, what Raz
terms ‘the common good’ informs the justiﬁcation of rights, such that
the interests of the individual and the interests of the society coincide
and both form vital components of the way that we justify the assign-
ing of rights. 
Raz argues for the conclusion that the justiﬁcation of rights must be
found in part in the interests of the common good, by examining a
puzzle that arises when we look only to the interest of the individual
right-holder to ground our justiﬁcation of a right. He ﬁnds that the
interest of the individual in what she has a right to is not a sufﬁcient
justiﬁcation for the existence of the right, thus giving rise to the ques-
tion of what else may ground the justiﬁcation of the right:
On the one hand, typically rights are to what is or is thought to be
of value to the right-holder. On the other hand, quite commonly
the value of a right, the weight it is to be given or the stringency
with which it is to be observed do not correspond to its value to the
right-holder. Since rights are, generally speaking, to beneﬁts, to
what is in the interest of or is valuable for the right-holder, it is
plausible to suppose that that interest is the basis of the right, i.e.,
that the reason for the right, its justiﬁcation, is the fact that it serves
the right-holder’s interest. But in that case we would also expect the
weight or importance of the right to correspond to the weight or
importance of the interest it serves. Since this is clearly not the case,
since the weight of rights diverges from the weight of the interests
they serve one would expect that the reasons for or justiﬁcation of
rights relate to considerations other than those interests. But if so why
do rights dovetail with interests? Why do we generally have rights
only to what is in our interest? Can this be a mere coincidence? (Raz
1992: 128–9)
Raz thinks that this puzzle of the imperfect overlap between the weight
of rights (very strong) and the interests that they serve in the individual
(less strong) is resolved by reference to the notion that rights also serve
the interests of the common good; when we take this into consideration,
the overlap becomes more commensurate – we accord rights such grave
weight because not only do they serve the individual, they serve society
as a whole, the common interest, at the same time. 
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So, the characterization of rights as interests of the right-holder seems
to be an insufﬁcient basis for the justiﬁcation of the existence and gravity
of rights. Instead, Raz contends, we need to acknowledge that the right is
justiﬁed by the fact that by serving the interest of the right-holder, it
serves the interest of some others, and the interest of these others con-
tributes to determining the weight due to the right. The interests of these
others matter, however, only when they are served by serving the right-
holder’s interests – only when helping the right-holder is the proper way
to help others. 
Raz gives a persuasive example to illustrate this relationship between
the right-holder and others:
I, as a parent, have, in English law, a right to a periodic payment
known as a child beneﬁt, which I receive because I am a parent and
because beneﬁting me is a good way of beneﬁting my child. People
who support invalid parents or spouses have similar rights to reduc-
tions in their tax liability, and there are many other examples. 
In all of them the weight of the right does not match the right-
holder’s interest which it serves, because in all of them the 
right is justiﬁed by the fact that by serving the interest of the right-
holder it serves the interest of some others, and their interest 
contributes to determining the weight due to the right. (Raz 
1992: 133)
This example illustrates that the rights-to-interests ratio becomes much
more explicable once we factor the interests of third parties into the
justiﬁcatory account of the right. Raz feels that these examples support
a twofold understanding of what I will call the ‘reciprocal interests’
justiﬁcatory framework of rights:
On the one hand, rights are sometimes justiﬁed by the service they
secure for people other than the right-holder. On the other, other
people’s interests count for the justiﬁcation of the right only when
they are harmoniously interwoven with those of the right-holder,
i.e., only when beneﬁting him is a way of beneﬁting them, and
where by beneﬁting them the right-holder’s interest is served. (Raz
1992: 134)
At this point, the parallels between Mill’s and Raz’s accounts become 
clear. For both theorists, rights support both the right-holder and others,
and when we take those others into account, the weight of the right
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becomes more intelligible. As the previous excerpts from On Liberty and
Utilitarianism reveal, Mill sees rights as supportive not only of the indi-
vidual’s interest, but as necessarily, qua utilitarian, supportive of the
community interest.
Raz’s examples up until this point have exclusively concerned the
interests of third-party dependents, and one is justiﬁed in wondering if
perhaps these parties are special cases, rather than general instances.
Raz goes on to argue that they are not, and that, indeed,
[t]he protection of many of the most cherished civil and political
rights in liberal democracies is justiﬁed by the fact that they serve
the common or general good…. When people are called upon to
make substantial sacriﬁces in the name of one of the fundamental
civil and political rights of an individual this is not because in some
matters the interest of the individual or the respect due to the indi-
vidual prevails over the interest of the collectivity or of the majority.
It is because by protecting the right of that individual one protects
the common good and is thus serving the interest of the majority.
(Raz 1992: 135–6)
He contends that the common good often meets the condition of har-
mony with individual interest, and that if we ﬁrst agree, echoing Mill,
that the protection of individual civil and political rights serves the com-
mon good, then we can move to the second, and more controversial,
position that the common good served by those rights is, in the majority
of cases, more important to individuals than the enjoyment of their own
civil and political rights, and therefore that the status that rights enjoy 
in liberal democracies is due to their contribution to the common good
(1992: 136). Raz proceeds to give several examples of cases where the
beneﬁts of everyday rights exceeds their beneﬁts to the individual right-
holder, and these examples reveal that he and Mill are on the same page
with respect to the reciprocity of interests between the individual and
society:
Consider freedom of contract. It is a vital means for assuring people
a measure of control over the conduct of their affairs. Its value to
individuals depends on protection from duress, deceit, misrepresen-
tation…. [T]he existence of such an environment is a common
good. It serves not only those who make contracts. If you doubt
this, think of young children. They do not make contracts but they
beneﬁt from the fact that they live in a free society in which people
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generally have power to control the conduct of their own affairs.
(Raz 1992: 136)
This view seems to echo Mill’s justiﬁcations of rights in that reference
is made in the same breath not only to the interest of the right-holder,
but to the interest of society as a whole. Mill will most famously make
this reciprocal argument about the right to freedom of expression,
which I will take up in Chapter 2.
Raz holds that this understanding of the justiﬁcation of rights from
reference to the common good also serves to explain
[w]hy civil and political rights which are the prize of the ofﬁcial
culture of liberal democracies do not enjoy a similar place in the esti-
mation of most ordinary people. Many people judge them by their
contribution to their well-being, and it is not much. Their real value is
in their contribution to a common liberal culture. That culture serves
the interests of members of the community. (Raz 1992: 137)
Having examined both Mill’s and Raz’s reciprocal interests views 
of rights, I would like to suggest that such an account ought to 
be adopted by the egalitarian liberal state for two reasons, both of
which are key to the argument of this study. First, reciprocal interests
accounts of rights can more easily accommodate a departure from neu-
trality in cases where rights violations not only affect the interests of
the particular affected individuals but also the interests of the com-
munity as a whole. Such is the case in instances of cultural oppression
– the interests of the minorities are of course infringed upon, but so
too are the interests of the society, because presumably we all beneﬁt
from a society that treats us respectfully and as equals. 
Second, reciprocal interests accounts of rights offer a principled 
criterion of adjudication – the common good – in hard cases, such as
those of hate speech and pornography. In considering whether, for
example, pornography ought to be protected as free speech (upholding
the rights of the pornographers), or restricted because it interferes with
the rights of women (upholding the rights of women), it will prove
helpful to have recourse to a third set of interest holders – the society
in general. Instead of viewing the issue rather narrowly as a conﬂict
between two sets of rights-holders, it is more fruitful to ask which 
decision better supports the common good.6
In a similar vein to Raz’s arguments, Owen Fiss, in The Irony of Free
Speech (1996), and Cass Sunstein in Democracy and the Problem of Free
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Speech (1995), offer a critique of the dominant liberal viewpoint that
rights operate to protect the individual from the harms of the state.
However, Fiss and Sunstein look only at the United States’ freedom of
expression jurisprudence to make this case, and their arguments are
thus particularly apposite for themes of this book. Fiss argues that it is
a misconception to view the state as always the enemy of freedom of
expression. This view is a half-truth, and the other half of this truth
can be found in understanding the liberal state as an ally in protecting
a collective interest in the democratic process:
The debates of the past were premised on the view that the state was
the natural enemy of freedom. It was the state that was trying to
silence the individual speaker, and it was the state that had to be
curbed. There is much wisdom to this view, but it represents only a
half truth. Surely, the state may be an oppressor, but it may also be
a source of freedom…. [T]his view is predicated on a theory of the
First Amendment and its guarantee of free speech that emphasizes
social, rather than individualistic, values. The freedom the state may
be called upon to foster is a public freedom…. The law’s intention is
to broaden the terms of public discussion as a way of enabling
common citizens to become aware of the issues before them…. A
distinction is thus drawn between a libertarian and a democratic
theory of speech, and it is the latter that impels my inquiry into the
ways the state may enhance our freedom. (Fiss 1996: 2–3)
The idea of the state as potentially enhancing our collective freedom
by adjudicating its freedom of expression decisions in order to facilitate
our collective interest in a robust democratic process is exactly what 
I am maintaining that an activist egalitarian liberal state ought to 
do. I will examine the details of Fiss’s argument about the freedom of
expression jurisprudence in Chapter 7, when I discuss the principles
under which an activist egalitarian state may operate. At this point 
I want only to highlight that Fiss’s project is another relevant account
of the role of the liberal state that departs from the orthodox liberal
reading of the state as the enemy of individual liberty.
Similarly, Sunstein argues (1995: 241) that: ‘The American consti-
tutional system is emphatically not designed solely to protect private
interests and private rights…. Instead, a large point of the system is 
to ensure discussion and debate among people who are genuinely dif-
ferent in their perspectives and position.’ In other words, the Millian
vision of the marketplace of ideas describes a collective interest – and
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not an individual interest – in a diverse discussion, and the right to
freedom of expression is designed to facilitate that collective interest
and that discussion, which the framers, along with Mill and Dworkin,
saw as an interest crucial to democracy itself.
Unlike Mill and Dworkin, however, Fiss and Sunstein believe that the
way to facilitate the common interest in ‘marketplace of ideas’-style
debates is not necessarily to insist upon state neutrality in the market-
place. In Chapter 7, when I discuss how an activist egalitarian liberal state
may work in practice, I will return to Fiss and Sunstein for their insights
into the state as a non-neutral facilitator of the marketplace.
1.4 Ronald Dworkin: Concern, respect, and rights
Having adopted the reciprocal interests view of the state and indi-
vidual, and the role of rights within it, it is important to turn now 
to Dworkin’s somewhat contrary account of these topics. Dworkin’s
egalitarian liberalism provides a framework for understanding the
scope of the state’s responsibilities to its citizens, articulated primarily
in terms of a theory of rights. In developing his egalitarian liberalism,
Dworkin ﬁrst inquires into the meaning of liberalism per se. He can-
vasses a number of traditional liberal positions on political questions,
such as the ideas that inequalities of wealth are to be reduced through
welfare and other forms of redistribution ﬁnanced by progressive taxes;
the support of racial equality and approval of government intervention
to secure it; and the opposition to other forms of collective regulation
of individual decisions, such as regulation of the content of political
speech and regulation of sexual literature (Dworkin 1986: 185–7). Having
catalogued these positions, he then asks whether or not there is a
single principle that runs through them. It is often thought that there
is not a single principle in these positions, but rather that there is a cer-
tain tension revealed within them between the principles of liberty and
equality, with equality winning out in liberalism, and liberty winning
out in conservatism. In other words, conservatives value liberty cen-
trally and thus oppose welfare schemes, for example, which they view
as impinging on the liberty of the taxpayer, while liberals value equal-
ity among citizens over liberty for each individual citizen and thus
approve of such schemes. Dworkin thinks that such a view is off the
mark, because he does not think that liberty is a quantiﬁable thing that
is capable of being independently valued – he argues (1986: 189) that
‘the fundamental liberties are important because we value something
else that they protect,’ namely equality.
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Dworkin maintains (1986: 183) that ‘a certain conception of equal-
ity, which I shall call the liberal conception, is the nerve of liberalism.’
What, exactly, is this particular liberal conception of equality? On
Dworkin’s view, the state’s fundamental obligation is to treat its citi-
zens with what he terms ‘equal concern and respect,’ and from this
positive obligation, he grounds his theory of the role of rights. How we
are to understand this obligation, and what exactly follows from it, will
be of great concern to the argument in this study. Dworkin, in elabo-
rating this notion of equal concern and respect, writes that:
Government must treat those whom it governs with concern, that 
is, as human beings who are capable of suffering and frustration, and
with respect, that is, as human beings who are capable of forming 
and acting on intelligent conceptions of how their lives should be
lived. Government must not only treat people with concern and
respect, but with equal concern and respect. (Dworkin 2005: 272)
Underlying this formulation, though not stated explicitly here, is the
idea that this obligation of equal concern and respect means that the
government’s concern and respect will be equally bestowed upon both
majority and minority groups. According to Dworkin, this fundamen-
tal right to equal concern and respect might be understood in two
importantly different ways:
1. The right to equal treatment, that is, to the same distribution of
goods or opportunities as anyone else has or is given. 
2. The right to treatment as an equal. This is the right, not to the
equal distribution of some good or opportunity, but the right 
to equal concern and respect in the political decision about how
these goods and opportunities are to be distributed. 
(Dworkin 1986: 190)
According to Dworkin, the latter, the right to treatment as an equal, is
more fundamental than the former, the right to equal treatment. Rights
to speciﬁc liberties are only recognized when it is shown that the right to
treatment as an equal requires that they be (2005: 273). In other words,
for Dworkin, the liberal state must guarantee that it takes each citizen’s
interest into account equally in its decision-making, though doing so 
is not synonymous with, and need not entail, an equal distribution of
resources. In economic controversies, liberals want more of the right 
to equal treatment than conservatives do, but for both liberals and 
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conservatives, Dworkin maintains, the right to treatment as an equal is
constitutive and the right to equal treatment is derivative. He writes:
Sometimes treating people equally is the only way to treat them as
equals; but sometimes not. Suppose a limited amount of emergency
relief is available for two equally populous areas injured by ﬂoods;
treating the citizens of both areas as equals requires giving more 
aid to the more seriously devastated area rather than splitting the
available funds equally. (Dworkin 1986: 190)
In other words, our commitment to treating people as equals may or may
not entail the right to equal treatment in a particular case, but whether or
not it does depends on the circumstances of that case, rather than on a
prior and fundamental commitment to the right to equal treatment.
The important point, though, in all of this, is that Dworkin has recast
the debate between liberals and conservatives, and the debate about the
nature of liberalism, as one wholly within a core commitment to equality
rather than as a debate between liberty and equality. He concludes his
discussion (2005: 272) thus:
We must reject the simple idea that liberalism consists in a distinctive
weighing between constitutive principles of equality and liberty. But
our discussion of the idea of equality suggests a more fruitful line. 
I assume that there is a broad agreement within modern politics that
the government must treat all its citizens with equal concern and
respect.
The shift in emphasis from a debate about the relative weighting 
of liberty versus equality, to a discussion about the nature of equality 
itself, is of paramount import for the argument I will advance. Granting
Dworkin the idea that liberalism is committed to equality in the sense of
the right to treatment as an equal, and that liberties are to be understood
as instrumental to that end, rather than potentially inimical to it, takes
away the major stumbling block to an activist state – the idea that such a
state would violate the liberty of citizens, and is thus anathema for the
liberal. As long as the state is activist only in the pursuit of true equality,
and the liberties that such a pursuit may violate are liberties that were in
fact at odds with equality, there is no problem, according to Dworkin,
with their violation.
Dworkin’s next task, having dispensed with liberty as a core prin-
ciple underlying both liberalism or conservatism, is to dispense with
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another myth that he feels causes liberalism to be misunderstood. This
myth revolves around the notion that liberalism is a political theory
about state neutrality, rather than about state commitment to equality.
He maintains that there are two forms of liberalism – neutrality liberalism
and equality liberalism – that have vital differences between them (1986:
205–13). Both argue against the legal enforcement of private morality,
and both argue for greater sexual, political, and economic equality, but
they disagree over which of these two tenets is primary, and which is
derivative. Neutrality liberalism takes as fundamental the idea that gov-
ernment must not take sides on moral issues, and it supports such egal-
itarian measures as can be justiﬁed in accordance with this idea. Equality
liberalism, conversely, holds that government’s primary obligation is to
treat citizens as equals, and insists on moral neutrality only to the degree
that is required by egalitarianism (1986: 205). 
Dworkin maintains that neutrality liberalism has two defects: ﬁrst, it
is a negative theory based on moral skepticism; and second, it is so nar-
rowly tailored that it merely addresses moral conservatism, rather than
also including economic conservatism. As to the ﬁrst problem, neutral-
ity liberalism is compatible with the view that there is no such thing as
‘the good life,’ but rather there are only competing, subjective, versions
of it. Dworkin wants to leave open the possibility of greater realism
about the good, especially since he is a realist about the notion that a
society that realizes equal concern and respect towards its citizens is a
society that is more truly facilitating the good lives of its citizens than
one which does not. Equality liberalism rests on this positive moral
position, while neutrality liberalism can operate without subscribing 
to it. 
The second problem for neutrality liberalism, as Dworkin sees it, is
that it is too narrowly focused on a hands-off attitude towards state
interference in private moral choices of how best to conduct one’s life,
and as such it is unable to adequately address the problem raised by
economic inequalities: whether or not the state ought to intervene to
correct for differences in distribution of resources caused by the free
operation of the market. Neutrality liberalism, without the positive moral
underpinnings of equality liberalism, does not have the theoretical teeth
to delve into this matter.
Equality liberalism, on the other hand, is not ﬂawed in this way. It rests
on a positive commitment to an egalitarian morality. Equality liberalism
insists that the government treat people as equals in the following sense:
they must impose no sacriﬁce or constraint on any citizen in virtue of an
argument that the citizen could not accept without abandoning her sense
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of her equal worth. If individuals are asked to sacriﬁce their styles of
life for the community, they must be able to do so in a way that is con-
sistent with their being treated with equal concern and respect, and
there must be some reason advanced as to why they ought to feel that
the community that they are being asked to sacriﬁce for is in fact their
community. A citizen can feel a part of the community only if they
have some power to shape that community’s future. These conditions
impose serious restraints on any policy that denies any group of 
citizens, however small or politically negligible, the equal resources
that equal concern would otherwise grant them (1986: 205). Dworkin
writes:
If government pushes people below the level at which they can help
shape the community and draw value from it for their own lives, 
or if it holds out a bright future in which their own children are
promised only second-class lives, then it forfeits the only premise
on which its conduct might be justiﬁed…for society’s obligation
runs ﬁrst to its living citizens. (1986: 213)
So Dworkin has made clear that the liberal state’s obligation to treat its
citizens with equal concern and respect does not entail an equal dis-
tribution of resources, but does entail a high degree of participation by
the individual in the community, and relies upon their own consent
and agreement as to how they are treated relative to others. However,
thus far Dworkin’s account reveals that the state’s role is to perform
only those actions consistent with the state’s commitment to treating
its citizens with equal concern and respect, but Dworkin does not yet
have a positive statement as to what this equal concern and respect
commitment actually entails. 
In this regard, Dworkin says that there are two possible answers to
this question of the meaning of equal concern and respect. First, the
government is neutral on what constitutes the good life: since people’s
conceptions of the good life differ, government does not treat them
equally if it prefers one conception to another. And secondly, the gov-
ernment cannot be neutral on the question of the good life, because 
it cannot treat its citizens as equal human beings without a theory of
what human beings ought to be: good government means fostering
good lives.
Dworkin claims that liberalism picks the former as its constitutive
morality, and it is here that neutrality enters back into the Dworkinian
picture – not at the primary level of ‘neutrality liberalism,’ for the
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reasons just canvassed, but as a means of ensuring that citizens are
treated with equal concern and respect. Because people have different
conceptions of the good life, the state’s job is either to ensure that it
promotes all of them equally – or, alternatively, echoing Mill, to pro-
vide a background wherein their private proponents may be given equal
opportunity to promote their visions themselves. So while Dworkin
rejects neutrality as the fundamental underpinning of liberalism in favor
of equality as that underpinning, he nevertheless rather quickly returns to
an embracing of the notion of neutrality, albeit as a second-order good,
insofar as it best promotes equality.
It is worthwhile to pause here to note that thus far Dworkin’s
account, though innocuous on its face, is already masking some deep
tensions in terms of the question of state activism or interventionism
in the prevention of harms. Recall that Dworkin claims that concern 
– one branch of the liberal state’s commitment to equality – means
that people are the kinds of beings who can feel suffering and frus-
tration. From here, he moves quickly to the idea that qua sentient 
in this way, they are thus worthy of respect, which means that they are
to be trusted with the capacity to make their own decisions. What is
worthy of note here, I would suggest, is Dworkin’s quick move from
merely deﬁning concern to this deﬁnition’s putative entailment of
respect, where respect means a hands-off approach to the question of
the good life. 
This move is questionable in two ways, one more radical than the
other. First, and more radically, it is worth asking whether it in fact
follows at all from the fact that we are beings capable of suffering and
frustration (concern) that we should be left to our own devices (respect)
to devise strategies to avoid such suffering and frustration. Second, and
less radically, it is worth asking, even granted that there is such an entail-
ment between concern and respect, whether respect is the only obligation
entailed by concern, or whether there are others.
These are questions of paramount import for the argument of this
study. Taking the less radical view, and assuming that there is a con-
nection at least, if not a strict entailment, between concern and res-
pect, I will argue that there is an important further entailment that
derives from the idea of concern – namely that when the suffering and
frustration that is visited upon a minority by a majority is of such a
nature as to be systemic and institutionalized, it is not the case that 
the minority can merely be treated with Dworkin’s hands-off idea of
respect. This is because what it means to be a minority frustrated and
suffering due to systemic and institutionalized causes is to say that the
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minority is incapable by its own efforts of remedying the situation,
because the traditional channels of remedy are themselves implicated
in the very problem; these channels are exactly those institutions
which are themselves systemically and institutionally discriminatory.
Given this wrinkle in Dworkin’s casting of respect as a hands-off
affair between government and citizen, I want to suggest that his quick
move from concern to respect is untenable, assuming both that the
liberal state sees concern and respect as equally central to its oblig-
ations, and that it is serious about treating its citizens equally. I argue
that a serious commitment to equality, coupled with an understanding
of the fact and mechanics of discrimination, leads to the conclusion
that liberalism must depart from its idea of mere hands-off respect in
order to remedy such cases. I will argue, further, that Dworkin’s rights
justiﬁcation arguments in fact entail this very conclusion, although
Dworkin does not seem to see the implication. Part of this project,
then, involves reading Dworkin against himself in order to show that a
thoroughgoing commitment to the egalitarian principles he articulates
necessitates a more interventionist state than he grants. If I am success-
ful in establishing this, a secondary question arises of how to identify
these cases – how to know when circumstances are such as to warrant
hands-off respect, and when they are such as to warrant state activism.
This question will be among the concerns addressed in later chapters.
Returning to Dworkin’s liberalism, given that the state’s job is to
promote each vision of the good life equally, Dworkin claims that the
state will ﬁnd two guiding institutions in effecting its task. For econ-
omic decisions, about what goods shall be produced and how they
shall be distributed, the economic free market is appropriate; for collec-
tive decisions about what conduct shall be prohibited or regulated so
that other conduct might be made possible, representative democracy
is the best institution. Each provides a more egalitarian distribution
than any other general arrangement.
However, Dworkin warns, while these institutions provide a starting
point for the state’s task of treating its citizens with equal concern and
respect, they are not the end of the story. The reason that they are not
is that the free market and representative democracy, left alone, cannot
produce truly egalitarian outcomes, because people differ not just in
terms of preferences, but also in terms of things like talents, leading to
unequal distributions under the market economy. Unequal distribu-
tions of beneﬁts due to innate talents are unacceptable for the liberal,
since differences in talent do not amount to differences in moral worth
sufﬁcient to justify such unequal distributions as we have. Given this,
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the liberal conception of equality thus requires an economic system 
that allows certain inequalities and not others. Thus, the free market, left
unchecked, produces both the permissible (based on preference) and the
forbidden (based on talent) inequalities (Dworkin 1986: 197–200). 
Therefore, the liberal, to remedy the forbidden inequalities, must
introduce some kind of welfare scheme, in order to achieve the best
possible practical realization of the demands of equality itself. So the
belief in the market economy to generate equal economic distributions
based on preferences has to be revised, because preferences aren’t the
only things that need to be equalized – so too do talents. It is of note at
this point that Dworkin seems perfectly comfortable with an activist
state to correct for market processes in the case of social welfare. Given
this activism, it is worth asking why departures from mere respect are
allowable in the economic sphere and not in a broader sphere?
The belief in the democratic process too needs revision, according to
Dworkin, because voting does not straightforwardly mean that each
person, equally, receives her due concern and respect by equally voicing
her opinion. The situation is complicated by the fact that the outcomes
of those opinions may end up violating, rather than upholding, equality.
This problem arises because of what Dworkin calls ‘external preferences’ 
– where a person casts her vote not only according to her own personal
preference for her own consumption of resources – such personal prefer-
ences are always legitimate, according to Dworkin – but also her sec-
ondary preference, or what Dworkin calls an external preference, which 
is a vote about how resources ought to be consumed or allocated to
others. These preferences can frustrate the preferences of minorities in
some cases. External preferences, according to Dworkin, always effectively
amount to two votes. Thus, they are always an illegitimate and perverse
consequence of utilitarianism, for which rights provide the remedy.
Commentators have raised many persuasive objections to the notion of
external preferences (see, for example, Hart 1979), but for my purposes
Dworkin’s broader scheme of understanding rights as checks on utilitar-
ianism in general, rather than on external preferences in particular, is
sufﬁcient. Rights may be equally required to ensure equal concern and
respect of a minority where their rights are violated by even the internal,
merely personal, preferences, of a majority. The point that is worth high-
lighting is that rights serve a counter-utilitarian function for Dworkin:
cases where utilitarian outcomes violate equal concern and respect entail
that the state needs to intervene in order to meet its obligation to treat its
citizens with equal concern and respect. This intervention is exactly what
rights are. 
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In order to mitigate against the problems of violations of equal concern
and respect to minorities caused by utilitarian voting procedures, the lib-
eral needs a scheme of civil rights whose effect will be to determine those
political decisions that are antecedently likely to cause such violations,
and to remove those decisions from majoritarian political institutions
altogether. I will turn to discussing that scheme of rights now, but con-
clude by noting that the liberal, drawn to the economic market and to
political democracy for distinctly egalitarian reasons, ﬁnds that these
institutions will produce inegalitarian results unless they add to their
scheme both welfare to remedy the inequities in the economic sphere, 
and different sorts of individual rights in the political sphere. Again, it is
important for my project of justifying liberal state activism to note that
from the outset of Dworkin’s articulation of liberalism, which has now
become quite mainstream, there are two deep strains of allowable forms of
state action in the name of equal concern and respect – welfare and rights. 
It will be my contention, in the name of these same goals – concern
and respect – that the state needs to remedy cultural oppression in a way
that goes deeper than Dworkin’s allowable interventions of welfare and
the traditional civil rights. I will argue that what it means to live in a
society where cultural oppression takes place is to have victims unable to
be recipients of respect, in the sense that they cannot, due to the social
forces at work in their situations, take advantage of the freedoms and self-
determination that the liberal state’s stance of respect is supposed to
provide. If this is a sound characterization of the operation of cul-
tural oppression, then, I will argue, it leads, in exactly the same way as
Dworkin’s talents and counter-utilitarian arguments lead, to the con-
clusion that the state ought to fashion an activist remedy to correct the
problem, just as it does in the case of welfare and the case of rights. 
My argument is simply that if Dworkin, and egalitarian liberalism
more generally, is comfortable with being in the business of fashioning
remedies in the case of failures of the state to meet its obligations of
equal concern and respect, then the fact of cultural oppression against
minorities is simply one more feature of our lives that the egalitarian
liberal state must take into account when asking itself the question 
of whether or not it is meeting its mandate to safeguard its citizens’
equality. Seeing that a hands-off policy towards cultural oppression
constitutes a failure of its obligations in this regard, it must set about to
fashion the appropriate remedy, just as it did, fairly uncontroversially,
in the cases of welfare and of civil rights.
It is worth spending some time going through Dworkin’s justiﬁcation
of the enactment of civil rights in the egalitarian liberal state, as it will
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prove to be key to my aims in holding that this very structure of justiﬁ-
cation in fact leads to the conclusion that the state ought to treat cases of
systemic oppression very differently than it does. As already discussed, for
Dworkin, rights are to be understood as remedies for the imperfect oper-
ation of an unchecked utilitarianism. These rights will function as ‘trump
cards’ held by individuals and serve to check decisions made in consider-
ation of majoritarian aims. The ultimate justiﬁcation for these rights, as
noted, is that they are necessary to protect equal concern and respect,
which is how the market economy and political democracy are them-
selves justiﬁed. So, rights are best understood as trumps over some 
background justiﬁcation, such as utilitarianism, which is based on a com-
munity goal. Utilitarianism, like rights, owes its appeal to its egalitarian
cast, but utilitarianism needs tweaking, due to the fact that external pref-
erences are double counted, and hence fails in fact to treat people as
equals.
On Dworkin’s account of rights, then, we can
enjoy the institutions of political democracy, which enforce overall
or unreﬁned utilitarianism, and yet protect the fundamental right 
of citizens to equal concern and respect by prohibiting decisions
that seem, antecedently, likely to have been reached by virtue of the
external components of the preferences democracy reveals. (Dworkin
2005: 277)
Thus rights are to be understood as offering insurance, or backup, for
utilitarian outcomes, rather than acting as replacements for them. On
Dworkin’s picture, the majority of state decisions will be made by util-
itarian calculations, with the caveat of rights-based decisions in areas
where the state has determined that some fundamental interests of a
minority are unduly likely to be violated if the state did not intervene.
The state then intervenes in these cases precisely by invoking a civil
right which corresponds with the protection of the endangered minor-
ity interest, in order to ensure that that interest is not subject to the
vagaries of utilitarian outcomes, given their tendency to distort equality
through external preferences. 
I would agree that there is a need for the state to intervene in certain
cases of unchecked utilitarianism, but Dworkin’s characterization of such
cases as those where external preferences prevail is insufﬁcient to describe
the proper range of relevant cases, for two related reasons: it is too broad
in that it grants minorities per se a right of moral independence over util-
itarians who employ external preferences to discount the way of life of
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the particular minority group; but stated thusly this right can be used
to protect minorities whose lifestyles contravene our egalitarian liberal
interest in the promotion of equal concern and respect, or whose life-
styles violate Mill’s harm principle. Such minorities may include, but
are not limited to: racist organizations, pornographers, smokers, and
pedophiles. I will argue that we need to ﬁnd a theoretical principle that
will limit the application of Dworkin’s ideas to protect only those minor-
ity groups whose protection is consistent with the egalitarian liberal aims
of promoting equality and preventing harm. The adoption of the notion
of cultural oppression provides just such a theoretical principle. 
The second reason for holding that Dworkin’s external preferences
account of rights is inadequate is Hart’s, offered in his 1979 essay ‘Between
Utility and Rights.’ Hart’s idea is essentially the inverse of the ﬁrst crit-
icism offered above, in that there are some lifestyles that contain external
preferences which we actively wish to promote, rather than curtail, as
they further our egalitarian goals of the fostering of equality and the 
prevention of harm. For Dworkin, says Hart, those few protected liberties
which may not be violated on utilitarian grounds are not justiﬁed as
‘essentials of human well-being’ or by any substantive idea of the good
life or individual welfare. What distinguishes liberties that ought to be
protected from those that ought not is a procedural rather than a sub-
stantive matter based on the content of the particular preference: those
liberties where there is an antecedent likelihood that an unrestricted util-
itarian calculation of the general interest of a majority vote would likely
violate equality by the workings of external preferences will be protected
by a right. Hence, the peferred liberties are those such as freedom of
speech or sexual relations, which are to rank as rights when we know
from our general knowledge of society that they are in danger of being
overridden by external preferences in a utilitarian procedure. Thus, accord-
ing to Hart, Dworkin tries to derive rights to speciﬁc liberties from nothing
more controversial than the duty of governments to treat their citizens
with equal concern and respect. 
The problem with the theory for Hart is that it isn’t really external pref-
erences per se that are problematic, but rather those external preferences
that oppose a given freedom, in which case the issue isn’t merely pro-
cedural, but instead it is tied to the particular content of the particular
preference. For example, Hart argues (1979: 94), in the case of liberal 
heterosexuals who are in favor of granting rights to homosexuals, these
external preferences are unproblematic. If this example is correct – and 
I believe it is – then Dworkin’s external preferences idea needs amending.
I will argue in later chapters that the appropriate amendment to remedy
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this problem will come from an analysis in terms of power, as under-
stood by Michel Foucault and others. 
If one accepts Hart’s and my own criticism, then one denies that the
justiﬁcation for the invocation of rights is a merely procedural matter 
– rather, it must be understood as substantive. An adequate account 
of rights, then, requires a substantive rationale through which to deter-
mine when a particular majority preference undermines equal concern
and respect. By attempting to ground his account in the procedural
realm, Dworkin overlooks what in my account is fundamental – namely,
the particular cases wherein a historically marginalized group’s interests
in equal concern and respect are denied. Put another way, Dworkin’s
failure to satisfactorily ground the justiﬁcation of rights in the procedural
realm is for my purposes a happy failure: it underlines the fact that rights
and interests need to be investigated in a deeper, more nuanced way 
– taking into account not only the narrow interests of the right holders,
but also their position in the community and the history of their group’s
membership in that community. 
Dworkin’s picture, it has often been pointed out, is adequate only 
to the extent that one agrees to premise his fundamental right to
equality, which is assumed to hold as a guiding moral axiom in both
utilitarian and rights-based decisions. The theory is thus vulnerable to
the critique that there is no such fundamental right underlying either
process – be it utilitarian or rights-based. Such an objection has often
been made throughout the rights theory literature, holding that there
is indeed a fundamental and primary right to liberty, rather than to
equality.7
Dworkin argues against this view, and claims not only that the right
to equality is more basic than the right to liberty, but more radically
that there is no such thing as a right to liberty at all, let alone a 
primary one. Liberty, as it has been traditionally understood, means
the absence of constraints placed by a government upon what a person
might do if she wishes. Liberty, on this view, is understood as license,
neutral to whatever substantive choices a person might choose to make
in virtue of it. Dworkin maintains that to see something this broad as a
right, though, is absurd. 
According to Dworkin, we can deﬁne a right, in basic terms, as some-
thing that if it exists, it would be wrong for the government to inter-
fere with, even if interference were in the general interest. In other words,
a right is something that survives the passage of any law that the govern-
ment may make that attempts to undermine it. Deﬁning rights in this
way makes clear the absurdity that on this view of rights and of liberty,
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any law is an obstruction of liberty – in Dworkin’s famous example, it
would be wrong for the government to turn Lexington Avenue into a
one-way street, since the restriction on driving in the prohibited direc-
tion is indeed a restriction on my liberty. But, of course, it isn’t wrong,
and it isn’t wrong because I don’t have a right to liberty in that strong
sense.
But what about basic liberties, like freedom of speech? If we try to
call them ‘basic’ because of the quantity of liberty that their restraint
violates, this doesn’t seem to be an accurate characterization – things
like the criminal law violate liberty in a quantitative sense much more
greatly than mere trafﬁc laws, without attracting rights controversy. If
instead we try to talk about our basic rights as protecting a certain
quality of liberty, then we run into the equally intractable problem
that any way of explaining different qualities of liberty, as such a dis-
tinction would require, will go beyond the bounds of liberty as such, 
to other values, like equality or dignity, which are what Dworkin
thinks are really at stake in the issue of rights justiﬁcation. He claims
that we protect certain liberties – such as freedom of speech and
freedom of religion – because we value something that underlies them 
– not liberty itself, but rather equality of concern and respect. Rights,
for Dworkin, represent the liberal state’s promise to minorities that
their interests will be treated with concern and respect equal to that of
the majority.
Dworkin adds (2005: 272) that the particular justiﬁcation that he has
offered of grounding rights in the state’s commitment to equal concern
and respect is ‘only one possible ground for rights.’ And indeed he has
been criticized for the pragmatism of his justiﬁcatory framework – his
critics, including Hart, arguing that there ought to be a ﬁrmer founda-
tion for rights than as mere correctives for the inadequacies of utilitar-
ianism, because without such a ﬁrmer foundation we are left with the
odd result that a society with fewer utilitarian failings would have
fewer rights. Dworkin, however, does not seem to mind this result,
claiming that nothing much is lost in considering rights as merely cor-
rective, rather than fundamental in some deeper sense. For Dworkin,
what is fundamental is the state’s commitment to equality, and rights
are but one way that the state can go about meeting this fundamental
commitment:
We need rights, as a distinct element in political theory, only when
some decision that injures some people nevertheless ﬁnds prima-
facie support in the claim that it will make the community as a whole
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better off on some plausible account of where the community’s
general welfare lies. (Dworkin 1986: 371)
A decision in such a case to opt for the community’s general welfare is
wrong, Dworkin says, in spite of its apparent merit, because it does not
treat the minority population with equal concern and respect.
Another criticism of Dworkin’s account is that it doesn’t tell us which
positive rights we in fact have, but rather only says that if we have a
right, it is because the right functions as a protection of an interest
which otherwise would be compromised by an unchecked utilitarian-
ism. Given that the account proceeds in this way – arguing that if there
is a likelihood of violation of equal concern and respect through the
operation of utilitarianism, then there ought to be a right granted 
to preemptively thwart its operation – it is worth noting that for the
purpose of arguing that instances of cultural oppression ought to be
remedied by the liberal state, casting the problem of cultural oppres-
sion against minorities in terms of a malfunction of utilitarianism will
meet Dworkin’s criteria for when the liberal state ought to intervene
with a remedy. 
Put another way, since Dworkin’s methodology proceeds from viol-
ations of equality to rights, the particular rights that we have at any
given time must be ﬂuid ones, as they arise and fall away depending
on the majority’s particular preferences. If rights are ﬂuid in this way,
then we can claim a right whenever utilitarian outcomes are such as to
threaten an interest to equal concern and respect. If Dworkin wishes 
to deny a new right, by the same token, he must do so by arguing that
our core interest in equal concern and respect is not being threatened
by the particular majority preference. 
It is noteworthy that this conception of rights sees them as pro-
tective of an interest of the right holder – in particular, an interest in
equality, rather than in liberty. It is central to my argument that rights
be understood as protective of interests, since I will argue that the
liberal state has an obligation to protect certain interests, and if rights
are protective of interests, then it has an obligation to extend certain
rights. However, there has been some debate as to whether the char-
acterization of rights as being protective of interests is the most apt
description of their role in our political life. In the literature, the view
of rights as protecting an interest rather than as protecting a choice of
the right holder about how and whether to go about alienating that right
against corresponding duty-holders is controversial and unresolved – the
choice theory of rights being defended most notably by Hart, and the
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interest theory being defended by Bentham, Mill, and Raz. The choice
theory singles out the right holder in terms of the power she has over
the duty in question, and holds that what it is to have a right is to have a
choice respected by the law. This degree of power or control over the
duty-bearer makes an individual a right-bearer on Hart’s account. 
However, those holding the interest view maintain that the choice
account seems insufﬁcient to describe the relations between rights and
duties, because not all rights, the right not to be killed for example, are
best understood as alienable in this way. In those cases, we think of the
right not as based in power or choice, but as based in some basic
human interest, hence the appeal of the interest theory.8
For the purposes of this study, I will argue that either account is
acceptable, as both make sufﬁcient reference to interests to support the
argument for an interventionist state in cases of cultural oppression.
The choice theory can be seen to be protective of interests, albeit per-
haps less directly, by giving individuals autonomy over the promotion
of those interests. As I said earlier, the adoption of the interest theory
dovetails quite well with Dworkin’s theory of rights as protective of a
fundamental interest in equality, rather than as protective of a certain
kind of choice or power that one individual has over another. I will argue
that viewing rights as protective of interests, under either the interest
or the choice theory, can be seen as giving way to a more active, inter-
ventionist understanding of the state’s role in granting and protecting
rights. On Dworkin’s view, which sees rights as protective of interests,
it is the role of the state to anticipate those issues that might, if left to
pure utilitarian calculation, violate an individual’s fundamental interest
in being treated with equal concern and respect by the state, and to inter-
vene with the enactment and enforcement of a right in such cases, in
order to preempt that interest’s violation. Given that the interest theory
seems to necessitate a more active state role in the guarantee that rights
will indeed protect fundamental citizens’ interests, it is well suited to my
purposes in arguing that the state ought to see cultural oppression as a
particular kind of violation of equal concern and respect which it is in the
business of actively preventing.
Thus far, then, I have argued that there is a basis in egalitarian liberal
theory for an interventionist state, under certain circumstances. Follow-
ing Dworkin, I argue that these circumstances exist when a decision, left
to utilitarianism, would be antecedently likely to violate a minority’s
interest in equal concern and respect by the government. In such cir-
cumstances, the state’s job is to remove that decision from the range of
decisions allowable by utilitarian procedures by creating a right in order
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to safeguard that minority’s interest. I argued, secondly, that such a view
of the role of rights is consistent with the idea of rights as protective of
individuals’ interests – either their interests in equal concern and respect,
as per Dworkin, or their interest in autonomy, as per the choice theory of
rights. If that is the case, and rights ought to be understood as protective
of individuals’ interests, such a characterization is compatible with the
notion of an activist state, whose competencies and activities range 
into the controversial realm of inquiring into fundamental interests and
protecting them through rights. So far, then, both theories – rights as
safeguards against simple majoritarianism in certain cases, and rights as
interests – are compatible with the notion of the activist liberal state. 
1.5 Conclusion: Towards a framework for an activist state
By examining the theories of Mill, Raz, and Dworkin, I have attempted to
offer a picture of the egalitarian liberal state that has conceptual space for
state activism to prevent, or at least vitiate, cultural oppression. The egal-
itarian liberal state ﬁnds this space in three ways. First, the state departs
from its neutral stance as a liberty-maximizing state in order to prevent
harms, as Mill’s account allows. This would allow the state to begin to
think of cultural oppression as harm, following Mill, substantial enough
to violate an interest protected by a right. In Chapter 2, the case for 
the harm of cultural oppression being substantial enough to consti-
tute a rights violation – of the United States’ First and Fourteenth Amend-
ment rights of women and minorities – will be explored. If this case 
is compelling, then Mill’s harm principle will be triggered, and the 
egalitarian liberal state can contemplate action to remedy this rights 
violation. 
Second, this chapter has attempted, through discussing the work of
Raz, Fiss, Sunstein, and Mill, to show not just how rights may be thought
of as protecting conﬂicts between the individual against the state, 
but how rights are enacted and enforced because they have beneﬁts
which extend beyond the individual – extending to protect the common
good. This view of rights as protective of the common good will prove
beneﬁcial in discussing state activism to prevent cultural oppression,
since casting such state action as a beneﬁt to the common good – we
beneﬁt as a culture by living in an environment that does not trafﬁc 
in racist, sexist, or homophobic views – will offset the concern that such
state action may come at some expense to the liberty of the speakers of
culturally oppressive speech. Though there may indeed be such a cost if
the state engages in activism against culturally oppressive speech, that
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cost should be thought of as offset, and indeed perhaps outweighed, by
the beneﬁt to the common good that will come from state activism.
Finally, in addition to seeing allowances within established egalitar-
ian liberal traditions for the state departing from neutrality to prevent
certain harms and conceiving of rights as protective of the common, as
well as the individual, good, Dworkin’s argument that liberalism’s fun-
damental commitment is to treat its citizens with equal concern and
respect also forms a crucial piece of the picture, carving out the con-
ceptual space within egalitarian liberalism for state activism to prevent
culturally oppressive speech. As the arguments in Chapter 2 will begin
to outline, state allowance of unregulated freedom of expression to the
speakers of culturally oppressive speech may very well undermine the
state’s commitment to treating all of its citizens with equal concern and
respect, since the concern and respect shown for the speakers comes at
the direct expense of the concern and respect due to the targets of the
speech – women and minorities. If this is the case, then by Dworkin’s
own lights, the liberal state must intervene to ensure that it is in fact
treating all of its citizens with equal concern and respect.
All three of these strands of liberal theory demonstrate that, against the
received view that the liberal state must remain neutral in the market-
place of ideas in order to protect liberty, there are other key tenets of 
liberalism which must be discussed in order to get a more robust view 
of the liberal state’s commitments. Both Mill and Dworkin implicitly 
subscribe to the view made explicit by Raz and others that rights are 
best characterized as protective of interests; however, Mill, Raz, Fiss, and
Sunstein, on the one hand, and Dworkin on the other, disagree over who
these interest-bearers are – Mill, Raz, Fiss, and Sunstein considering the
community at large as among them, and Dworkin rejecting that view. 
That dispute notwithstanding, we have, taken together, the idea that
state neutrality is not absolute, that rights exist in order to serve the
common interest, and that the liberal state is committed to treating 
all of its citizens with equal concern and respect. These three ideas 
will form a powerful background to my argument for an activist state to
battle cultural oppression. However, notably, neither Mill nor Dworkin
has embraced the view that freedom of expression ought to be curtailed,
even for these seemingly laudable egalitarian purposes. Since my aim is to
carve out a space for an activist liberalism that will be accepted by the
egalitarian liberal tradition, Chapters 2 and 3, respectively, will delve into
Mill’s and Dworkin’s positions and attempt to ﬁnd room in their theories
for such activism.




Equality, Liberty, and Hard Cases:
A Classical View and
Contemporary Responses
2.1 Introduction
In Chapter 1, I argued that taking three inﬂuential tenets of modern
liberalism together – Mill’s harm principle, Raz’s theory of rights as
supportive of the common good, and Dworkin’s notion of rights as
correctives for the limitations of majoritarianism in treating citizens
with equal concern and respect – would provide a framework in which
to situate an argument for the justiﬁcation of state intervention in
cases of cultural oppression in order to protect equality and liberty. 
In Chapter 2, I argue that while the framework articulated in
Chapter 1 provides a starting point for the justiﬁcation of state inter-
vention to promote equality, classical egalitarian liberal theorists have,
notably, not gone so far as to endorse active state intervention for the
promotion of equality at the direct expense of freedom of expression.
It is the aim of this chapter to show why, according to their own
insights elsewhere, they should acknowledge a departure from neutral-
ity in these circumstances. John Stuart Mill is the leading classical egal-
itarian liberal, and thus this chapter explores his views in On Liberty as
well in The Subjection of Women, in order to determine the extent to
which they can accommodate an activist egalitarian liberalism. I argue
that reading On Liberty alongside The Subjection of Women yields a more
activist Mill. 
In order to present this activist Mill in a way that is faithful to his ideas,
it is necessary to treat Mill’s ideas on the notions of equality, state inter-
vention, and freedom of expression more carefully here. These three ideas
are closely linked, in that the issue of state intervention in order to pro-
tect equality becomes controversial in liberalism when such an interven-
tion is a curtailment of the freedom of expression of the putative equality
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violator. Examining the tension between freedom of expression, equality,
and state intervention, particularly in the work of Mill in this chapter and
in the work of Dworkin in Chapter 3, reveals deep and important reasons
why these thinkers have been interpreted as resisting the notion of state
intervention in freedom of expression in order to promote equality.
In Chapters 2 and 3, then, I will show that while the framework
articulated in Chapter 1 provides a starting point for the justiﬁcation 
of state intervention in cases of cultural oppression, neither Mill nor
Dworkin seems to go so far as to contemplate active state interven-
tion for the promotion of equality at the direct expense of freedom of
expression. Since my argument for intervention aims to be compatible
with the egalitarian liberal project, it is my task to show that both 
Mill and Dworkin ought to, by their own principles, accept it. I will
argue here that Mill would in fact be receptive to arguments about cul-
tural oppression, and thus that the popular reading of Mill is in need of
revision. I will do this both by calling attention to Mill’s arguments in
The Subjection of Women,1 as well as by noting the pro-equality impli-
cations of his arguments in On Liberty. The aim of my arguments will
be to support the idea that contemporary interpreters and critics of Mill
rely on a misinterpretation of his views, and a more thorough reading of
Mill will actually support a pro-equality position more strongly than it
supports an unqualiﬁed freedom of expression position. 
I will argue further, in Chapter 3, that Dworkin, though not recep-
tive to the arguments from systemic discrimination, by his own lights
ought to be. In what follows here as well as in Chapter 3, I will present
two important criticisms of the views of both Dworkin and Mill offered
by feminists and critical race theorists – the silencing and subordination
arguments, as they have come to be known. Both of these arguments
contend that the harms caused to minorities and women by protected
hate speech or pornography generate compelling inconsistencies in 
liberalism – either in terms of equality or positive liberty in the case 
of the subordination argument, or in terms of the negative liberty of
freedom of expression itself in the silencing argument. Thus, if accepted,
these arguments challenge the principles of egalitarian liberalism on its
own terms. I will not evaluate the strength of either of these arguments
until the later chapters of this book, because I need ﬁrst to discuss speech
act theory and Foucault’s ideas of power – the topics of Chapters 4 and 5
– in order to do so. However, once these ideas have been discussed, I will
argue that while neither of these arguments are airtight, either singly 
or in combination, they nonetheless point to an issue that is crucially
overlooked in mainstream egalitarian liberal theory: the nature of social
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power and the need to account for power imbalances when the state is
delineating the scope of rights and duties. It is this issue that the later
chapters of this work will attempt to come to grips with, using insights
from speech act theory and from continental philosophy.
The subordination argument can be cast either as a claim about the
interference with the equality rights of the targets of pornography and
hate speech, or as an interference with their positive liberties. If, as the
argument runs, pornography and hate speech communicate ideas of the
inferior moral worth of their targets, then subscription to those ideas 
by the majority has the result of subordinating the minority. Once sub-
ordinated – and the subordination argument will hold that the sub-
ordination is enacted in pornography or hate speech – the minority is, 
by deﬁnition, unequal, and will have fewer options – that is, positive 
liberties – available to them. 
The silencing argument claims that the targets of hate speech and
pornography have their subsequent attempted rebuttal speech ‘silenced’ 
– either because the speech is misinterpreted or not uttered at all – such
that protecting the speakers’ negative liberty of freedom of expression
comes at the direct expense of the negative liberties of the affected
targets. These two liberty-based criticisms – the positive liberty arm of the
subordination argument and the silencing argument – will be presented
in this chapter, after the discussion of Mill’s defense of freedom of expres-
sion in On Liberty, since they can be seen as counter-arguments to his
famous instrumental justiﬁcation for free speech. Since Mill, as a utilitar-
ian, is committed to free speech only insofar as he is convinced that it 
is indeed the course of action that best maximizes the utility of ‘the 
permanent interests of man as a progressive being,’ and since the silen-
cing and subordination arguments question whether such unregulated
speech in fact maximizes utility, such questions would need to be taken
seriously, and even be accommodated, by Mill.
The second line of argument I will present is an argument from
equality – that hate speech and pornography interfere with consti-
tutional commitments to equal protection of the laws. This is the
second arm of the subordination argument, and it will be presented 
at the end of my discussion of Dworkin in Chapter 3, since it seems
best targeted towards his presentation of free speech as itself ensur-
ing moral equality. Dworkin, unlike Mill, has had the privilege of
responding to this argument against him, and has notably rejected it.
I will argue in Chapter 3 that his reasons for rejecting it, however, are
at odds with his ostensible commitments to equality, and are thus
unacceptable.
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Examination of the classical liberal tension between equality, freedom
of expression, and state neutrality reveals that the contemporary prob-
lem of cultural oppression militates against these classical arguments 
in a way which compels us to re-examine classical liberal positions in
order to meet its challenge. This re-examination reveals an ally in Mill,
rather than an opponent, and Chapter 3’s discussion of Dworkin’s
opposition does not seem consistent with the rest of his commitments.
Thus, taken together, Chapters 2 and 3 are intended to suggest that 
there is reason, by liberalism’s own lights, to revisit its stance against state
intervention in cases of pornography and hate speech.
As noted in Chapter 1, Mill views the right to personal liberty in
general as subject to curtailment by the harm principle, should such a
curtailment itself maximize utility. However, Mill will go on, famously,
to argue that the exercise of our liberty of expression in particular is
not to be subject to curtailment by the operation of the harm prin-
ciple; in other words, the restriction of the right to freedom of expres-
sion is deemed in advance to have less utility than allowing the harms
to go unremedied. I will examine Mill’s reasoning for this position in
what follows, but at the outset it is important to note that if his argu-
ments are accepted, it is, at least on its face, a serious setback to my
point of view: it becomes difﬁcult to invoke the harm principle as part
of a justiﬁcation for state intervention to prevent cultural oppression,
when those interventions will likely take the form of impediments to
freedom of expression, which seem to have been explicitly excluded by
Mill. 
However, this is not fatal to seeing Mill as an ally in an activist state.
I will argue that Mill’s arguments in On Liberty for allowing free-
dom of expression notwithstanding its harms must be read in concert
with his arguments in The Subjection of Women, which seem to suggest
that Mill was aware of, and concerned to remedy, the harms to women
caused by male power in general. If one arm of male power operates
through the use of the right to freedom of expression, as the silencing
and subordination arguments maintain, then it seems that Mill must
be read to be especially concerned about this operation. It is impor-
tant to remember here that as a utilitarian, Mill cannot be committed
to freedom of expression per se; rather he is committed to it insofar 
as it enhances overall utility. The arguments in On Liberty are to the
effect that freedom of expression promotes the overall utility, but argu-
ments that there are costs of freedom of expression to interests as vital
as equality ought to be taken into the equation by Mill, and thus must
be taken on board by liberals who follow in his tradition. As Wayne
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Sumner succinctly summarizes the scope of Mill’s commitments to
liberty:
[Mill]…is not really entitled to assume that the utility calculation
will favour liberty equally, or underwrite exactly the same right 
to liberty, in all ‘civilized’countries at all times and under all con-
ditions. Under different social circumstances it is possible for 
Mill’s utilitarian methodology to generate a less absolute principle
concerning liberty in the personal sphere. (Sumner 2004: 23)
This is due to the fact that utilitarian cost-beneﬁt analysis must get its
data from the actual circumstances of the culture at the time the ana-
lysis is performed; as cultures change, so too does the calculation and
its dictates. It will be my contention that the present social circum-
stances of a systemically racist, sexist, and homophobic society are
sufﬁcient to tip the delicate utilitarian balance away from liberty in
freedom of expression and towards equality through its targeted regu-
lation. Mill certainly saw that a cost-beneﬁt analysis would be the rele-
vant test for determining the appropriate balance between liberty 
and equality in the service of promoting the general utility, though
whether or not he would ﬁnd today’s circumstances sufﬁcient to tip
that balance from the one he performed in the writing of On Liberty 
is of course unanswerable. However, Mill’s position in The Subjection
of Women suggests that he may very well favor such a move in such 
circumstances.
I will maintain that the silencing and subordination arguments’
claims about the problematic consequences of certain exercises of the
right to freedom of expression, and the arguments that Mill himself
raises in The Subjection of Women, taken together, are sufﬁcient to
demonstrate that Mill would be receptive to a revised reading of his
work that would attempt to accommodate the concerns of women and
minorities, and that his work indeed is compatible with such revisions.
Its compatibility with a changing understanding of the balancing of
rights derives in large part from the nature of utilitarianism itself, but
one need not sign on to utilitarianism as an overall social theory in
order to accept the provisional nature of rights. 
As Sumner points out, conceiving of rights as abstract and immutable
may easily be seen as an untenable approach, and be instead replaced by
a consideration of the way and degree to which rights facilitate the
general good. Once one opts for the latter approach, one is endorsing a
consequentialist view of the nature of rights. Then, according to Sumner
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(2004: 35), and implicitly to Mill, ‘[w]orking out the right answer 
for any society will be a complex matter requiring evidence and argu-
ment, and will consequently be perpetually open to re-examination
and revision.’ As Chapters 7 and 8 of this work will demonstrate, and
as Sumner notes at length in The Hateful and the Obscene, this approach
of perpetually revising the scope of rights appears to be in keeping with
the Supreme Court of Canada’s rights-balancing efforts in its famous
Oakes test. Keeping in view this commitment to revision, as well as the
changing weight of rights, throughout the arguments in these pages 
will afford a better view of the nature of this project and how its mech-
anics may better facilitate a more dynamic vision of the egalitarian liberal
state.
2.2 The role of freedom of expression in Mill’s political
theory
Understanding the role of freedom of expression in Mill’s scheme
requires prior discussion of the broad aims of his political theory. At
the most general level, Mill’s vision of the good society and the good
citizen, respectively, places penultimate value on the merits of diversity
among people at a societal level, achieved through a cultivation of
individuality on a personal level. Such diversity is valuable insofar as it
offers us the best chance of achieving Mill’s ultimate value: coming to
discover the style of life with the most overall utility. He writes:
It is not by wearing down into uniformity all that is individual 
in themselves, but by cultivating it and calling it forth, within the
limits imposed by the rights and interests of others, that human
beings become a noble and beautiful object of contemplation; and
as the works partake the character of those who do them, by the
same process human life also becomes rich, diversiﬁed, and ani-
mating, furnishing more abundant aliment to high thoughts and
elevating feelings, and strengthening the tie which binds every 
individual to the race, by making the race inﬁnitely better worth
belonging to. In proportion to the development of his individuality,
each person becomes more valuable to himself, and is, therefore,
capable of being more valuable to others. (Mill 1978: 60)
This passage not only reveals the value Mill places on diversity and
individual autonomy, but it also echoes what Mill feels to be the close
relationship between the individual and the culture, which was seen in
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Chapter 1. Here again, for Mill, beneﬁts to the individual are always
tied to beneﬁts to the culture as a whole; these reciprocal beneﬁts 
reinforce and underline each other, rather than undercut each other, as
some liberals, including Dworkin, maintain. 
So Mill has these intermediate goals of autonomy and diversity,
which are seen as instrumental to the ultimate and ongoing goal of
determining the most felicitous style of life. However, Mill is careful to
limit the cultivation and expression of autonomy to the point at which
its expression interferes with the rights of others: ‘Whenever, in short,
there is a deﬁnite damage, or a deﬁnite risk of damage, either to an
individual or to the public, the case is taken out of the province of
liberty and placed in that of morality or law.’(1978: 80). Short of that,
however, Mill is clear that there is important and substantial merit 
in allowing autonomy to ﬂourish where real harm to others is not an
issue, and that there is a strong disutility in not doing so:
To be held to rigid rules of justice for the sake of others develops the
feelings and capacities which have the good of others for their
object. But to be restrained in things not affecting their good, by
their mere displeasure, develops nothing valuable except such force
of character as may unfold itself in resisting the restraint. If acqui-
esced in, it dulls and blunts the whole nature. To give fair play to
the nature of each, it is essential that different persons should be
allowed to lead different lives. (Mill 1978: 61)
While Mill does not use the word ‘liberty’ here explicitly, it is nonetheless
clear that his notion of autonomy is closely tied to it; different persons
being allowed to lead different lives speaks to the inseparability of auto-
nomy and liberty – we need to be at liberty to cultivate and express 
our individuality. Once liberty is protected, individuality ﬂourishes; once
individuality ﬂourishes, diversity arises; and once diversity arises, we can
begin to assess competing visions of the good.
Recalling the discussion in Chapter 1, Mill cashes out his view of the
right to individual liberty largely as liberty of self-development – the
opportunity to enrich oneself intellectually, ethically, and personally,
in such a way as to become a competent judge of the good life. This
notion of liberty of self-development, Mill believes, presupposes the
notions of liberty of thought and conscience, since it is only if we have
the ability to think for ourselves that we may then be able to choose
‘our own good in our own way,’ which of course is the very point 
of a free society – that citizens may have different choices of lifestyle
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available to them and have the agency and the discernment to pick
between them.
So, for Mill, the idea of liberty of thought is a crucial precondition
for any other liberty – in particular, the liberty of self-development; we
can only meaningfully choose what to do and how to live if we have
the ability freely to contemplate such choices as educated individuals
in a diverse society. He writes:
As it is useful that while mankind are imperfect there should be dif-
ferent opinions, so is it that there should be different experiments of
living; that free scope should be given to varieties of character, short
of injury to others; and that the worth of different modes of life
should be proved practically, when anyone thinks ﬁt to try them. It
is desirable, in short, that in things which do not primarily concern
others individuality should assert itself. (1978: 54)
Evident here is the close connection between diversity of opinion and
diversity of lifestyle. For Mill, both forms of diversity are to be pro-
tected because of our imperfection and evolution as a species – insofar
as we have yet to determine the best views and the best lifestyles, all
we can do is experiment with as many competing options as possible
in order to experientially attempt to address those questions. 
Uncontroversially, then, we need liberty of thought and conscience
for Mill’s scheme of facilitating the determination of the good to get
off the ground, but Mill seems to think that freedom of expression
follows from freedom of thought. This move from liberty of thought to
liberty of expression is a very signiﬁcant one, in that it goes from the
wholly individual realm, where others are not affected, to the social
one, where they may be. Once we have entered the public sphere, as
Chapter 1 revealed, we need to consider whether the harm principle
need be invoked, and of course, in many cases of expression, harm is
in fact caused. 
As noted earlier, whether or not harm is caused is only a threshold
issue for Mill; once we have determined that harm has been caused, we
then need to ask whether this harm is caused to an interest signiﬁcant
enough to be considered a right. If and only if that question is answered
afﬁrmatively does the harm principle get triggered, and the offending
behavior limited. In other words, the harm principle is a necessary, but
not a sufﬁcient, condition for the limitation of a right. Mill is of course
aware that in holding freedom of expression to be itself a right, and
indeed a right that potentially harms others, he must confront the
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questions raised by the harm principle in delimiting it, but he spends
surprisingly little time in On Liberty directly addressing the harms of
freedom of expression and justifying the allowance of those harms.
Rather, his argument is almost entirely targeted towards explicating
the utility of freedom of expression and the disutility of suppressing
opinions. 
Notably, Mill seems almost to go so far as to equate thought itself
with expression. He writes that
[t]here is a sphere of action in which society, as distinguished from
the individual, has, if any, only an indirect interest: comprehending
all that portion of a person’s life and conduct which affects only
himself…This, then, is the appropriate region of human liberty. It
comprises, ﬁrst, the inward domain of consciousness, demanding
liberty of conscience in the most comprehensive sense, liberty of
thought and feeling, absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on
all subjects, practical or speculative, scientiﬁc, moral, or theological.
The liberty of expressing and publishing opinions may seem to fall
under a different principle, since it belongs to that part of the
conduct of an individual which concerns other people, but, being
almost of as much importance as the liberty of thought itself and
resting in great part on the same reasons, is practically inseparable
from it. (Mill 1978: 11–12)
This formulation makes clear that Mill sees thought and expression to
be so closely connected as to be inseparable, if not conceptually, then
at least practically. But what basis does he have for seeing the two as so
intimately related? Though he does not make this argument explicitly,
it seems that he feels, and I think rightly, that one is not optimally able
to form one’s own opinions and thoughts if one cannot hear or read
the opinions of others. In order to hear or read these opinions, of course,
they must have ﬁrst been expressed freely, so as to be available to guide
the thoughts of others. In this sense, then, there is an argument for the
idea that freedom of expression is, in a loose sense, prior to freedom of
thought. 
While this seems to be a strong argument for taking the two liberties of
thought and expression together, Mill’s utilitarian justiﬁcation for rights,
as discussed in Chapter 1, has it that rights are only to be protected 
as such insofar as they enhance the general utility, or the overall good, of
the community. Given that Mill’s account justiﬁes the enshrinement of
rights by their merit to the general utility, as well as to the particular
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individual, and that rights in general are limited where that merit is
vitiated by certain harms which adversely impact the general utility
more than a restriction on the right would, it seems that Mill must be
committed to balancing the merit of the exercise of the right to the
general utility against the weight of the harm to others that the exercise
of the right entails. If this is correct, then Mill ought to be amenable to
arguments that claim that disutility in the operation of a right may justify
its limitation. This of course would be true for any right, including the
right to freedom of expression.
It seems that freedom of thought and freedom of expression each
require a separate utilitarian calculation, in light of their different abilities
to cause harm. While Mill does not seem to think that either freedom 
of thought or freedom of expression merit curtailment based on their
respective harm versus utility calculation, if he could be shown facts con-
cerning the history and sociology of cultural oppression,2 it seems that he
would need to address these harms, and indeed should welcome the
opportunity, since the task of deﬁning the good society is, according 
to his own view, an ongoing one which can and ought to be revisited in
light of new evidence brought to bear on this great experiment. 
Notably, in terms of my claim in Chapter 1 that for Mill and Raz,
rights are justiﬁed by their overall beneﬁt to the common good, Mill’s
argument for freedom of expression in On Liberty turns almost exclu-
sively on the common good afforded by the protection of freedom of
expression, rather than on the beneﬁts to the particular individual of
such a right. He writes:
…[T]he peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is 
that it is robbing the human race, posterity as well as the existing
generation – those who dissent from the opinion, still more than
those who hold it. If the opinion is right, they are deprived of 
the opportunity of exchanging error for truth; if wrong, they lose,
what is almost as great a beneﬁt, the clearer perception and livelier
impression of truth produced by its collision with error. (Mill 
1978: 16)
Here Mill maintains that the justiﬁcation of freedom of expression is
that diversity of opinion per se, whether that opinion is true or false,
beneﬁts society as a whole, both presently and in the future, because
diversity of opinion alone ensures that truth will eventually unfold.
The justiﬁcation for freedom of expression, then, relies on the location
of the utility of freedom of expression to be found in the common
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good, rather than in the good to the individual speaker or listener, who
is understood as an aggregative facet of the common good. As I noted
in Chapter 1, Mill’s understanding of rights as justiﬁed in part by their
efﬁcacy in promoting the general utility is useful to my argument for
state intervention in cases of cultural oppression, because it is com-
patible with the view that we must look to the outcome for the com-
munity as a whole when we determine the interests that a particular
right protects.
Mill’s argument above derives its force from the contention that in
either of two possible scenarios – that the opinion is true or it is false 
– the outcome is better by allowing the opinion to be aired, rather than
censored. If the opinion is true, the beneﬁt is obvious – we are able 
to replace our false beliefs with the new true belief. If the opinion is
false, we still beneﬁt from the exercise of actively refuting it – such 
an exercise allows us to sharpen our opinions and to become more
intellectually assured of what we already believe.
These two arguments – from the possibility of the truth of an opinion,
and from the intellectual merit of deciding between opinions – are
among the four main arguments that Mill presents in On Liberty in favor
of freedom of expression. Mill summarizes these arguments succinctly 
in Chapter 4: the opinion could turn out to be true; the opinion could
contain some portion of the truth; by engaging and debating false 
opinions, we come to hold our true opinions as more than mere pre-
judice; and by failing to engage in rigorous and free debate among com-
peting opinions, we lose intellectual vigor, and eventually ideas will lose
their very meaning in this slovenly environment. 
It is important to note, before examining these arguments in detail,
that they have in common an instrumental justiﬁcation of freedom 
of expression, and indeed Mill’s utilitarianism would seem to dictate 
that such justiﬁcations are the only kind permissible. This is relevant 
for two reasons. First, as I have already noted, if the argument is instru-
mental (that is, freedom of expression is valuable because it is the 
means to a good end), then if it can be shown that the end result is not
what was anticipated, there is no conceptual difﬁculty in adjusting 
the means. The most effective arguments against Mill take this sort of
tack, and the silencing and subordination arguments offered by feminists
and critical race theorists take this route. Second, Mill’s instrumental-
ism is in strong contrast to Dworkin, who will argue that freedom of
expression is a good in itself (what he calls a ‘constitutive’ good), though
he claims, in my view inaccurately, Mill as an ally in this kind of
justiﬁcation.
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I will take this debate up later in Chapter 3, but now I will consider
Mill’s ﬁrst two arguments in favor of freedom of expression. Lest we
think that we can be sure in advance of the falsity of an opinion, and
hence dispense with what Mill thinks is the worthwhile (Mill’s third
and fourth arguments) exercise of actively refuting it, Mill reminds us
that the course of history tells us otherwise:
We can never be sure that the opinion we are endeavoring to stiﬂe
is a false opinion; and if we were sure, stiﬂing it would be an evil
still. First, the opinion which it is attempted to suppress by author-
ity may possibly be true. Those who desire to suppress it, of course,
deny its truth; but they are not infallible. They have no authority 
to decide the question for all mankind and exclude every other
person from the means of judging…ages are no more infallible than
individuals – every age having held many opinions which subse-
quent ages have deemed not only false but absurd; and it is as
certain that many opinions, now general, will be rejected by future
ages, as it is that many, once general, are rejected by the present.
(Mill 1978: 17)
Mill here again suggests that the beneﬁt of free speech is to society as a
whole – present and future – through the beneﬁting of individuals, and
that the course of history has shown that the ideas that we believe and
disbelieve change over time, warning us not to be so sure of ourselves
that we preemptively dismiss an idea.
Very closely tied to the notion of suppressing an idea because of a
mistaken belief in its falsity is the possibility of suppression not due to
an innocent mistake as to its truth value, but rather due to a moral
judgment about the idea. Mill holds that this kind of moral judgment
is ubiquitous and pernicious:
…[T]he strongest of all the arguments against the interference of the
public with purely personal conduct is that, when it does interfere,
the odds are that it interferes wrongly and in the wrong place…In
its interferences with personal conduct it is seldom thinking of any-
thing but the enormity of acting or feeling differently from itself;
and this standard of judgment, thinly disguised, is held up to
mankind as the dictate of religion and philosophy by nine-tenths of
all moralists and speculative writers…And it is not difﬁcult to show,
by abundant instances, that to extend the bounds of what may be
called moral police until it encroaches on the most unquestionably
56 The Cost of Free Speech
abbie.levin@gmail.com
legitimate liberty of the individual is one of the most universal of all
human propensities. (Mill 1978: 81–2)
While this may seem a cynical view of human nature, it seems that the
history of censorship has borne out Mill’s opinion.3 In any case, we
need not subscribe to Mill’s view of human nature – that we can mis-
takenly and innocently censor, or that we can censor based on nar-
rowly held moral views. Either route is problematic for the simple
reason that the effect is the obscuring of what may prove to be the
truth. 
Mill then begins a second line of argument, to the effect that com-
peting truth claims are rarely wholly true or false, but some mixture of
each. Thus, when some opinions are suppressed, we decrease the range
of options through which we may be able to sift to ﬁnd the truth:
‘Only through diversity of opinion is there, in the existing state of
human intellect, a chance of fair play to all sides of the truth.’ (Mill
1978: 46). So, Mill’s ﬁrst and second arguments for freedom of expres-
sion appeal to a fairly obvious instrumental justiﬁcation – the desire to
hold true opinions and the belief that freedom of expression facilitates
that effort. It is against these two arguments that feminists and critical
race theorists launch their silencing and subordination arguments, to
the effect that protecting certain kinds of speech, such as hate speech
and pornography, actually suppresses other kinds of speech, such that
the greatest possible amount of speech, and thus the greatest likeli-
hood at arriving at truth, is not effected. I will turn to these arguments
shortly, after considering Mill’s third and fourth arguments in favor of
freedom of expression.
Mill’s third and fourth arguments, on the other hand, appeal to the
end of developing critical thinking skills, rather than to the end of
holding true beliefs. Since Mill’s primary task of determining which
style of life is best requires that we hone our critical skills to become
competent judges, we are thus aided in our pursuit of the good life by
those activities which facilitate critical thinking. Freedom of expres-
sion, and its corollary enterprise of sorting true from false as per argu-
ments one and two, facilitates the development of our critical thinking
capacity, because:
[w]rong opinions and practices gradually yield to fact and argu-
ment; but facts and arguments, to produce any effect on the mind,
must be brought before it. Very few facts are able to tell their own
story, without comments to bring out their meaning. The whole
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strength and value, then, of human judgment depending on the
one property, that it can be set right when it is wrong, reliance can
be placed on it only when the means of setting it right are kept con-
stantly at hand. In the case of any person whose judgment is really
deserving of conﬁdence, how has it become so? Because he has kept
his mind open to criticism of his opinions and conduct. Because it
has been his practice to listen to all that could be said against him.
(Mill 1978: 19)
The idea here is that developing a capacity to receive criticism of one’s
opinions from others – a capacity only possible through freedom of
expression – is a worthwhile undertaking, since it both facilitates the
examination of one’s opinions and, further, provides the ability to use
that discernment, once developed, to choose among competing
lifestyle choices – the ﬁrst aim of Mill’s social philosophy. 
It is again clear from this formulation that Mill intends to appeal to
outcomes in his justiﬁcation; however, this argument, as opposed to
the ﬁrst and second, proceeds independently of any merit to be gained
from the actual content of the ideas that may be expressed; it matters
not at all here what the value of the ideas themselves are. Rather, all 
of the merit is in the process of developing our critical thinking skills.
This is important to note because many popular arguments for regu-
lating hate speech and pornography contend that since the ideas
expressed in these modes of speech are highly unlikely to be true, it 
is therefore acceptable to dispense with them. However, many of Mill’s
arguments for freedom of expression, including this one, proceed without
reference to the likelihood of the truth of the particular idea.
A corollary to this idea of free expression as supportive of critical
thinking is the idea that the way that either true or false beliefs are
held is relevant to the intellectual health of the believer:
However unwillingly a person who has a strong opinion may admit
the possibility that his opinion may be false, he ought to be moved
by the consideration that, however true it may be, if it is not fully,
frequently, and fearlessly discussed, it will be held as a dead dogma,
not a living truth. (Mill 1978: 34)
Here, again, the idea of competent judges plays a crucial role in Mill’s
arguments. Unless we are the kinds of people who hold beliefs ratio-
nally and on the basis of argument, we are ill-equipped to face the many
choices of styles of life that confront us in a diverse community. Thus,
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the rigors of debate among competing beliefs serve not only their 
direct function of adjudicating between competing views, but also serve 
the larger function of ensuring that we are competent adjudicators.
Mill writes:
The human faculties of perception, judgment, discriminative feeling,
mental activity, and even moral preference are exercised only in
making a choice. He who does anything because it is the custom
makes no choice. He gains no practice either in discerning or in
desiring what is best. The mental and the moral, like the muscular,
powers are improved only by being used. (1978: 56)
Thus, according to Mill, there is crucial intellectual merit in the acti-
vity of discernment among competing views, and this merit accrues
regardless of the truth or falsity of the beliefs being considered.
Finally, without this debate among competing beliefs, there is a
sense in which we do not really know or understand the views that we
hold:
He who knows only his own side of the case knows little of that. His
reasons may be good, and no one may have been able to refute
them. But if he is equally unable to refute the reasons on the oppo-
site side, if he does not so much as know what they are, he has no
ground for preferring either opinion. The rational position for him
would be suspension of judgment. (1978: 35)
So not only do we hold our judgments as mere opinions when we do
not engage in their rigorous examination, but further, we are guilty of
irrationality in doing so: without a serious consideration of the com-
peting views, there is no reason to imagine that one’s own views are
the right ones – we can only make this assessment after thoroughly
canvassing the other candidates. Hence, for Mill, without freedom to
express competing views, all of our views run the risk of being inelig-
ible candidates for belief, for the reason that they cannot truly be
known to be true or false at all. 
Such a state of affairs would lead to a dulling of the ideas themselves
over time:
Not only the grounds of the opinion are forgotten in the absence of
discussion, but too often the meaning of the opinion itself. The
words which convey it cease to suggest ideas, or suggest only a small
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portion of those they were originally employed to communicate.
Instead of a vivid conception and a living belief, there remain only a
few phrases retained by rote; or, if any part, the shell and husk only
of the meaning is retained, the ﬁner essence being lost. (1978: 37–8)
When we fall into habits, rather than beliefs, we would then cease to
become truly thinking creatures, instead becoming lazy in our intel-
lectual activities: ‘Both teachers and learners go to sleep at their post 
as soon as there is no enemy in the ﬁeld…. The fatal tendency of
mankind to leave off thinking about a thing when it is no longer
doubtful is the cause of half their errors.’ (1978: 41). So, the risk we
face when we neglect freedom of expression again here is based upon
the loss of our capacity to judge truth and falsity in general. If we cease
to debate the truth or falsity of our beliefs, Mill argues that we will
soon hold our opinions, whether true or false, as mere dogma and 
prejudice.
It is important to note here that On Liberty’s characterization of the
nature of censorship has been incredibly inﬂuential in shaping the sub-
sequent dominant line of liberal thought, both in terms of the traditional
liberal fears of the ills of censorship and in terms of the very character-
ization of the operation of censorship. In terms of the latter, Mill con-
ceives of censorship as occurring by the state, after a (paradigmatically
written) utterance has already been uttered. This formulation seems
uncontroversial and indeed parallels the nature of ‘book banning’ prac-
tices and jurisprudence, but it is by no means the only, or the most 
persuasive, characterization of censorship. 
If my argument for an activist egalitarian liberal state is to succeed, it
must overcome these liberal fears of the evils of state censorship, since
part of state activism may involve censorship of one sort or another in
order to facilitate equality and a properly functioning marketplace of
ideas. In Chapter 6, I argue that the Millian conception of censorship
as occurring by the state and after an utterance has been spoken is too
limited to capture the full operation of the workings of censorship. The
full workings of censorship, importantly, include the way in which
speech is censored before it is even uttered, and if this is the case, the
liberal fear of censorship is misplaced. I argue in Chapter 6 that censor-
ship in the more robust, post-Millian sense is unavoidable, and thus
the liberal state’s fears of it are misplaced.
Having now canvassed all four of Mill’s arguments for freedom of
expression, I will turn brieﬂy to discuss his ideas of the limited circum-
stances in which such freedom ought to be curtailed. Mill suggests in
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On Liberty that there are particular circumstances where speech becomes
so close to action as to be governed by the harm principle:
Even opinions lose their immunity when the circumstances in
which they are expressed are such as to constitute their expression a
positive instigation to some mischievous act. An opinion that corn
dealers are starvers of the poor, or that private property is robbery,
ought to be unmolested when simply circulated through the press,
but may justly incur punishment when delivered orally to an
excited mob assembled before the house of a corn dealer, or when
handed about among the same mob in the form of a placard….The
liberty of the individual must be thus far limited: he must not make
himself a nuisance to other people. But if he refrains from molesting
others in what concerns them, and merely acts according to his own
inclination and judgment in things which concern himself, the same
reasons which show that opinion should be free prove also that he
should be allowed, without molestation, to carry his opinions into
practice at his own cost. (1978: 53)
The idea here is that there are some circumstances where freedom of
expression ought to be curtailed because of the likelihood of its inciting
direct and tangible harm – in the above example, the physical harm of
a riot. These circumstantial restrictions are understood as opposed to
content restrictions – it is not the meaning of the expression that is 
the source of the restriction, but rather the environment in which the
expression is uttered which gives rise to the restriction. Only when the
context causes injury, rather than the content, is freedom of expression
held to be subject to the harm principle.
Mill does, however, go a step further toward content regulation in a
footnote at the beginning of Chapter 2, where he argues that prosecu-
tions for advocating tyrannicide may be acceptable, but only if such
advocacy then leads to the instigation of the actual crime. Obviously,
the regulation of either the advocacy of tyrannicide or the idea that
corn dealers are starvers of the poor has something to do with the
content of the ideas themselves, or else it would be nonsensical to
claim that they lead in any logical way to certain unacceptable actions
under certain circumstances, but Mill wants to say that the content of
the ideas alone is insufﬁcient to merit regulation. 
I will conclude this brief survey of the justiﬁcation of freedom 
of expression in On Liberty by noting that Mill argues in favor of free-
dom of expression because of what he takes to be its instrumental
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merits, either for the end of holding true beliefs, or the end of develop-
ing critical capacities. As a result of this way of arguing, he is vulner-
able to arguments which can demonstrate disutilities of freedom of
expression which he may have overlooked. Second, freedom of expres-
sion is a right that occupies a privileged and almost inviolable place in
Mill’s theory of rights in that it is not subject, as other rights are, to
curtailment by the disutility of its harms, unless it is for reasons of cir-
cumstance rather than content. Animating this view is the now ortho-
dox liberal idea that the best remedy for false opinions is not state
action, but instead rigorous debate, through which falsity will become
exposed to all and be persuasive to none. Or, in other words, the best
way to combat false speech is through more speech. This is the view
that has animated nearly all of the US free speech jurisprudence of the
past century, and is the view of Dworkin, perhaps the most prominent
contemporary theorist of liberalism.
2.3 Silencing and subordination: The consequences of
unregulated freedom of expression
It is precisely this view – that the best way to combat false speech is with
rebuttal speech – which the feminist and critical race theory arguments
from liberty intend to challenge. The arguments, from both positive (sub-
ordination argument) and negative (silencing argument) liberty, is that
there is a crucial disutility of unregulated freedom of expression, because
the expression that is protected in the cases of pornography and hate
speech in fact has the result of reducing the liberty of the oppressed
groups that such speech targets, thus thwarting the central liberal goal of
maximal liberty consistent with the prevention of harm. 
Described another way, the thrust of the subordination and silencing
arguments is as follows. Freedom of expression does not always lead to
a ‘marketplace of ideas,’ which many commentators summarize as the
utility for which Mill’s position argues. Rather, unregulated freedom of
expression leads, in cases of culturally oppressive speech, to views of
the unequal moral worth of certain groups of citizens, such that those
groups are subordinated in society, or their speech is silenced. The act
of these groups’ silencing or subordination would have the effect of
making Mill’s marketplace a venue of less than optimal utility for the
goal of maximal liberty consistent with the prevention of harm. The sub-
ordination and silencing arguments both maintain that unregulated
freedom of expression leads to non-maximal liberty as well as failure to
prevent harm. 
62 The Cost of Free Speech
abbie.levin@gmail.com
The subordination argument against pornography, advanced by
Catharine MacKinnon in Only Words (1996), and reﬁned by Rae Langton
and Jennifer Hornsby in a series of inﬂuential articles, holds that
[p]ornography is the graphic sexually explicit subordination of
women, in pictures or words…The claim was not, or not simply,
that pornography depicts the subordination of women, or that it
has, among its effects, the perpetuation of women’s subordination,
but that pornography is subordination…According to the feminist
argument, pornography ranks women as inferior, deprives women
of certain powers, and legitimates discrimination against them.
(Langton 1998: 262; emphasis as in original)
The idea here is that pornographic representations themselves are the
subordination of women – they create women’s subordinated status 
in much the same way as does, say, the statement that blacks under
apartheid are not allowed to vote, when uttered by the legislature in 
an apartheid regime.4 In other words, there is something so power-
ful about pornography and hate speech that they have the power to
actually enact subordination – that is, ranking their targets as inferior.
In other words, pornography and hate speech do not merely claim that
their targets are inferior, they actually make it the case that their
targets are inferior. This, of course, is saying something stronger than
that pornography or hate speech subsequently causes subordination
due to the majority’s reactions to the speech and their subsequent
behavior; here the charge is that the subordination is seen as arising
simultaneously with the speech itself, and independently of the viewer
response to these images. This is quite a strong, and possibly false, claim.
Its evaluation requires reference to speech act theory, which I will
discuss in Chapter 4 and then use to evaluate the argument.
For now, though, let us assume that the argument is true. The problem,
then, in Millian terms, is that there may be a net decrease in liberty to
society as a whole in allowing freedom of expression in certain cases,
because the protection of the negative liberty interests of the porno-
graphers and hate speakers interferes with the positive liberty interests of
the women and minorities whom that speech targets, by subordinating
them to the dominant culture, and thus interfering with their range of
options in life. The idea here is that this interference is, at least in part,
tangible and material: it makes it harder for women and minorities to get
the kinds of jobs they want, because employers have mistaken views
about their inferiority, caused by the protected speech. It is thus harder to
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earn the kind of money and thus have the kind of lifestyle they want,
for the same reason; and of course it makes their lives harder in terms
of mobility, social status, and interpersonal relationships. Such interests
are what Isaiah Berlin calls ‘positive liberties,’ or the liberty to direct
and control one’s own life:
The ‘positive’ sense of the word ‘liberty’ derives from the wish on
the part of the individual to be his own master. I wish my life and
decisions to depend on myself, not on external forces of whatever
kind. I wish to be the instrument of my own, not of other men’s,
acts of will. I wish to be a subject, not an object; to be moved by
reasons, by conscious purposes, which are my own, not by causes
which affect me, as it were, from outside. (Berlin 1968: 131)
The complaints of feminists and critical race theorists in the subordina-
tion argument obviously appeal to this notion of liberty; the denial of
opportunities to exercise agency because the views of others impede
one’s choices is a violation of positive liberty, if it is a violation at all.
Such obvious interferences with liberty would of course be of interest
to liberals, who would ostensibly want to minimize all obstruction of
liberty in the absence of a competing reason not to do so. However,
many leading liberals, including Dworkin, are unswayed by the idea
that protection of pornography leads to the views of the unequal moral
worth of women, and hence violates their positive liberties. It is worth
examining Dworkin’s reasoning here, because it is relevant, as well, 
to the argument against unregulated speech from equality, which will
be introduced after discussing Dworkin’s views. Dworkin argues that,
even if we grant the premise that pornography and racist speech has 
all of the harmful consequences suggested above, the subordination
argument is unpersuasive, because
the point of free speech is precisely to allow ideas to have what-
ever consequences follow from their dissemination, including 
undesirable consequences for positive liberty…Freedom of speech,
conceived and protected as a fundamental negative liberty, is the
core of the choice modern democracies have made, a choice we
must now honor in ﬁnding our own ways to combat the shaming
inequalities women still suffer. (Dworkin 1997: 221)
The premise upon which such an opinion relies is that negative liberty
rights are more fundamental to democracy than positive liberty rights,
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and thus are much more stringently protected. There is a long liberal tra-
dition that holds that this is the case.5 While it is outside of the scope of
this project to examine that view, it is of interest to us for two reasons.
First, Dworkin’s conclusion above seems intuitively unsettling if we
believe that the subordination of women and minorities is a real problem
– it does not seem an adequate response to suffering to simply say that
such suffering must continue unabated because we have decided to 
privilege the negative liberty of freedom of expression over all positive 
liberties. Second, this response will be subject to criticism by critical 
race theorists and feminists as itself equality-violating and a function of
power; the choice to privilege one kind of liberty over another, they will
argue, is by no means an innocent or innocuous choice, and it is one
with consequences that should be of interest to liberalism generally. 
For it to be of interest to Mill in particular, of course, the harm to pos-
itive liberty must be sufﬁciently strong as to warrant protection by a right,
and it is unclear whether Mill would be persuaded that the harms to pos-
itive liberties such as employment, political inﬂuence, and social status
are important enough to be considered rights, though his activism on
behalf of women’s rights seems to suggest that he may be sympathetic to
this argument. That question aside, it is nevertheless the case that the
subordination argument is somewhat weakened because of its appeal to a
set of rights which are understood as being less fundamental than the
bedrock negative liberty of freedom of expression.
The silencing argument, however, seems to avoid the weaknesses of the
subordination argument by arguing from within the negative liberty of
freedom of expression itself. The argument uses Mill’s ideas of the utility
of diversity of lifestyle and opinion to claim that if we have a society in
which the speech of women or minorities is taken out of the debate in
advance – because racist or sexist views preclude the targets of the speech
from adequately responding to it – then the diversity that Mill thinks is
central to the ﬂourishing of society is compromised, because the views
and lifestyles that those minorities have to offer to the debate have been
discounted in advance by conclusions about their worth conveyed in
racist, sexist, or homophobic speech. In other words, Mill’s laudable 
goal of maximizing public discourse is not attained in a marketplace 
of ideas distorted by the workings of privilege and subordination and
their reiﬁcation in racist, sexist, or homophobic discourse. As critical race
theorist Charles R. Lawrence III asserts:
The reason that racial insults should not fall under protected speech
relates to the purpose underlying the ﬁrst amendment. The purpose
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of the ﬁrst amendment is to foster the greatest amount of speech.
Racial insults disserve that purpose. Assaultive racist speech functions
as a preemptive strike. The racial invective is experienced as a blow,
not a proffered idea, and once the blow is struck, it is unlikely that dia-
logue will follow. Racial insults are undeserving of ﬁrst amendment
protection because the perpetrator’s intention is not to discover truth
or initiate dialogue, but to injure the victim. (Lawrence 1993: 68)
Lawrence is implicitly appealing to the instrumentality of Mill’s argu-
ments for freedom of expression. If the purposes enumerated by Mill,
such as arriving at truth, dialogue, and diversity, are not met, and are
in fact thwarted by some speech, then we ought to regulate that speech
in the interest of facilitating these purposes. The obvious Millian answer
is that insult or injury, as Lawrence here describes them, is insufﬁcient,
without further argument, to trigger Mill’s criteria for the limitation of
a right. Lawrence needs to argue persuasively that the injury is to an
interest important enough to be protected by a right, and the passage
above fails to enumerate a right that is violated. 
In other words, in order to advance an argument against freedom of
expression on Millian grounds, one must demonstrate two things: ﬁrst,
that the speech goes against the aims of truth and diversity; and
second, that the rights of citizens have been violated through the act
of speech. Other critical race theorists have documented at length
what, in particular, they mean by the injury that is sustained by the
victims of racist speech:
The negative effects of hate messages are real and immediate for 
the victims. Victims of vicious hate propaganda experience physio-
logical symptoms and emotional distress ranging from fear in the
gut to rapid pulse rate and difﬁculty in breathing, nightmares, post-
traumatic stress disorder, hypertension, psychosis, and suicide…
Victims are restricted in their personal freedom. To avoid receiv-
ing hate messages, victims have to quit jobs, forgo education, leave
their homes, avoid certain public places, curtail their own exercise
of speech rights, and otherwise modify their behavior and demeanor.
(Matsuda 1993: 24)
However, even these harms must still be put in terms of a rights viol-
ation on Mill’s scheme, and the question is, ﬁrst, whether these kinds
of harms are of a sort which go to a right at all, and if so, to which
right in particular. 
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The two most persuasive attempts to cash out these injuries in terms
of a rights violation are as a violation of the right to freedom of expres-
sion itself, and as a violation of the right to equal protection of the
laws. Of these two, the violation of the right to freedom of expression
is more persuasive to egalitarian liberals, because of freedom of expres-
sion’s centrality to many liberal accounts of rights, including Mill’s.
Freedom of expression is seen as paramount of all rights for two reasons:
because of its centrality to healthy democratic political life, and because
it seems to be a prerequisite to freedom of thought itself. While this
privileging of freedom of expression over other rights, especially the
right to equality, has been problematized by feminists and critical race
theorists, it is nevertheless strategically superior to cash out the harms
of racist, sexist, or homophobic speech in terms of a violation of the
right to freedom of expression: since this is the right that holds such a
high place in our theories of rights, its violation in the case of racist,
sexist, or homophobic speech demands urgent redress, even according 
to the tenets of a classical liberalism, such as Mill’s. To this end, the
silencing argument will attempt to cast the harms of racist, sexist, and
homophobic speech as a violation of freedom of expression. 
Lawrence continues his discussion (1993: 77) of the harms of racist
speech, alluding to the silencing argument:
[I]t is not just the prevalence and strength of the idea of racism that
make the unregulated marketplace of ideas an untenable paradigm for
those individuals who seek full and equal personhood for all. The real
problem is that the idea of the racial inferiority of nonwhites infects,
skews, and disables the operation of a market. It trumps good ideas
that contend with it in the market. It is an epidemic that distorts the
marketplace of ideas and renders it dysfunctional.
This idea that racist, sexist, or homophobic ideas effectively ‘trump’ 
– or ‘silence’ – the objections that may be raised to them comes closer
to getting at the idea that there is a rights violation – either in terms of
equality or in terms of freedom of expression – involved in having a
racist marketplace; some people’s speech, on this view, counts more
than other people’s speech, which could be cashed out as an equality
violation. On another interpretation, ‘trump’ could mean ‘cancel out’
or ‘silence’ the oppositional speech, thereby implying a violation of the
right to freedom of expression itself. On either reading, what is impor-
tant to note is that Mill ought to be receptive to these arguments, if they
are true, because they aim, compatibly with Mill’s project, at increasing
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the diversity of the community, which, of course, was one of Mill’s
chief aims as well. 
Moreover, unregulated freedom of expression was held by Mill to be
useful only because of its instrumentality in attaining diversity, and
thus an argument that diversity can be better attained by some other
means is compatible with the ultimate goals of Mill’s social philo-
sophy, if not his intermediate goals. Given this, it seems surprising that
leading liberals such as Dworkin do not welcome this argument, and 
I will examine his reasons for this in Chapter 3, after introducing the
argument more fully here.
The argument from silencing was advanced by Catharine MacKinnon
and others,6 and it maintains that certain instances of hateful speech
directed toward minorities and women preclude an effective response, or
counter-speech, from those addressed, thereby denying their right to
freedom of expression itself. MacKinnon is not, of course, saying that
those addressed literally cannot speak, but rather that their speech will
not count towards the debate in the way that the speech of the dominant
culture will. The mechanics of this charge have been elaborated by 
speech act theorists, whose arguments in this regard will be examined in 
Chapter 4. For now, however, my aim is simply to introduce this argu-
ment to show that if successful it, like the subordination argument, is a
counter-example to Mill’s description of freedom of expression as facil-
itating a diverse discussion of alternative ways of life without impeding
rights. The argument maintains that the constitutional protection of free
speech cannot be defended on Millian grounds of facilitating maximal
speech and dialogue, because some speech does not facilitate counter-
speech or dialogue, but rather thwarts it by effectively denying those
addressed their right to freedom of expression. It is important to note that
this argument does not necessarily preclude other kinds of defenses of
protection of free speech, but it does seem to preclude a Millian defense
of free speech as instrumental to diversity. Dworkin will attempt to offer a
new kind of justiﬁcation of protection of hate speech and pornography in
an attempt to circumvent this kind of criticism, and I will examine that
argument in Chapter 3.
So how, exactly, does culturally oppressive speech silence? Key to
making sense of this idea is the insight that the social positions of speak-
ers may be such that some speech does not create an open dialogue or
debate, but instead effectively manufactures subject position – in exactly
the same way that the subordination argument claims it does – such that
telling someone that they are inferior because of their race, gender, or
sexuality is not a simple conjecture, rebuttable by evidence to the con-
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trary, but rather, in its very utterance, makes it so. The speech of the
powerful so effectively dictates opinions about oppressed groups as 
to enact or further that oppression, such that minority identity itself 
is enacted by the content of hateful speech, or women’s identities are
enacted by the discourse of pornography. The subject thus by such
speech will then have their own speech discounted as a result of the
inferior subject position formed by the injurious speech. MacKinnon
claims:
In the context of social inequality, so-called speech can be an exercise
of power which constructs the social reality in which people live, from
objectiﬁcation to genocide….Together with all its material supports,
authoritatively saying that someone is inferior is largely how structures
of status and differential treatment are demarcated and actualized.
Words and images are how people are placed in hierarchies, how social
stratiﬁcation is made to seem inevitable and right, how feelings of
inferiority and superiority are engendered, and how indifference to
violence against those on the bottom is rationalized and normalized.
Social supremacy is made, inside and between people, through making
meanings. To unmake it, these meanings and their technologies have
to be unmade. (MacKinnon 1996: 30–1; emphasis as in original)
This argument, like the arguments of feminists and critical race theorists
generally, begins with the premise that power relations between pri-
vileged and subordinated groups are key to understanding the actual
workings of social and political interaction. Such an idea, though radical
even by the standards of today’s egalitarian liberalism, was nonetheless
contemplated and embraced by Mill in his The Subjection of Women. 
As David Dyzenhaus suggests, this text, read alongside On Liberty, offers 
a robust understanding of the nature of harm, equality, and auto-
nomy, such that Mill becomes an ally of these contemporary concerns,
rather than an opponent of them. I will turn now to a brief summary of
Dyzenhaus’s position, in order to demonstrate that the popular reading
of Mill’s On Liberty as a text hostile to any consideration of impeding
freedom of expression is crude and inaccurate in light of the breadth and
sophistication of Mill’s concerns.
2.4 The Mill of Subjection: An early egalitarian activist
While the bulk of The Subjection of Women is explicitly concerned with
suffrage for women in Mill’s Victorian England, the important point
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for our times is the fact that Mill does not make the mistake of equat-
ing the formal equality that would be granted with the attainment of
suffrage with substantive, or what he calls ‘perfect equality,’ that would
require much more than mere legal rights. Dyzenhaus notes that Mill
views the legally prescribed inequalities between the sexes as the mere
formal codiﬁcation of the actual inequalities of the social relations
between men and women and thus Mill would not be likely to make
the mistake of thinking that changing the laws would be sufﬁcient to
change the social reality that underlies those laws. This distinction
between formal legal rights and the reality of the interests they protect
as lived on the ground is an important one, because it is exactly the
distinction that is made by feminists and critical race theorists in the
silencing and subordination arguments. Both arguments grant that 
the targets of hate speech and pornography still possess their formal
rights to liberty – what they question is whether culturally oppressive
speech vitiates the formal right. What this distinction points to is the
issue of social power, not only at work in the granting of a formal
right, but also at work in the way that the right may or may not be
exercised on the ground. This question of social power, and what egal-
itarian liberalism’s response to it ought to be, will occupy the latter
half of this book.
In The Subjection of Women, Mill notes that the underlying social
reality of inequality is carried out in the private sphere, which prevents
women from forming alliances with each other to overcome their sub-
ordination. He further notes that the relationship of power imbalance
between the sexes is reinforced and upheld by its apparent naturalness,
and thus is given the veneer and supposed legitimacy of a consensual
arrangement. To buttress this seeming naturalness, Mill further notes
(1997: 14–15) that a morality has developed around the whole arrange-
ment, such that women have come to believe that it is in their nature
to ‘live for others; make complete abnegations of themselves, and to
have not life but in their affections.’ This insight is strikingly com-
patible with many contemporary feminist positions, which recognize
that the appearance of consent is by no means the end of the story of
oppression and aim to theorize from this recognition.
So Mill’s text, then, is notably in keeping with most contemporary
feminist analyses of power. What Mill suggests is that the fact that
women accept their subordinate role does not mean that these roles
are unproblematic. In fact, they are even more problematic by virtue of
this supposed ‘consent,’ because such ‘consent’ lures one away from
considering the roots of oppression underlying the status quo. What is
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problematic about the inequality of the sexes, according to Mill, is that
such inequality necessarily impedes women’s autonomous function-
ing, and such autonomy, on Mill’s scheme, is requisite for women to
experience for themselves their own conception of the good life. 
Dyzenhaus suggests (1992: 540) that insofar as pornography operates
under the same insidious veil of consent as does the general relationship
between the sexes, it is to be considered as yet another piece of sup-
port for the system of domination of women by men, and would thus 
be objectionable to Mill for the same reasons. Further, because of porno-
graphy’s conﬁnement to the private sphere, it likewise has the effect of
denying women the ability to mount any kind of united opposition to 
it. Dyzenhaus concludes that Mill’s ideas about the subtle manifestations
of sex inequality in his The Subjection of Women demonstrate that he was
well aware of the complexity of the operations of sexism, and the deep
harm of gender inequality to the goals of autonomy and liberty. 
As Dyzenhaus notes, the radicalism in Mill’s position – which is the
radicalism that unites him with contemporary feminists in favor of regu-
lation of pornography – is his acknowledgement of the fact that neither
consent nor formal equality alone or in combination are sufﬁcient to
vitiate inequality. However, this insight seems to be at odds with the util-
itarian character of Mill’s liberalism – how can we calculate preferences if
we are acknowledging that some people’s preferences might not be what
they seem? Further, once we allow that a regime of systemic inequality
such as sexism might operate by skewing preferences, we seem to have
opened the ﬂoodgates towards paternalism and away from liberalism’s
hands-off stance regarding inquiring into preferences. There are several
passages in On Liberty that caution against ‘improvement’ of others, or
inquiring further into people’s preferences than their stated ambitions. 
So the question becomes how to square these passages with the radical
strand in The Subjection of Women, which notes that there is more to 
the story than merely taking subjective preferences at face value. Further,
the bald claim that taking subjective preferences at face value entails state
neutrality is called into question by Mill’s position in Subjection. 
Dyzenhaus suggests (1992: 541–3) that Mill’s answer to this paternal-
ism charge is found in his appeal to experience, as opposed to a claim
to knowing better than someone else what style of life might be better
for them. Instead of thinking in terms of false-consciousness, Mill
couches the problem in terms of women’s (and men’s) limited experi-
ence of lifestyles – their possibilities of styles of life have been pre-
cluded in advance because of the deep regime of inequality in which
they live. Had their possibilities and range of experiences not been so
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drastically truncated, they might have been able to choose different
lifestyles, but as it stands, there was no opportunity to do so, because
of the lack of options. 
In other words, Mill questions the validity of choices in the absence
of sufﬁcient experience. Whether this really escapes the charge of
paternalism is doubtful; it seems a mark of paternalism, rather than an
escape from it, to claim that the experience of others is provincial.
Regardless, the point for the present discussion is that in a spectrum
between hands-off utilitarian liberalism on the one side and outright
paternalism on the other, The Subjection of Women seems to locate Mill
towards the paternalism end, and On Liberty seems to place him nearer to
the hands-off end. This is noteworthy not only because it casts doubt on
the popular reading of Mill as the paradigmatic hands-off liberal, but also
because of the fact that Mill’s more nuanced understanding of choice and
consent offered in The Subjection of Women seems to put him much more
squarely in line with the contemporary feminist position that would 
regulate certain forms of culturally oppressive speech.
In The Subjection of Women, Mill is taking the radical position that we
can only really know what our actual preferences are after we have had
the opportunity to live free from the limitations of views that our
culture perpetuates within us. This is because if our culture subscribes
to views that limit women’s autonomy, such as the view that it is her
nature to serve others, then we cannot use the fact that women appear
to want to serve others as having been a choice autonomously made by
women. As Dyzenhaus encapsulates:
In sum, Mill’s solution to the puzzle about real and perceived inter-
ests and wants is the following. If one’s concern is individual auto-
nomy, and if there is reason to suppose that a group’s wants were
formed under a regime hostile to autonomy, then one cannot appeal
to those wants to justify the regime. (Dyzenhaus 1992: 543)
Thus, as long as our priority is autonomy – and the arguments in On
Liberty are perhaps the best ever written to inspire us to make it such 
– Mill’s claim in The Subjection of Women is that in a situation that both
denies women autonomy and has developed a sophisticated rhetoric
designed to make them believe that autonomy is anathema, women’s
perceived lack of interest in autonomy cannot be taken at face value,
let alone used as support for such a situation. 
Thus, it appears that reading The Subjection of Women alongside On
Liberty reveals that Mill is well aware that his concern for autonomy is
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critically compromised in a society that has insidious mechanisms 
in place to ensure that half of the population is uninterested in that
very ideal. Further, it seems that the Mill of The Subjection of Women
is obviously interested in remedying this problem, presumably even if
the remedy violates his general hands-off posture in On Liberty.
If this is indeed the case, then why haven’t today’s liberals, who
claim Mill as their founder, offered nearly as nuanced a view of the
problematic nature of autonomy in an oppressive society? Dyzenhaus
suggests three reasons for liberal hostility to censoring pornography,
and claims that all of them are wrongly imputed to Mill. The ﬁrst
reason is the narrow reading of the harm principle as only applicable
to physical harm – since the physical harms of pornography have not
been adequately documented by social scientists, the argument goes,
this narrow harm principle has not been triggered. The second reason
for the liberal reluctance to censor pornography is because of their
support for the public/private distinction, which they claim must be
upheld in order to preserve the private sphere of autonomy from state
interference. Since this sphere must be protected, and since consump-
tion of pornography takes place in private, liberals see no principled
reason to invade the hallowed space of the private sphere. Finally, lib-
erals are committed to robust freedom of expression either because
they do not believe that speech can cause sufﬁcient harm to justify
state action, or because they believe that regulation is more harmful
than allowing freedom of expression. 
Dyzenhaus suggests that Mill would not have been receptive to the
idea of the public/private distinction, since The Subjection of Women’s
central point is that the inequality of women is perpetuated in the
home, in private, and that its location by no means excuses the injus-
tice. Thus, reading The Subjection of Women in concert with On Liberty
reveals two texts which must be taken together to stand for the idea
that a liberal society needs to protect liberty in the absence of harm,
wherever that liberty is located – in other words, with no allowance for
a private sphere that is immune from inquiry. 
What, then, of the harm principle? Ought it to be read as narrowly
applicable only to physical harm, thus excluding pornography, or ought
it to be read more broadly, to include harms beyond the merely phys-
ical? Examining On Liberty has shown that Mill explicitly states that 
his concern is with harm to interests sufﬁciently pressing to be consid-
ered rights. Through Dyzenhaus’s reading of The Subjection of Women,
Mill’s conception of interests appears to apply to real interests, rather
than merely perceived interests, and thus he is comfortable with 
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a certain degree of prescribing what these interests ought to be – the
fundamental interest of ‘man as a progressive being’ refers principally
to the interest in autonomy, which is of course an interest which tran-
scends an interest in the merely physical. There seems quite clearly to
be no basis in Mill’s thought for the notion that the harm principle is
applicable only to physical harm. However, even granted that the
harm principle seems clearly to be intended by Mill to apply to what-
ever interest is of sufﬁcient import to justify its being deemed a right, it
is still incumbent on those who claim harm to enumerate what right
or rights have been violated. The feminist and critical race theory argu-
ments tend to answer this question with reference to either equality or
freedom of expression itself, and the upcoming chapters will evaluate
to what degree their arguments have been successful.
The ﬁnal, and most formidable, obstacle in the way of treating Mill
as friendly to regulation of culturally oppressive speech is that of course,
on its face, On Liberty is explicitly a text which is hostile to any form of
regulation based on the content of expression. Dyzenhaus suggests that
this popular reading of Mill is actually unfaithful to a more nuanced
reading of the text, which would, as he puts it (1992: 547), ‘permit what
we might think of as a liberal censorship policy.’ There is no question,
Dyzenhaus concedes, that Mill’s arguments in Chapter 2 of On Liberty
are against interferences with liberty that come from outside of the will
of the people affected by the decision, even if such interferences are
made in what Mill calls a ‘spirit of improvement.’ In other words, Mill
unambiguously insists that interferences with liberty not be imposed
upon people, even in some kind of attempt to improve upon the choices
they have made. 
On its face, Mill’s resistance to ‘forcing improvements on an unwilling
people’ seems to characterize quite well the reasons that liberals resist
the feminist attempt to regulate pornography. So how could Mill be in
favor of regulation of pornography if he resists the spirit of improve-
ment? Dyzenhaus suggests that Mill’s desire for freedom of expression
coupled with his desire to control a spirit of improvement might be
thought of in two ways. The ﬁrst is the traditional reading, which hopes
that freedom of speech might have the effect of curbing the spirit of
improvement because through discussion participants will come to expose
the ‘spirit of improvement’ and the denial of liberty that such a spirit 
represents. 
The second way to express the relationship between freedom of
expression and the injunction against the spirit of improvement is that
free debate may be used to determine ‘what coercive action should be
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taken in order to eradicate oppressive conceptions of the good life; thus
permitting, for example, the censorship of pornography’ (Dyzenhaus
1992: 547). Dyzenhaus wants to suggest that we can read Mill’s injunc-
tion against spirits of improvement being imposed upon an unwilling
people, and his strong commitment to freedom of expression, as com-
patible with regulation of culturally oppressive speech if we view his
understanding of the operation of the oppression of women in The Sub-
jection of Women as taking place in an atmosphere which silences and
shapes the desires of women well in advance of admitting them to the
discussion, thus effectively denying them meaningful participation in 
discourse in the ﬁrst place. 
In other words, if the operation of sexism is indeed as Mill suggests
in Subjection, then the strategy of debate offered in the ﬁrst reading
cannot be used to root out violations of liberty, because women are 
not in an epistemic position to be able to call attention to their pre-
dicament through debate, and thus the oppressive conception of the
good life which has women as subservient will not be able to be even
discussed, let alone remedied. However, even on the second reading,
the same problem arises: who is it who will be there to debate the
oppression of women, when the radical point offered in Subjection is to
the effect that women and men are both unaware of it?
Presumably, there is some faint hope that serious thinkers, such as
Mill himself, will be able to see their way through this cultural morass
to ﬁnd a way to critique it. Indeed, the harder it is to see the truth
through the deeply held cultural beliefs about inequality, the stronger
Mill’s case for freedom of expression becomes – if it is rare enough to
be able to even perceive the problem of the subjugation of women and
minorities, the environment available to express what one has per-
ceived becomes at once more crucial and more fragile. Further, the very
depth of the problem also seems to lend support to the idea that we may
need a more radical solution to it, such as that offered by the second
reading.
Acknowledging, then, that The Subjection of Women contemplates this
grim scenario of cultural oppression being so deep as to be almost unde-
tectable, it follows that On Liberty must too be read as a text which is
compatible with, rather than oppositional to, it. Indeed, since The
Subjection of Women was written after On Liberty, it would seem, in the
absence of some clear evidence to the contrary, that it is Mill’s more
mature formulation of the nature of, and remedies for, oppression.
Consistency dictates that we read the two texts in a way which rec-
onciles them, and Dyzenhaus’s suggestion is that one plausible way to
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do this is to see freedom of expression as crucial in attempting to root
out oppression through a dialogue about how to stop it, rather than as
a means of furthering oppressive – that is, liberty-denying – discourse.
This reading requires having a certain faith in humanity’s ability to
root out its own illiberality, but there is no reason to suppose that Mill
did not have such faith. In fact, On Liberty has many passages which
are almost polemical in their faith in humanity’s ability to correct its
own wrongs, given the proper environment and conditions for doing
so. Of course, it has equally many polemical passages about humanity’s
inability to correct its own mistakes when in circumstances which are
not conducive to such corrections, but it seems that the conclusion to
draw from this is not so much a statement about Mill’s conception 
of human nature, but rather a statement about the extreme importance
of having the proper circumstances and environment available for
debate, because of our susceptibility to being swayed by the climate of
our surroundings. 
However, even on this reading, it still seems a stretch to see Mill 
as advocating the somewhat paradoxical idea of having freedom of
expression for the sake of forming an agreement among the population
in favor of regulation of speech; but perhaps this reading is implausible
at least in part because we have been habituated toward the dominant
reading of Mill’s work as standing for robust freedom of expression in
the name of autonomy. Perhaps a stronger reason for supposing that
On Liberty’s advocating of freedom of expression ought to be read in
the way that Dyzenhaus suggests is that it seems more compatible with
the overarching goals of Mill’s project – the elimination of what, in
contemporary terms, I have been calling cultural oppression. It is the
elimination of oppression that Mill is most interested in, as his The
Subjection of Women further testiﬁes to, and he sees freedom of expres-
sion as instrumental towards that goal. As I mentioned earlier, there is
no reason to suppose that Mill would be hostile to amending anything
at all that he advances if it turned out not to be conducive to maximal
liberty consistent with the elimination of harm towards others, and
the discourses of pornography and hate speech, for reasons that I have
begun in this chapter to discuss, may be impediments to liberty. 
Dyzenhaus’s attempt to read On Liberty and The Subjection of Women
together elucidates that Mill’s primary concern in both texts is the
overcoming of oppression, both by the state and by the culture at large,
and this has the effect of reminding us that this, and not freedom of
expression per se, is Mill’s chief concern. Once Mill’s project is resituated
in this way, which facilitates a turn to discussing oppression and its
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various remedies rather than discussing merely the one possible remedy
afforded by freedom of expression, we are able to see more clearly how
the issues of pornography and hate speech might be compatible 
with Mill’s fundamental interest in liberation from oppression, and 
thus pose less of a problem for his instrumental interest in freedom 
of expression.
Further, The Subjection of Women of course should be read as a strong
endorsement of Mill’s commitment to equality. This should be kept
ﬁrmly in mind, as a reminder that his concern with freedom, so elo-
quently argued in On Liberty, was by no means the only right that he
was concerned with. In Subjection, he notes that
the principle which regulates the existing social relations between the
two sexes – the legal subordination of one sex to the other – is wrong
in itself, and now one of the chief hindrances to human improve-
ment; and that it ought to be replaced by a principle of perfect equal-
ity, admitting no power or privilege on the one side, nor disability on
the other. (Mill 1997: 1) 
Here Mill seems to be returning to his ‘permanent interests in man as a
progressive being,’ which guides his determination of the interests
sufﬁcient to be considered rights. Because sex inequality is a hindrance
to the cause of human improvement, and sex equality is a boon to it,
we ought to be concerned with replacing the former with the latter.
Mill grants that our long-term interests as progressive beings may of
course not be immediately apparent to us in the short-term, but that
should not deter us from steering a course towards equality:
Though the truth may not be felt or generally acknowledged for
generations to come, the only school of genuine moral sentiment is
society between equals. The moral education of mankind has hitherto
emanated chieﬂy from the law of force, and is adapted almost solely
to the relations which force creates. In the less advanced states 
of society, people hardly recognize any relation with their equals.…
Existing moralities, accordingly, are mainly ﬁtted to a relation of com-
mand and obedience. Yet command and obedience are but unfor-
tunate necessities of human life: society in equality is its normal state.
(Mill 1997: 42)
Though of course any attempt to naturalize a particular condition as
more innate than any other is controversial at best, nevertheless Mill
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demands to be read as afﬁrming in the strongest way possible his belief
that equality is a necessary condition of morality in general. As he
describes it (1997: 96): ‘The moral regeneration of mankind will only
really commence, when the most fundamental of the social relations is
placed under the rule of equal justice, and when human beings learn
to cultivate their strongest sympathy with an equal in rights and in
cultivation.’ Thus equality seems to be a prerequisite not only for our
permanent interests as progressive beings, but also for something much
more basic: the ability to live under moral laws at all.
In Subjection, Mill also seems to be well aware of the fact that though
gender equality seems to be an utterly basic requirement for a civilized
life in general, pursuing equality in a society accustomed to its opposite
is no easy task:
…[S]o long as the right of the strong to power over the weak rules 
in the very heart of society, the attempt to make the equal right 
of the weak the principle of its outward actions will always be 
an uphill struggle; for the law of justice, which is also the law 
of Christianity, will never get possession of men’s inmost senti-
ments; they will be working against it, even when bending to it.
(Mill 1997: 82)
This statement would of course be echoed by the feminists and critical
race theorists discussed in this chapter, and it seems that Mill is both
aware of, and sympathetic to, their concerns. 
Also related to the question of whether Mill would be on board with
the feminist and critical race theorist critiques of unregulated freedom
of expression, the Mill of Subjection seems to be quite sophisticated in
his understanding of the relationship between rights and power, in a
way which is strikingly similar to the tenor of the critique that these
contemporary theorists launch. Mill writes of those who think that the
achievement of true equality is a simple matter:
They do not understand the great vitality and durability of insti-
tutions which place right on the side of might; how intensely they
are clung to; how the good as well as the bad propensities and senti-
ments of those who have power in their hands, become identiﬁed
with retaining it; how slowly these bad institutions give way, one at
a time, the weakest ﬁrst. Beginning with those which are least inter-
woven with the daily habits of life; and how very rarely those who
have obtained legal power because they ﬁrst had physical, have ever
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lost their hold of it until the physical power had passed over to the
other side. (Mill 1997: 6)
Mill here conceives of power (in this case, physical power) as a precon-
dition for the attainment and origin of a right (in this case, the right of
men to control women) in a way which seems to be of a piece with the
views of feminists and critical race theorists who contest the ways that
rights get demarcated to serve the interests of those who hold social
power over the interests of those who do not wield such power. 
The arguments in this chapter are intended to suggest that there is
reason to consider Mill as an ally within liberalism in the principled
opposition to cultural oppression, and as a pioneer in understanding
that true liberty and equality are nuanced ideas that require more to
actualize than the mere granting of a formal right. In his discussion in
The Subjection of Women of the radical social conditions that would
have to obtain in order for women and men to obtain true equality
and liberty, he seems to anticipate contemporary feminist concerns
about how imbalances in power between men and women may serve
to effectively deny women’s liberty. 
Further, I have attempted to show here how Mill’s concern with free-
dom of expression in On Liberty is compatible with a strategy to maximize
equality and autonomy that may regulate freedom of expression. Refocus-
ing attention to Mill’s commitment to autonomy and equality reveals
how his commitment to freedom of expression should be read as instru-
mental to those goals of autonomy and equality, rather than an end in
itself. If this is correct, then – if freedom of expression can be shown 
to lack the instrumentality that Mill believes that it has – it follows that
the values of equality and autonomy are paramount, and freedom of
expression is only valuable insofar as it supports those aims.
This chapter has attempted to read Mill as an ally in the liberal state’s
active role in remedying cultural oppression, by demonstrating his under-
standing of the role of social power in impeding the ability of the power-
less to achieve autonomy and equality and, through an analysis of 
The Subjection of Women, by demonstrating his primary commitment to
equality. Having Mill as an ally goes an important part of the way toward
entrenching an interest in rectifying power imbalances within liberalism,
but a discussion of Dworkin’s views on pornography and hate speech 
is also necessary to ground my view that liberalism ought to be more
interested in addressing power relations than it has been thus far.




Equality, Liberty, and Hard Cases:
A Contemporary View
3.1 Introduction
Contemporary egalitarian liberals – unlike their classical counterparts 
– have lived through many contentious events where the right to
freedom of expression has been tested to its limits: the Skokie, Illinois
skinhead marches, hate speech incidents on college campuses, internet
pornography and hate speech sites, Holocaust deniers, and cross-burners,
to name just a few. Despite this contemporary tumult, freedom of expres-
sion has been nearly unanimously afﬁrmed in both the US jurisprudence
and philosophical discourse. In what follows, I will examine Ronald
Dworkin’s inﬂuential contemporary justiﬁcation for freedom of expres-
sion, which claims that a thoroughgoing right to freedom of expression is
justiﬁed by the fact that it guarantees and preserves liberalism’s commit-
ment to equality by offering everyone an opportunity to speak, whereas
any other policy, such as state regulation, would fail to offer this equal
opportunity. 
In an interesting contrast to Mill, Dworkin’s justiﬁcation for freedom of
expression is based on equality, not liberty, and it is based not on the
instrumental reasons for allowing a robust right to freedom of expression,
but rather on reasons that Dworkin feels are ‘constitutive’ features of a
democratic society. This justiﬁcation is by no means immune to criticism,
and has indeed been challenged by feminists and critical race theorists
who ﬁnd the cases of pornography and hate speech to be sufﬁcient threats
to the freedom of expression and equality of their targets – women and
minorities – to warrant limiting freedom of expression in these cases. I
will argue that if Dworkin is to take equality as seriously as he claims to,
then, by his own lights, he must back away from an unrestricted freedom
of expression – which entails a backing away from state neutrality – in
light of these distinctly contemporary challenges of the harms of 
abbie.levin@gmail.com
systemic racism, sexism, and homophobia that underlie hate speech
and pornography.
The core of Chapters 2 and 3 taken together, then, reveal that the
liberal state’s focus on neutrality – as endorsed by Dworkin and by the
dominant reading of Mill – does not in all cases preserve equality, and
that in the cases of pornography and hate speech, it in fact operates 
to promote oppressive views of women and minorities. Given this, the
neutrality requirement ought to be jettisoned in light of our racist and
sexist culture, and the liberal state’s commitment to equality should
instead be championed.
3.2 Dworkin on freedom of expression
Dworkin argues that freedom of expression is absolutely crucial to moral
agency, and that moral agency is the cornerstone of democratic culture.
As moral agents, we should all have an equal opportunity to inﬂuence
the moral environment of our shared culture. Therefore, to do anything
but endorse a bare negative right to freedom of expression for every
subject is to violate the state’s core commitment to equality. Key to
understanding Dworkin’s view of the nature of the right to freedom of
expression is the distinction he makes between instrumental justiﬁcations
for freedom of speech, such as Mill’s – which famously holds that protect-
ing freedom of expression maximizes utility – and justiﬁcations, includ-
ing his own, which view freedom of speech as a constitutive element of
democratic fairness. Dworkin holds that the latter view is in fact the cor-
rect view, though he canvasses the history of American jurisprudence and
admits (1997: 197–8) that most of the leading decisions have made much
greater use of the former. Since the instrumental view is vulnerable to the
charge that there is in fact a disutility to its exercise, Dworkin feels that
his approach is inherently stronger.
Dworkin does not claim that instrumental justiﬁcations for freedom
of expression are false, but rather that they fail to capture what really,
fundamentally, underlies the right to freedom of expression. The
instrumental and constitutive justiﬁcations, then, are not mutually
exclusive, but the constitutive view is seen by Dworkin to hold even if
the instrumental view is proven to be false.
What exactly does Dworkin mean by the constitutive justiﬁcation for
freedom of expression? The constitutive view
…supposes that freedom of speech is valuable, not just in virtue of the
consequences it has, but because it is an essential and ‘constitutive’
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feature of a just political society that government treat all its adult
members, except those who are incompetent, as responsible moral
agents. (1997: 200)
Thus, Dworkin claims (1997: 25–6) that each individual’s having a sphere
of independent decision-making around moral issues is a precondition 
of democracy itself, and that freedom of expression is closely tied to facil-
itating that sphere. The claim is best understood as twofold: for a sus-
tainable democratic culture, it is necessary both that individuals are
independent moral agents (or at least have the inherent potential to
develop into them), and that government treat them as such. Dworkin
goes back and forth between each aspect of the claim, but it is best to
consider them each as separate necessary conditions for democracy.
For Dworkin, as a liberal within the egalitarian tradition, the aim of
democracy is not merely to facilitate majoritarianism, but rather to
facilitate equality. To this end of promoting equality, certain back-
ground conditions are required as prerequisites to the effective func-
tioning of democracy, one of which is independent moral agency:
A genuine political community must therefore be a community of
independent moral agents. It must not dictate what its citizens think
about matters of political or moral or ethical judgment, but must, on
the contrary, provide circumstances that encourage them to arrive 
at beliefs on these matters through their own reﬂective and ﬁnally
individual conviction. (Dworkin 1997: 26)
It is uncontroversial to hold that moral independence is a requirement
of a democratic culture, at the most simplistic level, simply because
freedom of thought seems fundamental to such elementary democratic
processes as voting. Further, it is uncontroversial to suppose that
freedom of expression is instrumental in facilitating that goal of moral
agency.
However, Dworkin means to say something stronger than that – that
freedom of expression is not merely instrumental to the goal of moral
independence, but indeed constitutive of it. It seems that much more
argument and elaboration is needed to make sense of this idea.
Certainly it cannot be the case that mere citizenship in a society which
protects freedom of expression is sufﬁcient to make every person an
independent moral agent. If not, then this raises the question of how
much participation in such a culture is necessary to secure moral agency.
It seems that it is up to the individual how, if at all, and to what
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degree, they engage with the ideas presented in a society which pro-
tects freedom of expression, and hence, on Dworkin’s scheme, up to
them how much of a moral agent they in fact are. It is even difﬁcult to
think of the relationship between moral agency and freedom of expres-
sion as anything but instrumental, although of course it is importantly
instrumental. 
The second aspect of Dworkin’s moral agency necessary conditions,
though, requires that government treat its citizens as moral agents,
regardless of how or whether the citizenry in fact exercise that agency.
Dworkin claims that this treatment amounts, at least in part, to refrain-
ing from censorship, particularly in controversial matters of moral or
political concern:
First, morally responsible people insist on making up their own minds
about what is good or bad in life or in politics, or what is true and false
in matters of justice or faith. Government insults its citizens, and
denies their moral responsibility, when it decrees that they cannot be
trusted to hear opinions that might persuade them to dangerous or
offensive convictions. We retain our dignity, as individuals, only by
insisting that no one – no ofﬁcial and no majority – has the right to
withhold an opinion from us on the ground that we are not ﬁt to hear
and consider it. (Dworkin 1997: 200–1)
So the ﬁrst requirement of democracy is a certain autonomy of the cit-
izenry in moral decisions – the presumption that citizens are in fact moral
agents – and what is necessary in order to meaningfully exercise that
autonomy is exposure to different, morally relevant, ideas. It would be
vacuous to subscribe to an idea of moral autonomy without also subscrib-
ing to the societal conditions, such as exposure to a diversity of ideas,
which give such autonomy substance. Hence, it is government’s role to
facilitate this diversity by protecting speech, thus fulﬁlling the second
part of Dworkin’s requirement that government treat citizens as moral
agents. This formulation thus closely links freedom of expression with
moral agency, both of which, for Dworkin, are necessary conditions of
democracy.
Dworkin’s second requirement of democratic culture, that government
treat its citizens as moral agents, ties freedom of expression in at the level
not only of hearing, but also of speaking about, different morally relevant
ideas. There are, then, two aspects of freedom of expression – hearing the
opinions of others, and disseminating one’s own opinions to others – and
both are intimately tied to moral agency, which is a prerequisite of
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democracy. Thus, for Dworkin, freedom of expression is itself effec-
tively a precondition of democracy. Once Dworkin ties treatment as a
moral agent to freedom of expression, then a curtailment of freedom 
of expression becomes an infringement on moral agency, and thus on
democracy itself, and consequently cannot be tolerated. 
3.3 The silencing and subordination arguments, revisited
While this seems a strong argument for allowing free speech in all cases,
Dworkin’s position is nonetheless vulnerable to criticism by those who
ﬁnd unregulated hate speech and pornography problematic for the moral
agency of the women and minorities that such speech targets. It is here
that the silencing and subordination arguments will be revisited, this
time in light of the concerns they raise about equality, rather than liberty.
Again, I will reserve my evaluation as to the persuasiveness of these argu-
ments until Chapter 5, once speech act theory and continental con-
ceptions of social power have been introduced. However, even without
those conceptual tools for evaluating these arguments, they are suggestive
and persuasive enough on their face to require that Dworkin needs to
address them more seriously than he does.
The equality arm of the subordination argument holds that state 
tolerance of freedom of expression in cases of hate speech and porno-
graphy compromises the equality interest of those targeted by racist and
sexist speech in favor of protecting the liberty interest of the speakers.
In other words, put in terms of the US jurisprudence that Dworkin is
primarily addressing, the charge is that the hate speech and porno-
graphy decisions privilege the First Amendment rights to freedom of
expression of the speakers over the Fourteenth Amendment right to
equal protection of the laws of the minorities and women addressed by
this speech. The claim is, further, that such a privileging is illegitimate
and grounded only in the racist, sexist, and homophobic relations of
power operative in our culture, rather than grounded in any legitimate
doctrinal reason to privilege the First Amendment over the Fourteenth.
As critical race theorist Charles Lawrence III poses the problem:
We are balancing our concern for the free ﬂow of ideas and the
democratic process with our desire for equality…. When we see the
potential danger of incursions on the ﬁrst amendment but do not
see existing incursions on the fourteenth amendment, our per-
ceptions have been inﬂuenced by an entire belief system that makes
us less sensitive to the injury experienced by nonwhites. Unaware,
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we have adopted a worldview that takes for granted Black sacriﬁce.
(Lawrence 1993: 72, 82)
Similarly, MacKinnon argues:
The law of equality and the law of freedom of speech are on a col-
lision course in this country. Until this moment, the constitutional
doctrine of free speech has developed without taking equality seriously
– either the problem of social inequality or the mandate of substan-
tive legal equality…. [T]he First Amendment has grown as if a com-
mitment to speech were no part of a commitment to equality and 
as if a commitment to equality had no implications for the law of
speech…. Understanding that there is a relationship between these
two issues – the less speech you have, the more the speech of those
who have it keeps you unequal; the more the speech of the dom-
inant is protected, the more dominant they become and the less the
subordinated are heard from – is virtually nonexistent. (MacKinnon
1996: 71–3)
The idea behind both of these charges is that hate speech and porno-
graphy violate equality because the views that they put forward give
rise to unequal opportunities for the minorities and women who 
are addressed by this speech – if women are treated as sex objects in
pornography and the content of hate speech is about the inferiority of
whatever minority group is being targeted, then women and minorities
go out into a world where those views are prevalent, and their oppor-
tunities for advancement are thus hindered accordingly. 
Recall also that for MacKinnon, even more strongly, pornography is
itself an act of subordination as well as causing further subordination
as a result. She writes (1987: 172) that pornography ‘institutionalizes
the sexuality of male supremacy…. Men treat women as who they 
see women as being. Pornography constructs who that is.’ It is when
pornography ‘constructs who that is’ that it is itself an act of sub-
ordination, and it is when women’s status is consequently lowered as 
a result of that construction – in that women are seen either as sex
objects, as subservient to men, or as enjoying rape – that pornography
causes further subordination down the road. The claim of the sub-
ordination argument, then, is that women’s status, agency, and pos-
itive liberties – all of which boil down to a claim about inequality – are
effectively lowered by the very utterance of speech which enacts their
subordinate status, and that subordinate status is then furthered by a
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community which offers women and minorities fewer positive life
choices, due to the beliefs spread and accepted by pornography and
hate speech.
The claim that pornography and hate speech, at the moment of its very
utterance, enact subordination is certainly a strong one. MacKinnon
writes (1987: 172) that pornography ‘sexualizes rape, battery, sexual
harassment, prostitution and child sexual abuse; it thereby celebrates,
promotes, authorizes and legitimizes them.’ But how can she support this
claim? It is here that the work of Rae Langton and Jennifer Hornsby 
is apposite (see Langton 1993; Langton and Hornsby 1998). Though a 
full explication of these ideas will be given in Chapter 4, a brief discus-
sion follows here, in order that we may make more sense of Dworkin’s
response to it. 
In trying to explicate and render plausible MacKinnon’s claim 
that pornography itself enacts the subordination of women, Langton 
and Hornsby apply the apparatus of speech act theory developed by 
J. L. Austin, arguing that pornography may best be considered an illocu-
tionary speech act, employing Austin’s terminology – a speech act that
changes the state of affairs in the world at the moment of its utterance,
such as saying ‘I do’ when participating in a legally binding marriage 
ceremony. While a full explication of these ideas is forthcoming in
Chapter 4, in sum I believe that Langton and Hornsby’s work offers a
compelling theoretical framework to buttress MacKinnon’s claim. 
The subordination argument holds, then, that if pornography is pro-
tected by the First Amendment, pornography violates another competing
constitutional value – the Fourteenth Amendment, which guarantees
equal protection of the laws for all citizens. If so, the argument continues,
then the state’s task is to balance the two constitutional values, and since
pornography contributes nothing of any importance to political debate,
and commitment to equality is a central concern of liberals, the debate
should be resolved in favor of equality. Thus, like other instances where
speech is regulated due to other compelling and competing interests,
such as in the cases of libel and slander, pornographic and hate speech
may be justiﬁably regulated in order to promote equality for women and
minorities.
The subordination argument is particularly salient against Dworkin’s
formulation of the right to freedom of expression, because he views
freedom of expression as itself protective of equality, rather than in
competition with it. Not only is freedom of expression protective of
equality, but further and more profoundly, democracy itself is under-
stood as protective of equality. The whole thrust of Dworkin’s con-
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ditions of moral membership in a democratic community, which include
the right to freedom of expression, is that such conditions are equality
preserving (see Dworkin 1997: 25–6).
Thus, the charges of the subordination argument are damaging to
Dworkin’s justiﬁcation for freedom of expression because they suggest
that freedom of expression cannot in all cases be tied to equality, and
that in some cases equality is impeded by the protection of the right to
freedom of expression. Hate speech and pornography are inimical to
equality, since they subordinate minorities and women and thus offer
them unequal opportunities in society – economically, politically, and
interpersonally.
The second argument against unregulated freedom of expression 
– the silencing argument – maintains that the choice to privilege the
speaker’s dignity and moral agency over the recipients’ same interests, by
consistently protecting the speech interests of the white, male, majority
over the speech interests of oppressed groups, as the US jurisprudence on
the topic has repeatedly done, violates the First Amendment rights of
women and minorities in favor of those of pornographers and consumers
of pornography. If this argument is correct, it establishes the idea that the
protection of some speech compromises the speech interests of others.
Recall that this argument claims that sexist or racist speech in a sexist and
racist culture ‘silences’ the subsequent speech of women and minorities 
– either because the chilling effect of the racist or sexist speech is so 
powerful as to entail that women and minorities will not bother even
attempting to rebut it – whether out of fear, disenfranchisement, cyni-
cism, or some combination of each – or that their attempted rebuttals 
will be wholly ignored, not even heard, or profoundly misunderstood by
the dominant culture. 
Here again, the work of Langton and Hornsby is illuminating: if
women are ‘silenced’ by pornography, one way to make sense of that
claim in spite of the fact that women are of course literally as free to 
speak as anyone else, is to think of their speech acts under the social con-
ditions of silencing, in Austin’s terms again, as infelicitious. Attempted
illocutionary speech acts can be said to ‘misﬁre’ when the circumstances
of their utterance render them not conducive to their being efﬁcacious.
One persuasive example that Langton and Hornsby give here is the 
situation of date rape: when a woman says ‘no’ to sex, but the man, for 
whatever reason, hears that as a ‘yes.’ In such a situation, though the
woman has of course spoken, she has been thoroughly misunderstood or
ignored – in other words, silenced. Again, while a thorough examination
of feminist speech act theory follows in Chapter 4, I believe that this
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theoretical framework adds the needed back-story behind MacKinnon’s
claims.
Thus, while of course women and minorities are still technically as
free as anyone else to speak, the silencing argument holds that it is the
background conditions for their speech, which having been established
by the preceding racist or sexist speech are such that any subsequent
speech is discounted in advance by the privileged recipients, or not
spoken at all by the oppressed speakers. According to these arguments,
the speech of the dominant culture so effectively dictates opinions
about oppressed groups as to create the oppression of those groups, 
as the subordination argument has it, and once created, furthers that
oppression, as the silencing argument has it. The oppressed – and thus
unequal – subjects enacted by such speech will then have their speech
discounted as a result of the inferior subject position created by the
injurious speech. MacKinnon claims:
In the context of social inequality, so-called speech can be an exercise
of power which constructs the social reality in which people live,
from objectiﬁcation to genocide…. Together with all its material
supports, authoritatively saying that someone is inferior is largely
how structures of status and differential treatment are demarcated
and actualized. Words and images are how people are placed in hier-
archies, how social stratiﬁcation is made to seem inevitable and right,
how feelings of inferiority and superiority are engendered, and how
indifference to violence against those on the bottom is rationalized
and normalized. Social supremacy is made, inside and between people,
through making meanings. To unmake it, these meanings and their
technologies have to be unmade. (MacKinnon 1996: 30–1; emphasis 
as in original)
This argument, like the arguments of feminists and critical race theo-
rists generally, begins with the premise that power relations between
privileged and subordinated groups are key to understanding the actual
workings of social and political interaction, and it is this insight that, 
I will argue, Dworkin fails to contemplate throughout his writings on
freedom of expression.
Once the subordinated culture has been oppressed by the speech of
the dominant culture, the ﬁrst step in silencing has been achieved, and
the dominant culture is alleviated from the burden of listening to that
culture. It is once this has happened that we see more clearly the work-
ings of silencing. Pornography in particular, as opposed to other types
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of sexist speech, according to MacKinnon, silences women by causing
its consumers to miscomprehend the ideas that women intended to
express by uttering words in a sexual context:
When anyone tries to tell what happened, she is told that…[h]er no
meant yes…. You learn that language does not belong to you, that
you cannot use it to say what you know…. Society is made up of
words, whose meanings the powerful control, or try to. (MacKinnon
1996: 4, 5, 10)
Women are stripped of the ability to have their meaning properly
heard: though they speak, they are effectively silenced, since they are
taken to have said the opposite of what they did, in fact, say.1
Seen in this light, the silencing argument can be understood as a
charge that the Dworkinian free speech program, enacted in a racist
and sexist culture, in effect protects the right to freedom of expression
of the dominant culture at the expense of the protection of that same
right towards the oppressed cultures. Put in Dworkin’s own terms, the
silencing argument denies that unregulated freedom of expression allows
individuals equal opportunity to speak, and by speaking, inﬂuence their
culture.
These two arguments – from silencing and from subordination – are
independent of each other, and feminists and critical race theorists 
can and do offer them either as alternatives or in combination. While
these arguments are by no means completely above criticism, I believe
that they raise an important objection to Dworkin’s views about 
free speech, especially with the theoretical boost offered by Langton
and Hornsby. Both of these arguments are of course in stark contrast 
to Dworkin’s view that freedom of expression is necessarily linked 
to equality, because each points out a particular way that porno-
graphy enacts and furthers inequality – the subordination argument 
by showing how women’s status in society is lowered through repre-
sentations that are degrading to women, and the silencing argument
by showing how men’s speech is worth more than women’s, since
women’s voices are effectively silenced, especially with respect to
speech acts about consent to or refusal of sexual intercourse. We need
to investigate further Dworkin’s views about these claims in order 
to see whether he can meet their charges. He has several different 
arguments against these charges, all of which, I will argue, are inade-
quate responses to the idea that pornography and hate speech vitiate
equality. 
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Before turning to those arguments, though, let us conclude by noting
that the silencing and subordination arguments effect their criticism
by granting Dworkin’s conception of the link between freedom of
expression, moral agency, and democracy itself, and then showing that
lack of regulation too denies moral agency and is thus deleterious to
democracy. The force of the silencing argument is to grant that free-
dom of expression is indeed tied to moral agency and then to demo-
cracy itself, but to show that given that, the fact that some speech
leads to the denial of other speech must itself also entail that moral
agency and hence democracy are violated by lack of regulation. The
most mild reading of the silencing argument has it that the conclusion
is at least a dilemma – essential conditions of democracy are violated
both in cases of state regulation of some speech and in some cases of
free speech – and a stronger reading has it that democracy is more
importantly violated in allowing hate speech than in prohibiting it,
because views of the unequal moral worth of citizens are more of 
an affront to democratic society than is regulation that prohibits 
such views. Either reading of the silencing argument, however, grants
Dworkin’s formulation of the relationship between democracy, moral
agency, and freedom of expression and reads it against itself by
showing that the relationship is violated by allowing unregulated
speech, in the cases of hate speech and pornography. 
Dworkin’s argument for freedom of expression certainly has persuasive
rhetorical value. He is all but demanding that we ought to be morally out-
raged at the very idea of any kind of regulation of speech. It denies our
‘dignity,’ it claims that we ‘cannot be trusted,’ it is a ‘wrong,’ it ‘frustrates
moral personality,’ and it is an ‘insult’ (Dworkin 1997: 200–1). All of
these terms are of course emotionally loaded, and Dworkin seems to rely
heavily on that. That said, if indeed there is such a relationship between
moral agency, freedom of expression, and democracy, as Dworkin posits,
then his argument for freedom of expression is indeed a strong one.
However, I want to suggest that it is a strong argument only in less 
controversial cases of freedom of expression, where harms to oppressed
groups from hate speech and pornography do not raise issues about the
effects on the freedom of expression and moral agency of the targets
arising from the content of the speech in question. 
Cases where freedom of expression expresses and furthers views
about the unequal moral worth of certain classes of people – women
and minorities – such as hate speech and pornography, demonstrate
that there cannot be such an easy relationship between freedom of
expression and ideas of human dignity and agency. If the content of
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such speech is doing little or nothing other than disputing the moral
agency of women, according to such feminists as MacKinnon, and
nothing other than assaulting the dignity of visible minorities, as many
critical race theorists hold, then how can there be a necessary con-
nection between freedom of expression, on the one hand, and dignity
and moral agency on the other? 
In other words, it seems that freedom of expression cannot be con-
stitutively tied to dignity and moral agency if in some cases the exercise
of freedom of expression denies the dignity and moral agency of its
targets. This objection, which owes its inspiration to the arguments of
feminists and critical race theorists, seems sufﬁcient to show that there
is no reason, without providing further argument against this objec-
tion, to believe that there is a constitutive link between freedom of
expression and dignity and agency, although there may very well be an
instrumental link between these ideas in cases where cultural oppres-
sion against women and minorities is not implicated. It seems that
Dworkin has not convincingly made his case that there is a consti-
tutive link between freedom of expression and democracy, and the
importance of this link being constitutive is hard to overestimate 
for Dworkin’s theory, since he needs to argue constitutively if he is to
successfully sidestep any arguments from the disutility of freedom of
expression.2
3.4 Dworkin’s response to the subordination and 
silencing arguments
3.4.1 The overall challenge to Dworkin
In discussing Catharine MacKinnon’s arguments against constitutional
protection of pornography, Dworkin notes (1997: 205) that they are
instrumental arguments, and that only by arguing constitutively can they
be defeated. Much, then, seems to turn on the question of whether 
the constitutive argument can get off the ground, and, as I have argued, 
it cannot, for at least two reasons. First, Dworkin has not established 
that there is anything other than a strong instrumental link between
moral agency and freedom of expression; and second, the arguments
from pornography and hate speech, if correct, show that there cannot 
be a constitutive relationship between freedom of expression and moral
agency and dignity if some instances of freedom of expression operate to
vitiate both agency and dignity. 
Dworkin, then, needs to show that these arguments that porno-
graphy and hate speech vitiate dignity and agency ought not to be
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accepted as they stand; but he makes several statements that show that
he fails to appreciate the point of their charges. With reference to racist
speech, he writes:
It is very important that the Supreme Court conﬁrm that the First
Amendment protects even such [racist] speech; that it protects, 
as Holmes said, even speech we loathe. That is crucial for the reason
that the constitutive justiﬁcation of free speech emphasizes: because
we are a liberal society committed to individual moral respons-
ibility, and any censorship on grounds of content is inconsistent
with that commitment. (Dworkin 1997: 205)
This just restates the problem. The charge from critical race theorists is
that dignity, which Dworkin was happy to equate with moral respons-
ibility when it suited his rhetorical purposes, is impaired by the very
operation of freedom of expression. 
In the case of pornography, Dworkin discusses and disagrees with the
Supreme Court of Canada’s Butler decision that would regulate some
pornography containing degrading and dehumanizing depictions of
women, because the Court found that such speech constitutes harm not
acceptable to a free and democratic society (R.v. Butler [1992]1.S.C.R.452).
Dworkin writes of Butler:
In a recent decision, the Supreme Court of Canada accepted a dif-
ferent instrumental argument for upholding a statute censoring
certain forms of pornography…. The Canadian Court conceded that
the effect of its ruling was to narrow that constitutional protection,
but said that ‘the proliferation of materials which seriously offend
the values fundamental to our society is a substantial concern which
justiﬁes restricting the otherwise full exercise of the freedom of
expression.’ That is an amazing statement. It is the central, deﬁning,
premise of freedom of speech that the offensiveness of ideas, or the
challenge they offer to traditional ideas, cannot be a valid reason for
censorship; once that premise is abandoned it is difﬁcult to see what
free speech means. The Court added that some sexually explicit
material harms women because ‘materials portraying women as 
a class as objects for sexual exploitation and abuse have a negative
impact on the individual’s sense of self-worth and acceptance.’ 
But that kind of harm is so close to mere offensiveness that it
cannot count, by itself, as a valid reason for censorship either. Every
powerful and controversial idea has a potential negative impact on
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someone’s self-esteem.… It is obviously inconsistent with respecting
citizens as responsible moral agents to dictate what they can read 
on the basis of some ofﬁcial judgment about what will improve 
or destroy their characters, or what would cause them to have incor-
rect views about social matters. (Dworkin 1997: 206–8) 
The Butler decision stands for the proposition that some pornography
may impair the fundamental interests of a democratic society, and is
thus subject to state regulation on that basis, so it is no defense against
that decision to simply reiterate the importance of society treating its
citizens as responsible moral agents. At the very least, Dworkin must
acknowledge that there is a standoff between the dignity and moral
agency of the speakers and that of the recipients, and then make a com-
pelling further argument for why the agency of the speakers matters
more than that of the recipients. 
3.4.2 Dworkin’s response to the subordination argument
Dworkin has three responses to MacKinnon’s subordination argument
– that pornography subordinates women and thus limits their ability 
to have equal access to opportunities – and her conclusion that porno-
graphy ought to be regulated. First, Dworkin claims that there is a 
prohibitively slippery slope in entertaining this kind of approach:
Government could then forbid the graphic or visceral or emotion-
ally charged expression of any opinion or conviction that might rea-
sonably offend a disadvantaged group. It could outlaw performances
of The Merchant of Venice, or ﬁlms about professional women who
neglect their children, or caricatures or parodies of homosexuals in
nightclub routines. Courts would have to balance the value of such
expression, as a contribution to public debate or learning, against
the damage it might cause to the standing or sensibilities of its targets.
(Dworkin 1997: 236)
This, again, simply restates MacKinnon’s problem – she wants the
courts to ‘balance the value of such expression…against the damage it
might cause to the standing of its targets.’ One can at least imagine as
plausible the possibility that in such a balancing by thoughtful people
with clear criteria for decision-making, The Merchant of Venice will pass,
and certain kinds of pornography may fail. This is not to suggest that
the process of balancing will be at all easy. It indeed may prove to be
prohibitively difﬁcult as a practical matter, but this kind of conclusion
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needs to be arrived at after considered and sincere attempts and debate,
rather than at the outset. MacKinnon’s point, though, which Dworkin
in the above quotation dismisses, is that taking the conﬂict between
the First and Fourteenth Amendments at all seriously would necessarily
require some kind of balancing of these interests, and Dworkin’s
refusal to engage in that balancing calls into question his commitment
to equality. 
Dworkin admits as much when he writes (1997: 236): ‘If we must
make the choice between liberty and equality that MacKinnon envis-
ages – if the two constitutional values really are on a collision course 
– we should have to choose liberty because the alternative would be
the despotism of thought-police.’ Dworkin’s equation of equality with
despotic thought police seems a substantial leap. If there were in fact
despotic thought police, this would of course be a problem for a liberal
society.3 However, Dworkin needs to show that a careful judiciary – or
other body – committed to the equality of women and minorities is 
in fact a despotic thought police in disguise. It is not obvious that such
a careful judiciary, in aiming to uphold democracy’s central values 
of equality, moral agency, and dignity, would necessarily violate 
those very principles. He has not even come close to establishing that,
unless he means to suggest that the very idea of advancing minority
equality rights is itself despotic and thought controlling. If so, then in
what sense is he committed to equality, moral agency, or democracy 
at all?
Hence, these arguments against MacKinnon’s position seem weak at
best. Dworkin’s second, and more powerful, response to the subordina-
tion argument is that the First and Fourteenth Amendments aren’t really
opposed at all, and thus that the concerns of feminists and critical race
theorists are misguided. Dworkin claims that political equality is pre-
served through the operation of the First Amendment itself:
Citizens play a continuing part in politics between elections because
informal public debate and argument inﬂuences what responsible
ofﬁcials will do. So the First Amendment contributes a great deal to
political equality: it insists that just as no one may be excluded from
the vote because his opinions are despicable, so no one may be
denied the right to speak or write or broadcast because what he will
say is too offensive to be heard…. Equality demands that everyone,
no matter how eccentric or despicable, have a chance to inﬂuence
policies as well as elections. Of course it does not follow that gov-
ernment will in the end respect everyone’s opinion equally, or that
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ofﬁcial decisions will be equally congenial to all groups. Equality
demands that everyone’s opinion be given a chance for inﬂuence,
not that anyone’s opinion will triumph or even be represented in
what government actually does. (Dworkin 1997: 236–7)
The claim here is that an unrestricted First Amendment leads to protec-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment because an unrestricted First Amend-
ment allows each person an equal chance to inﬂuence the political
sphere. This response seems inadequate to the charges of the subord-
ination argument, but before I address that inadequacy, I will present
Dworkin’s third and ﬁnal attempted rebuttal to the subordination 
argument. 
According to Dworkin, because pornography has little political merit,
it seems immune to his argument above. He thus needs to modify his
position slightly in order to claim that the First Amendment, even in
cases of pornography, is equality-preserving. He claims that not only
should every citizen have an equal chance to inﬂuence the political
process, but so too should every citizen have an equal chance to
inﬂuence the moral environment:
Exactly because the moral environment in which we all live is in
good part created by others…, the question of who shall have the
power to help shape that environment, and how, is of fundamental
importance, though it is often neglected in political theory. Only
one answer is consistent with the ideals of political equality: that no
one may be prevented from inﬂuencing the shared moral environ-
ment, through his own private choices, tastes, opinions, and
example, just because these tastes or opinions disgust those who
have the power to shut him up or lock him up…But we cannot
count, among the kinds of interests that may be protected in this
way, a right not to be insulted or damaged just by the fact that
others have hostile or uncongenial tastes…. Recognizing that right
would mean denying that some people – those whose tastes these
are – have any right to participate in forming the moral environ-
ment at all…. In a genuinely egalitarian society, however, those
views cannot be locked out, in advance, by criminal or civil law;
they must instead be discredited by the disgust, outrage, and
ridicule of other people. (Dworkin 1997: 237–8)
Dworkin claims that the only way to preserve our right to equal parti-
cipation in inﬂuencing our shared moral environment is through an
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unregulated First Amendment. To regulate this Amendment in any
way would necessarily give some groups an unequal opportunity to
speak. However, this seems to straightforwardly beg the question when
viewed in light of the charges of the silencing argument. MacKinnon’s
point in the silencing argument is that who is participating in that debate
is exactly the question at issue. Her claim is that some speech takes
other speech effectively out of the debate, because it is systematically mis-
interpreted, and in so doing violates the right of all persons to have an
equal chance to speak. So, Dworkin is right that equality demands that
each person have an equal chance to speak, but the claim of the silencing
argument can easily be put as follows: hate speech and pornography
effectively deny every person an equal chance to inﬂuence govern-
ment or morality, because those kinds of speech, due to their content,
ensure that their target’s subsequent speech will be misunderstood and
misinterpreted, thus denying the victim the right to speak. If we accept
the silencing argument, then Dworkin’s idea that the lack of regulation
leads to equality fails to be persuasive.
3.4.3 Dworkin’s response to the silencing argument
Dworkin, however, does not accept the silencing argument. He argues
that, according to the silencing argument:
[i]t is women, not pornographers, who need First Amendment protec-
tion, because pornography humiliates or frightens them into silence
and conditions men to misunderstand what they say…. Because this
argument cites the First Amendment as a reason for banning, not for
protecting, pornography, it has the appeal of paradox. But it is pre-
mised on an unacceptable proposition: that the right to free speech
includes a right to circumstances that encourage one to speak, and 
a right that others grasp and respect what one means to say. These 
are obviously not rights that any society can recognize or enforce.
Creationists, ﬂat-earthers, and bigots, for example, are ridiculed in
many parts of America now; that ridicule undoubtedly dampens the
enthusiasm many of them have for speaking out and limits the atten-
tion others pay to what they say. Many political and constitutional
theorists, it is true, insist that if freedom of speech is to have any value,
it must include some right to the opportunity to speak: they say that a
society in which only the rich enjoy access to the newspapers, tele-
vision, or other public media does not accord a genuine right to free
speech. But it goes far beyond that to insist that freedom of speech
includes not only opportunity to speak to the public but a guarantee
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of a sympathetic or even competent understanding of what one says.
(Dworkin 1997: 232)
Dworkin’s objection here derives much of its rhetorical force from its
occlusion of the issue of social power that is so central to the silencing
argument, and indeed all of the arguments against the refusal to regulate
hate speech and pornography. Though Dworkin is certainly not oblivious
to the notion of social power elsewhere in his writing, he does not
address it in his remarks here. Creationists, ﬂat-earthers, and bigots are
minority groups precisely because the views they espouse have already
been tested, debated, investigated, and empirically rejected through a fair
democratic discussion process. In other words, their views are ridiculed
for legitimate reasons, according to the Millian account of free speech as a
search for truth.
This is crucially not the case, however, for the views of minorities
and women, and the reason that their views are ridiculed and dis-
missed has everything to do with the illegitimate power that dominant
groups are able to exercise upon historically disadvantaged groups, dis-
counting their views for reasons that have absolutely nothing to do
with their merit as ideas. Interestingly and inexplicably, Dworkin
seems to understand that power is important in discussing the scope of
freedom of expression, because he grants, above, that it is a defensible
position to maintain that access to the press is importantly impeded by
economic concerns. Why would this concern be any different in prin-
ciple than the concern that other people’s views are discounted, or not
given airtime, not because of economic factors, but rather because of
racist or sexist prejudice? 
The issue underlying both of these important impediments to the exer-
cise of free speech is that of social power, and that issue seems to be all
but denied outright by most liberal accounts of freedom of expression,
including, notably, Dworkin’s. As Dworkin maintains above, free speech
includes nothing else but the bare negative liberty for any subject to speak
without direct impediment by the state. It is this bare bones account of
free speech that all of the feminist and critical race theory arguments
object to in one way or another, claiming alternatively that the market-
place of ideas is not a neutral space, as Dworkin and Mill would have 
it, but is instead corrupted by racism and sexism which serve to deny the
ideas of minorities and women in advance. It is only through an analysis
of the concept of social power, to which I will turn in Chapters 4 and 5,
that we can redress these shortcomings of the marketplace. Without it,
we are led to views as inadequate as those offered above by Dworkin.
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The charge of the silencing and subordination arguments, as we have
seen, is that free speech cannot be constitutively tied to morality – in
the case of the subordination argument because the speech enacts the
unequal moral worth of its subjects, and in the case of the silencing
argument, because the effective deprivation of the speech of women
and minorities must give them lower moral status by Dworkin’s 
own lights. Dworkin’s response to these charges – in the case of the
subordination argument, that unregulated freedom of expression itself
ensures equality – does not beg the question directly, since he is claim-
ing, effectively, that there is no need for the subordination argument.
However, his response still crucially misses the point of these argu-
ments. Dworkin is saying that there is no conﬂict between the First
and Fourteenth Amendments, because an unrestricted First Amend-
ment leads unproblematically to the upholding of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s equal protection clause. However, the charge of the sub-
ordination argument is exactly the opposite – unregulated freedom of
expression applied systematically in favor of the hate speaker and the
pornographer denies minorities and women the equal protection of
the laws. In other words, protecting pornography gives rise to the
silencing argument – privileging the freedom of expression interests of
the speaker over the freedom of expression interests of the minority is
an immoral and unjustiﬁed reiﬁcation of the status quo of the power-
ful, at the expense of the relatively powerless. Dworkin’s point above 
is only persuasive if it is convincing that pornographers are the minor-
ities whose interests are genuinely in need of protection. However,
such a response occludes the feminist and critical race theorists’ point
that pornography and hate speech are the voice of majority hegemonic
power, and thus the privileging of their interests over the interests of
minorities is yet another instance of these operations of power working
to oppress, rather than vindicate, minority interests.
It seems, then, that Dworkin’s attempts to justify freedom of expres-
sion as constitutive of moral agency, and as protective of equality, do
not effectively meet the charges offered against these justiﬁcations by
feminists and critical race theorists. The silencing and subordination
arguments from feminists and critical race theorists – which call into
question whether unregulated freedom of expression in fact promotes
liberty and equality – have raised important challenges to Dworkin’s
scheme, suggesting that there is room to criticize orthodox liberal
justiﬁcations of free speech. Thus it seems that the problem of harm to
women and minorities from hate speech and pornography remains
unaddressed in Dworkin’s attempt to dismiss it. If the arguments I
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have been presenting are persuasive, then these concerns about crucial
liberties and equalities are the very concerns that Dworkin’s theory
must genuinely address.
What these ﬁrst three chapters have attempted to show is that there
is conceptual space within egalitarian liberal theory for the departure
from state neutrality in order to regulate culturally oppressive speech
and the rights violations – cast either in terms of equality or in terms of
liberty – to which such speech gives rise. Chapter 1 attempted to show
that there are signiﬁcant strains of egalitarian liberal thought that lend
themselves to a conception of an activist state that regulates cultural
oppression in the name of equality: Mill’s harm principle, Raz’s concep-
tion of rights as serving the common interest, and Dworkin’s conception
that the function of the egalitarian liberal state is not to protect a liberty
right, but rather to treat all of its citizens with equal concern and respect.
Subsequently, Chapters 2 and 3 attempted to examine why other strands
of Mill, as the leading classical egalitarian liberal, and Dworkin, as 
the leading contemporary egalitarian liberal, have not gone so far as to
regulate freedom of expression for the activist state. 
What this examination has shown, I believe, is that in the case of
Mill, reading On Liberty alongside The Subjection of Women reveals him
to be more sympathetic to the issue of cultural oppression than reading
On Liberty alone would suggest. In the case of Dworkin, however, we
have seen that the centrality of equal concern and respect does not
seem consistently applied to the question of hate speech and porno-
graphy; by his own lights, Dworkin should depart from his com-
mitment to state neutrality in order to protect his own stated central
concern – the liberal state’s treatment of all its citizens with equal
concern and respect.
At the end of these three chapters, then, we are left with the concep-
tual space for the liberal state to embrace an activist position, with the
understanding that such a position would come at the expense of its
presumed neutrality in the marketplace of ideas. I say ‘presumed neu-
trality’ because the subordination and silencing arguments call into
question the idea that there really is any such neutrality – the state is
always promoting (by legalizing) some speech at the expense of other
speech, according to the silencing argument, or promoting (by legal-
izing) some speech at the expense of either positive liberty or equality.
What this criticism raises is the issue of state power, and how that issue
goes notably unaddressed in liberal philosophy and jurisprudence. It is
this issue which will become central in the remaining chapters. First,
the issue of the power of the state as disproportionately applied to
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certain groups over others, as the silencing and subordination argu-
ments suggest, will be addressed. The ﬂip side of this is if the state takes
this criticism on board, and then departs from its neutral stance in
order to protect equality against the harms of culturally oppressive
speech, how we can be sure that its activism is rightly directed – that is,
directed truly to protecting equality, as opposed to its own, or some
other, interest. This question is also one regarding state power, and its
resolution is key to allaying the traditional liberal concerns with abuse
of such power.
In order to properly address both sides of this issue of state power 
– the unconscious state unwittingly acting to promote the rights of the
majority over those of the minority, and the conscious, activist state
taking steps to ensure that equality is preserved, at the expense of 
neutrality – we need to take a much closer look at the nature and role
of the liberal state. This closer look, achieved through an examination
of the nature of state speech and through continental theories of social
power, will reveal a state that is always already implicated in power,
and thus necessarily in need of a revised understanding of its role. It 
is to this question of state power and state speech that I now turn.




Power and Politics: Speech Acts
and Freedom of Expression
4.1 Introduction
Thus far, I have argued that there is conceptual space within egalitarian
liberalism to accommodate an activist state in the service of regulating
culturally oppressive speech. In Chapters 2 and 3, I argued that the
criticisms of the traditional liberal justiﬁcations for unregulated free-
dom of expression brought by feminists and critical race theorists in
the silencing and subordination arguments demonstrated the lack of
attention paid to power relations by egalitarian liberal theory. The dis-
cussion in this chapter will show – using the framework of speech act
theory developed by J. L. Austin – that while there are signiﬁcant prob-
lems with the silencing and subordination arguments as they stand, in
particular their conclusion that the speech of pornographers and hate
speakers is powerful enough to silence and subordinate, they never-
theless make what I think is a fundamental point – that liberal think-
ing about the allocation and delineation of rights leaves something
crucial about power undiscussed, and that speech act theory provides a
very helpful framework for ﬁnally discussing the relationship between
language and power that the silencing and subordination arguments
have only gestured at. 
I argue, further, that these concerns about power are not funda-
mentally at odds with egalitarian liberalism, but instead ought to be
taken on board by it. By liberalism’s own commitments, there is 
an obligation owed by the state to pay attention to power, for at least
two reasons, both of which are intimated in the silencing and sub-
ordination arguments. First, these arguments suggest that a state which
is oblivious to the implications of rights allocations on power relations
may itself give rise to rights violations – in the cases of pornography
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and hate speech, either in terms of equality or in terms of freedom of
expression – and the state has a clear and uncontroversial obligation 
to prevent such violations, insofar as it is uncontoversially committed
to upholding the rights of all of its citizens equally. In other words,
this ﬁrst point is that a state which is not aware of its own power may
unwittingly neglect its obligations to its citizens.
Second, the discussion in Chapters 2 and 3 aimed to show that the
silencing and subordination arguments either implicitly or explicitly
make use of the notion of power in claiming that there is an obligation
to protect women and minorities from the harms of speech in certain
situations. They claim that the social situation of minorities and women
is importantly disanalogous to the social situation of the dominant 
culture, and that because of this, there is reason – grounded either in
equality or in liberty – to protect minorities and women from the rights
violations that may be caused by the dominant culture’s exercise of its
freedom of expression rights. However, egalitarian liberalism has, to date,
not acknowledged the importance of the discrepancy in power experi-
enced by minorities and women, and has thus decided these hard cases 
of freedom of expression in what appears on its face to be an abstract 
and formal manner, which has produced results which, by the liberal
principles I outlined in Chapter 1, ought to be considered unjust.
I will hold, along with the feminist and critical race theorists advan-
cing the silencing and subordination arguments, that this abstract and
formal manner serves to conceal the relations of power which are in
fact operative in the state’s leading judicial decisions regarding consti-
tutional protection for hate speech and pornography. In other words,
this second point concerns the obligation of the state to remedy imbal-
ances in power as between groups of citizens, again in order to treat all
its citizens with equal concern and respect.
It is the aim of this chapter to begin to explicate more fully the idea
of power operative in these critiques, and to show how a certain under-
standing of the nature of power makes sense of the charges advanced
by the silencing and subordination arguments. In order to begin to
address the issue of state power being pointed to in the silencing and
subordination arguments, I need ﬁrst to introduce the conceptual
framework of speech act theory as pioneered by J. L. Austin in his
seminal How to Do Things with Words, since this will facilitate the
development of a more robust vocabulary for discussion of the rela-
tionship between speech and power. Austin’s book, while introducing
the idea that some speech is best considered as action – that is, in its
very utterance, speech changes states of affairs in the world, rather
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than merely reporting upon states of affairs in the world – nevertheless
does not fully consider the political implications of why and how some
speech comes to be best considered as action and other speech does
not. 
To begin to answer this question, I will then introduce Foucault’s
notion of power framework in Chapter 5, which will complete the
framework necessary for my argument that state speech as exempliﬁed
in rights enactment and limitation will be seen to be the paradigmatic
instance of powerful, rather than neutral, speech acts that the egalitar-
ian liberal state has got to consciously be aware of, and self-regulate, in
order to ensure that it indeed treats its citizens with equal concern and
respect. 
It is important at this point to introduce speech act theory, not only
because the most sophisticated versions of the silencing and sub-
ordination arguments use it as their conceptual framework to discuss
the relationship between speech and power, and I need to be able to
address those arguments effectively, but further, and more impor-
tantly, speech act theory will form a key element of my argument for
the necessity of examining state power and state speech, as opposed to
examining the particular speech of pornographers and hate speakers,
as the silencing and subordination arguments would have it. I will
argue that the import of speech act theory for our purposes is – like
Foucault’s understanding of power – in its reconceptualization of the
role of the state, rather than in an explication of the power involved in
the actions of pornographers and hate speakers individually. I will
argue, in Chapter 5, that speech act theory is more fruitfully applied to
the state’s speech act of rights deployment than it is to the actions of
hate speakers and pornographers. 
I argue that the theorists discussed in this chapter lay a fruitful foun-
dation for understanding the role of the state in the operation of
power in general, and in rights justiﬁcation and operation in parti-
cular. These theorists provide the groundwork for understanding how
state power functions with respect to the enactment of rights, thus pro-
viding the tools for developing a framework which takes this power
into account when thinking about rights, rather than ignoring it as
contemporary egalitarian liberalism seems to do. 
Further, such a framework will enable us to determine whether a
particular state enactment or limitation of a right either undermines or
facilitates equality. Put another way, an increase in equality through
the deployment of a right, for instance, is best considered as a readjust-
ing of power relationships, such that the balance of power is shifted to
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reﬂect the fact that those with less power now have more. Thus, this
power-conscious egalitarian liberalism can be characterized as the effort
to ensure that power relations move toward equitable positions, rather
than away from them. In Chapter 8, an examination of the leading judi-
cial decisions in the US, Canada, and the UK will enable a determination
of this question.
How it is that under some circumstances, some kinds of utterances 
– what Austin terms ‘performatives’ – have the effect of simultaneously
enacting a new state of affairs in the world, rather than merely report-
ing on existing states of affairs, is Austin’s chief concern in How to Do
Things with Words (1975; ﬁrst edition published 1961), and it is mine 
as well, insofar as the answer to this question serves to elucidate the oper-
ation of state power as it is performatively exercised in the state’s speech
act of rights enactment or curtailment. I will argue that in describing 
the circumstances under which performatives ‘do something,’ Austin is
implicitly invoking the notion of power. 
I will argue, with Butler, whose work will be discussed in Chapter 6,
that power is what is efﬁcacious in making a performative work or not
work, and that the Austinian analysis of speech acts, enhanced by a
Foucauldian/Butlerian understanding of social power, makes sense of
the role of state power in the creation and limitation of rights, more
than – as feminist speech act theorists such as Rae Langton and Jennifer
Hornsby maintain – it makes sense of the silencing argument’s notion
that women’s speech acts fail to effect the performative of refusal in
certain circumstances. If the enactment and limitation of rights can be
understood as performative gestures, then the state apparatuses that allow
those gestures to have the efﬁcacy that they do can be better understood
and thus ultimately put to better use in the service of promoting equality.
Analyzing state power in terms of speech act theory will help to elucidate
the conclusion that I suggested, but did not elaborate on, at the end of
Chapter 3 – that the silencing and subordination arguments garner their
strength through the notion that the state is overlooking the operation 
of its own power at work in its decisions about the scope of rights. This
notion of state power operating through the state’s decisions can be 
contrasted to the idea that individuals such as pornographers or hate
speakers function as the locus of power. When we incorporate the
insights of speech act theory, the state emerges as a much more plausible
performative actor than do pornographers or hate speakers.
Of course, the aim of all of this is to try to provide tools for an
improved egalitarian liberalism, rather than to argue against that 
tradition. This is not to say that in all cases a move toward equality is
104 The Cost of Free Speech
abbie.levin@gmail.com
necessarily warranted – there may in some cases be other rights or other
interests which compel us to forgo our concern with equality in order 
to protect these interests instead. However, in keeping with Dworkin’s
conception of egalitarian liberalism, it would seem that these cases would
be exceptions to the general principle that the fundamental obligation of
the liberal state is to treat its citizens with equal concern and respect.
I will ﬁrst discuss speech act theory, as elaborated by J. L. Austin in
How to Do Things with Words, and show how his theory has been taken
up by feminists and critical race theorists in the more sophisticated for-
mulations of the silencing and subordination arguments, such as those
offered by Rae Langton and Jennifer Hornsby. Especially in its contem-
porary feminist guise, speech act theory implicitly makes use of the
idea of power. Since this is the case, I will attempt to read Austin and
his interpreters alongside the Foucauldian understanding of power
developed in Chapter 5. In the course of this analysis, my aim is to
show that there are compelling reasons within egalitarian liberalism for
an acknowledgement and accommodation of the Foucauldian idea of
power relations, as well as for the insights of speech act theory. The
effect of this accommodation, however, is to problematize the issue of
the role of the state as a powerful speech actor with respect to its func-
tion in rights enactment and limitation. Throughout this discussion, 
I want to argue that rights themselves should be viewed as speech acts
exercising power, and to show how such an understanding of rights
can yield a more nuanced view of the role of the state in furthering
and producing power, as well as produce more fair results in cases that
turn on the notion of equality, such as the hard cases of hate speech
and pornography.
4.2 Doing things with words: J. L. Austin’s speech act
theory
In his seminal How to Do Things with Words, Austin describes what he
feels are crucial differences between three kinds of speech acts: locution-
ary, perlocutionary, and illocutionary. Locutionary utterances simply
describe states of affairs in the world. These are the most common types
of speech acts, and we often think of them as indeed the only kinds. Our
commonsense assumption is that words have a second-order relation-
ship to events, in that words merely describe acts after the fact, rather
than participate in them. Locutionary utterances are these second-order
utterances, and Austin is content to leave his discussion of them at that.
The central point of the book, however, is to claim, in contrast to the
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commonsense view, that there are two other kinds of utterances – per-
locutionary and illocutionary, both of which cause conditions to change
in the world as a result of their utterance, rather than merely report on
the conditions of the world. In other words, he claims that some utter-
ances have a ﬁrst-order relationship to events – that in doing some-
thing, the speaker is in fact creating a new state of affairs in the world. 
Perlocutionary utterances create effects in the world not simultane-
ously with their utterance, but after the recipient or listener performs a
mental act which concludes with her taking up a different stance or
position than she occupied before the utterance. An example of such a
speech act is a sentence which insults someone, such that the recipient
of the insult’s position in the world moves from being a person who is
not insulted to being a person who is insulted. According to Austin,
such a movement does not occur simultaneously with the utterance,
and requires both a subsequent temporal as well as a mental shift to
occur within the recipient in order for the requisite change in the state
of affairs in the world to be effected. However, even though the effect
of the speech upon the new state of affairs is not simultaneous, it is
nevertheless the case, according to Austin, that perlocutionary speech
acts have a ﬁrst-order relationship to events in the world – they parti-
cipate in the creation of events, rather than merely report on them.
It is the third type of speech act, however, which will occupy the
bulk of Austin’s and my concerns. These are speech acts where the
change of state of affairs in the world is effected simultaneously with
the utterance, and the change is not dependent on a mental shift in
the recipient, but rather only on the proper circumstances of the utter-
ance, as well the comprehension of the listener, such that if these 
circumstances obtain, the change in the world is immediate. He calls
such utterances ‘performative’ or ‘illocutionary.’ Well-known examples
of performative utterances include saying ‘I do’ when one is marrying;
christening a ship when one has been authorized to do so; and calling
balls and strikes at a baseball game when one is an umpire. According
to Austin, in contrast to locutionary sentences, performatives do not
describe or report, and are not usefully thought of in terms of their
truth value. Rather than thinking of performatives in terms of truth
values, Austin feels that they should be thought of as actions. A perfor-
mative sentence, for Austin, does something, rather than reports some-
thing. This distinction between sentences which do and sentences
which report has been widely accepted, and seems intuitively correct
when considering Austin’s examples – there is undoubtedly a qual-
itative difference between saying ‘I do’ at a wedding and saying ‘the
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grass is green’ to someone who asks what color the grass is. Therefore, 
I will be adopting Austin’s distinction between locutionary and illocu-
tionary sentences in what follows.
How, then, do performatives do their work of doing things, rather
than merely describing them? Austin makes clear that the role of the
speaker and the circumstances of the utterance are the two keys to
effective performatives. He writes:
[I]t is always necessary that the circumstances in which the words
are uttered should be in some way, or ways, appropriate, and it is
very commonly necessary that either the speaker himself or other
persons should also perform certain other actions, whether ‘phys-
ical’ or ‘mental’ actions or even acts of uttering further words. Thus
for naming the ship, it is essential that I should be the person
appointed to name her. (Austin 1975: 8)
These necessary background conditions for effective performatives are
what Austin calls ‘conventions,’ and the persons performing the utter-
ance must be the proper persons as per the convention, or else the
transaction will fail to effect the illocutionary function that it intends 
– that is, the state of affairs in the world will not change as a result of
the utterance. Austin refers to those performatives that fail to be effec-
tive because of the circumstances of their utterance as ‘infelicitous.’ In
such cases, the utterance fails because the conventions that would have
ensured its success were not present. Conversely, performatives which
succeed in changing states of affairs are deemed ‘felicitous.’
Performatives can be wholly or partially infelicitous under the fol-
lowing circumstances: when the listener fails to comprehend the utter-
ance, when there is no convention, when the convention is invoked in
inappropriate circumstances, or when the convention is invoked by
inappropriate people. Conversely, what makes a performative efﬁcacious
is that its ‘felicity conditions’ have been met, as opposed to a descriptive
sentence being made true by virtue of its correspondence with the states
of affairs in the world. Austin is interested, then, not simply in the words
of a statement, but in the totality of the context in which that statement
is uttered:
In order to explain what can go wrong with statements we cannot
just concentrate on the proposition involved as has been done tradi-
tionally. We must consider the total situation in which the utter-
ance is issued – the total speech-act – if we are to see the parallel
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between statements and performative utterances, and how each can
go wrong. (Austin 1975: 52)
So Austin is interrogating the entirety of a speech situation in order to
ascertain why it is that some speech acts fail to effect what it is that
they intend to perform, while others succeed. 
He believes that there are several ways to account for the failure of per-
formatives. The ﬁrst has to do with the comprehension – or what Austin
calls ‘uptake’ of the listener about what was intended by the utterance:
‘Generally the effect amounts to bringing about the understanding of the
meaning and of the force of the locution. So the performance of an illo-
cutionary act involves the securing of uptake.’ (1975: 177). One aspect,
then, of the success or failure of the speech act depends on the listener 
– how they respond to what has been performed, or at least whether they
have adequate cognition of the meaning of the utterance, is crucial to
resolving the issue of whether the speech act has in fact been felicitous. 
Another aspect of the success or failure of a performative is whether it is
uttered in keeping with the conventions under which such utterances
have been deemed appropriate: ‘Strictly speaking, there cannot be an illo-
cutionary act unless the means employed are conventional.’ (1975: 119).
This criterion refers not only to the speaker or the listener, but also to the
overall circumstances surrounding the utterance, such that ‘[t]he truth or
falsity of a statement depends not merely on the meanings of words but
on what act you were performing in what circumstances’ (1975: 145). For
example, conventionality is demonstrated through voicing the phrase ‘I
do,’ which is inefﬁcacious in marrying unless the speaker is, immediately
prior to the utterance, unmarried, and unless the phrase is uttered in the
presence of a qualiﬁed ofﬁciator. As another example, the phrase ‘strike
three’ is infelicitous in calling the batter out unless the person uttering it
is acknowledged as a sanctioned umpire. 
It is Austin’s project to investigate these circumstances and background
conditions in order to interrogate what he calls ‘the total speech situa-
tion’; Austin claims (1975: 148) that ‘The total speech act in the total
speech situation is the only actual phenomenon which, in the last resort,
we are engaged in elucidating.’ So Austin’s view of language is thus quite
radical, in that it goes beyond questions of the meanings of words on
paper, and looks instead toward the world of concrete and social facts in
an effort to discern the overall workings of language within social life. 
Austin’s project has important implications for discussing freedom of
expression both with respect to how to evaluate the harms of porno-
graphy and hate speech – that is, through considering the overall social
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circumstances of the utterance, rather than merely considering the words
used – as well as on the issue of how to understand the state speech 
at work in rights enactment and limitation which legitimates porno-
graphy and hate speech as valid forms of expression. These issues are
implicitly illuminated as issues of power, and it is my task in this
chapter and the next to attempt to say more about power, in the hope
of ﬁnding a way to accommodate the insights of its major theorists 
– Foucault and Butler – within egalitarian liberal theory.
Austin does not address the issue of power directly, and he considers
his analysis in How to Do Things with Words to be descriptive – rather
than normative or political. Nevertheless, his work has been adopted
by thinkers such as Butler and Langton, who see political and nor-
mative implications of his work. The politics implicit in Austin’s ana-
lysis are revealed when he discusses the various types of illocutionary
speech acts and the different kinds of actions that they perform. He
describes ﬁve subcategories of performatives:
We may say that the verdictive is an exercise of judgment, the exer-
citive is an assertion of inﬂuence or exercising of power, the com-
missive is an assuming of an obligation or declaring of an intention,
the behabitive is the adopting of an attitude, and the expositive is 
the clarifying of reasons, arguments, and communications. (Austin
1975: 163)
The precise differences among these ﬁve categories are not important for
our purposes, but the crucial idea here is not only that there are a number
of ways to effect a performative, depending on the circumstances of the
utterance and its intended outcome, but also that all of these differently
nuanced performatives are each, to one degree or another, dependent
upon the notion of power – ‘an exercise of judgment,’ ‘an assertion of
inﬂuence or exercising of power,’ and ‘declaring an intention’ all implic-
itly or explicitly reference an assertion of power by the speaker. However,
since Austin himself does not explicate what he means by the word
‘power’ to describe these situations, and since I have yet to deﬁne it, I will
move to a discussion of Foucault in the next chapter, whose insights 
in this area will be adopted. For now, though, what is important to 
note is that all of these ﬁve subcategories of performative utterance are
dependent upon the speaker being the proper person to perform the
utterance, and how a person comes to be deemed proper for the purposes
of performing the speech act seems usefully construed as a function of
authority or power. 
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4.3 Silencing, subordination, and speech acts
Having given a brief summary of Austin’s classic account of speech
acts, I will now turn to consider one inﬂuential feminist attempt to
ground the silencing and subordination arguments in speech act
theory – that expressed by Rae Langton and Jennifer Hornsby in a
series of inﬂuential articles (see Langton 1993, 1999; Langton and
Hornsby 1998). In ‘Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts’ (1993), Langton
aims to show that the subordination and silencing arguments – in
particular, those developed by Catharine MacKinnon – are strength-
ened through the apparatus of speech act theory. Langton deals only
with arguments for the regulation of pornography, but her reasoning 
is equally applicable to arguments for the regulation of hate speech.
She claims that pornography might fruitfully be thought of as an illo-
cutionary speech act, which causes either or both subordination and
silencing in its very delivery. As an illocutionary speech act, it is to be
considered, at least prima facie, as comparable to such uncontroversial
illocutionary acts as marrying and naming ships. That pornography
belongs alongside these other illocutionary activities is by no means
obvious, and the bulk of Langton’s efforts are directed towards estab-
lishing that pornography ought to be considered illocutionary and
felicitous even though it departs from these paradigm cases in many
respects. 
Langton begins the task of applying the Austinian account of illocu-
tionary acts to pornography by noting that the force of illocutionary
acts are determined by felicity conditions which, as the preceding dis-
cussion has shown, have something to do with social context; they are
best understood as conventions, combined with the speaker’s intent.
Langton notes further that some kinds of illocutionary acts require for
their efﬁcacy that the speaker be in a certain position of authority in
order for the act to work as planned. Langton calls these ‘authoritative
illocutions’: actions whose felicity conditions require the speaker to be
occupying a position of authority in the relevant domain: for example,
being a judge when issuing a sentence.
Given this structure of the background conditions for effective illo-
cutionary acts, the question arises as to how one can know what the
illocutionary force of an utterance is, when it is not a paradigm case
like marrying, in which everyone knows what the felicity conditions
are, who can meet them, and when they have been met. Langton
argues that it is most plausible to suppose that some felicity conditions
were met in the case of pornography, and that they were sufﬁcient to
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secure the illocutionary efﬁcacy of the action, since, by hypothesis, the
silencing and subordination arguments maintain that the acts in ques-
tion are of the authoritative sort, so making sense of this claim requires
the supposition that pornographers are in fact in a position of author-
ity sufﬁcient to secure the illocutionary effects feminists are claiming.
Langton, correctly, thinks much of the debate turns on this question of
whether pornographers are in fact the voice of the dominant culture,
or whether they are instead more fruitfully thought of as a minority in
need of protection against moralistic state persecution. The answer to
this question is key to determining whether pornography in fact sub-
ordinates or silences. Everything, for this analysis then, turns on whe-
ther pornography is in fact authoritative and that enough felicity
conditions are satisﬁed to secure subordination or silencing.
Langton begins her discussion of this crucial question of porno-
graphers’ authority by noting that even if an illocution is sufﬁciently
authoritative to yield certain results, there is nevertheless a limit to the
extent to which saying something is so can make it so – for example,
according to Langton, the Catholic Church’s saying that homosexual-
ity is an objective disorder does indeed subordinate the homosexual,
but it is less clear that it makes it the case that the subordinated person
does indeed have an objective disorder. That said, that women are sub-
ordinated by certain illocutions is sufﬁcient to warrant concern, even
though it may not be the case that such subordination means that
women really are inferior to men.
However, Langton notes, for some authoritative illocutions (for
example, ‘You’re ﬁred,’ when said by the boss), saying so does indeed
make it so. These are what Austin calls exercitives. But for other kinds
of speech acts, which Austin calls verdictives, such as an umpire
saying, ‘You’re out,’ this isn’t quite as clear- cut. There is still the fact of
the matter of whether the ball was in fact inside or outside of the strike
zone, regardless of what the umpire called. It is in both the exercitive
and verdictive senses that Langton thinks that pornography may work
to subordinate women. She maintains that subordinating speech con-
structs reality by legitimating and making permissible certain ways of
acting, in part by representing them as ordinary and normal. The
speech of the powerful purports to describe the world, but it is really
disguising the fact that it is creating important aspects of the world by
virtue of the power that such speech has. For example, say that porno-
graphy typically represents women as enjoying certain sexual acts
more than others. And say that in fact, prior to the publication of the
pornographic images, this is not the case. However, if pornography has
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the power to effect illocutionary speech, it will become the case ﬁrst
that male consumers of pornography will be able to authoritatively
order that these acts be performed, and second that women will come
to see themselves as having, and perhaps even wanting, to perform
them.
In other words, authoritative verdictives have illocutionary effects on
the normative beliefs of their consumers – pornography operates, in
part, by legitimating false beliefs. In turn, when these false beliefs are
turned into the speech of the powerful consumers of pornography 
– because males in a misogynist culture are by deﬁnition powerful – they
have the illocutionary effect of in fact subordinating the women 
about whom the speech makes claims by requiring them to perform
acts that, prior to the inﬂuence of pornography, they had no interest
in performing.
At this point, it is worth exploring the notion of causality at play in
the scenario that I have just sketched. A great deal turns conceptually
on ﬁxing the harm of pornography and hate speech as illocutionary in
nature. If the effects of pornography are held to be causal in a tradi-
tional probabilistic sense – where a factor (C) is a cause of an effect (E)
if, and only if, the presence of C raises the incidence of E for a large
population and raises the probability of E for an individual case when
all factors other than the presence or absence of C are held constant1
– then whether pornography causes these effects on women would be
subject to the usual scrutiny of social science, and could be established by
recourse to the traditional studies showing whether a causal link was 
statistically signiﬁcant. There have been numerous such studies over 
the past thirty years with respect to the question of whether porno-
graphy causes the effect of sexual violence and they notably have 
failed to produce a conclusive determination that that there is any such
causal connection, at least between non-violent pornography and sexual 
violence.2
However, sexual violence is of course only one of the effects that
pornography may cause. The idea I have been considering throughout
this study is the notion that pornography and hate speech contribute
to the inequality of women and minorities through the ability of these
media to subordinate and silence them. Such a hypothesis is intrin-
sically less amenable to social scientiﬁc testing, due to the fact that
there are a myriad of causes of inequality in our culture, and it would
be extremely difﬁcult, though not impossible in principle, to isolate
pornography or hate speech from any of the other causes in order to
determine its particular causal role. However, envisioning the harm of
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inequality in terms of the traditional causal framework outlined above
leaves it empirically testable in principle, in the sense that the cause 
– pornography or hate speech – is seen as antecedent and is instrumental
to a subsequent harmful effect – such as subordination or silencing 
– such that if the cause were removed, the incidence of the effect of
inequality would be lessened.
In contrast, the illocutionary hypothesis, while still a causal hypo-
thesis, is nonetheless causal in a way that veers signiﬁcantly away from
the traditional model of causality and would tend to preclude in prin-
ciple its conﬁrmation or falsiﬁcation by traditional social science methodo-
logy, due to the near simultaneity of cause and effect that it posits.
Some would see this as a disingenuous sidestepping of the requirement
that any theory about an empirical state of affairs should be subjected
to scientiﬁc scrutiny. Others believe that it ﬁnally clearly deﬁnes the
societal harms caused by pornography, a characterization which has
long eluded adequate characterization by the social science models.
While nothing for my purposes turns on either position, since I will
not conclude by endorsing pornography or hate speech as either illo-
cutionary nor otherwise causally effective in the subordination of women
or minorities, it is still important to place the illocutionary hypothesis
within this debate about pornography’s relationship to empirical 
evidence, to better see its strengths and weaknesses.
Langton maintains, I think correctly, that actors who are different
from and lesser in authority than the state can sometimes subordinate
nonetheless; the question is only when and under what circumstances.
Langton answers this by saying that when either the local perceived
legitimacy or the local efﬁcacy of the utterance is sufﬁcient, subordina-
tion is effected. Put this way, she seems to think it plausible that given
our own social conditions of living in a historically and systemically
sexist, racist, and homophobic society, such local perceived legitimacy
may indeed be in effect such that the dominant culture has the power,
through pornography, hate speech, and other means, to legitimate
certain behavior towards and by women and minorities.
Even granting all of this, however, the conclusion of regulation of
speech still does not follow. One way that such a conclusion may 
be avoided is through the traditional liberal answer to problems of 
this kind – if women can ﬁght this oppressive speech with speech of
their own which argues against it, the correct position will win out 
in the end due to free debate on both sides. However, the very force 
of the silencing argument, in combination with the subordination
argument, is to suggest that women cannot simply combat speech
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which subordinates with more speech, since the very point of the
silencing argument is to deny the force or possibility of their speech.
Langton thus turns her attention to the silencing argument, anti-
cipating that speech act theory will be illuminating here as well. She
contends that if it is indeed the case that some speech is best construed
as action, as per speech act theory’s hypothesis, then ‘silence’ is not 
to be thought of strictly as literal silence, but more broadly construed
as any manifestation of the failure to act; pornography prevents
women from doing things with their words. Langton contends, quite
uncontroversially in light of Austin’s analysis, that performing speech
acts is a mark of political power, and failing to perform a speech act that
one would otherwise like to perform is a real mark of powerlessness.
In other words, if having authority in the relevant domain is sufﬁcient
to perform a speech act, then having no authority in the relevant domain
is sufﬁcient to fail to perform a speech act, or to have what Langton calls
‘illocutionary disablement.’ Examples of illocutionary disablement include
a homosexual attempting to marry in jurisdictions where marriage is 
restricted to heterosexual couples, or a black person in South Africa
during apartheid attempting to vote. Langton contends that these acts are
literally unspeakable, not just disobedient.
This idea of illocutionary disablement is rooted in Austin’s con-
ception of conventions as requisite for felicitous speech acts: felicity
conditions are ﬁxed by conventions, and one important way that con-
ventions are set is through prior speech acts. Some speech determines the
kinds of speech there can be in the future, so, therefore, some speech can
silence, not just by ordering, but by deﬁning the parameters of accepted
speech. In other words, the speech acts of men in pornography can them-
selves be understood as establishing a convention wherein the speech 
of women is systematically misconstrued by men. According to Langton,
we may be said to have situations of illocutionary disablement in cases
such as where a woman’s ‘no’ indicating declining to participate in sexual
activity is not understood, just like Donald Davidson’s example in
Inquiries Into Truth and Interpretation (2001: 270) of the actor on stage
yelling ‘ﬁre’ for real – the locution and intention are there, but the uptake
is not secured for the listener, and the speech act thus misﬁres. 
If conventions are set by the prior speech acts of authoritative speakers,
the interesting point for our purposes is that this implicates the speech
acts of the state as much as it implicates the speech acts of the porno-
graphers or the hate speakers. I will consider the speech acts of the state
in more detail in Chapters 5 and 6, but for now I simply wish to highlight
that this idea of speech acts as potentially restrictive of further speech
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creates a three-tiered structure of power: ﬁrst, the state’s power as the
primary – and uncontroversially authoritative – creator of the limits of
acceptable speech becomes the ﬁrst site of illocutionary power; second,
the individual speakers who then speak the speech thus enacted and
legitimated by the state are themselves created by the power of the
state in delimiting their speech; further, these individuals may them-
selves exercise power over others, if Langton’s hypothesis about the
mechanics of the silencing and subordination arguments is correct.
It appears, at all of these levels, that there may be some kinds of
structural constraints on the speech of women and minorities. Certain
felicity conditions are not being met for the woman who tries to say
‘no,’ and so the question becomes who is it who establishes these feli-
city conditions. In paradigm cases such as marrying, the felicity con-
ditions were set, uncontroversially, by prior speech acts in the law, but
in the case of pornography (and the same holds for hate speech),
Langton is forced to make the implausible claim that the felicity con-
ditions are in fact set by the pornographers. According to Langton and
MacKinnon, the consequence of pornography is that no matter what a
woman says, the only thing she can in fact do with her words is consent.
If this is the case, then a woman’s authority over her own body is com-
promised through pornography. Thus, if pornography sets up the rules
for the speech acts of sex – if pornography is the speech that determines
the kind of subsequent speech there can be – then, Langton concludes, it
is exercitive speech in Austin’s sense, for it is in the class of speech that
confers and removes rights and powers. 
All of this seems acceptable as far as it goes, but the premise concern-
ing pornography’s authority is of course empirical, and has yet to be
convincingly established by Langton or other feminists, and seems
quite dubious on its face. I want to suggest that pornographers and
hate speakers do not have this authority, at least not directly. Rather, 
I will contend, it is the state that has the straightforward authority 
to enact felicitous speech acts, and it does so by creating legislation or
judicial decisions concerning, inter alia, the constitutional protection
of hate speech and pornography. To the extent that these decisions
have protected hate speech and pornography, they have given the hate
speakers and pornographers whatever limited authority they do have,
but much more important than this limited authority is the very public
authoritative speech act of the state that says that such speakers and
their speech are endorsed by the state itself. This idea and its far-reaching
consequences will be further developed and interrogated in the next
chapter.
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Another critical question that Langton’s analysis leaves open is whether
pornography’s silencing, even granting that it does in fact silence, gives
rise to a violation of the First Amendment rights of its targets. Even if
Langton shows that pornography may prevent women from doing cer-
tain things with words, this does not necessarily mean that pornography
runs afoul of the First Amendment because of this. So the question, then,
is: Does the free speech that the First Amendment protects include free
illocution? Langton and Hornsby want to answer ‘yes’ in their article
‘Free Speech and Illocution’ (1998) and they claim Mill as their ally here.
Their suggestion is that a good justiﬁcation of the right to free speech is
the right to do certain illocutionary things, though they do not attempt
to prove it. While Langton and Hornsby have not demonstrated that the
First Amendment includes the right to illocution, they want to suggest
that such an interpretation makes the most sense of the importance of
free speech.
As discussed in Chapter 3, Dworkin notably rejects the idea of illocu-
tion as protected speech, arguing that such a conception departs from
what he feels is the fundamental notion that freedom of expression is 
a negative liberty. Protecting illocution – or protecting the idea that 
listeners will understand what is being said – would require that free
speech be construed as a positive liberty, as others not only have to
refrain from impeding the speech, but also learn how to listen better,
so as to enable the attempted performatives to meet their felicity con-
ditions. Such an undertaking would move freedom of expression into
the positive liberty sphere, because of the active involvement required.
While such a positive conception of liberty may indeed be desirable, it
is outside of the scope of this project to argue for such a conclusion, as
my aim is to show that state regulation of some speech is acceptable
within the tenets of liberals of Dworkin’s ilk, who view freedom of
expression as a strictly negative liberty.
However, even granting the quite controversial idea that the right to
freedom of expression protects illocution, Langton and Hornsby run
into a further problem in that they cannot maintain that any illocu-
tion at all should be constitutionally protected, because if they did,
then pornographic illocutions would have to be defended as well.
Thus, they only defend the illocution of refusal, not the illocution of
subordination. Langton writes:
If there are conﬂicts between freedoms to speak – if the free speech
of men silences the free speech of women – then there is a choice
about which speech is to be protected. If there is a conﬂict between
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freedom to perform illocutions of subordination and illocutions 
of refusal – it just might be that refusal matters more. (Langton
1998: 276) 
There is an intuitive appeal in this kind of sentiment, and while it 
may seem that the appeal depends upon agreeing with the feminist
position, I want to maintain that there is in fact a more general and
important reason why such a position is appealing. 
Langton’s remark derives its appeal from its gesturing towards power
relations. She is saying that given the nature of the interests and the
relative power of the groups, justice requires that we favor the interest
in refusal of the subordinated group over the interest in subordinating
by the dominant group. This suggestion provides an excellent segue 
to turn to Foucault’s work on the issue of power, in an attempt to show
how it, in conjunction with speech act theory, may illuminate the
issues that feminists and critical race theorists seem to be implicitly
employing. 
The discussion in the past chapter has demonstrated how power and
speech are intimately related, even if they are not related in exactly the
way that Langton and Hornsby want to maintain. However, there is
still a lot which remains to be said about the nature of power, which 
I will turn to in Chapter 5. To conclude, though, what the preceding
discussion has revealed is that the relationship between speech and
power – gestured to in the silencing and subordination arguments 
– nevertheless leads away from their conclusion that this relationship
culminates in the power of the speakers of pornography and hate speech.
Rather, as we have begun to see, the relationship of speech to power leads
to the more plausible, but more radical, conclusion that this relationship
in fact culminates in the state, whose speech acts in enacting laws and
deciding the scope of those laws in its judicial decisions is unequivocally
powerful. 
This conclusion, which I will spend the rest of the book elaborating
and defending, has far-reaching implications, particularly regarding
the end of the egalitarian ideal of state neutrality in the marketplace of
ideas. The discussion of speech act theory in this chapter has suggested
that the undercurrent in the silencing and subordination arguments 
– that the liberal’s lauding of state neutrality in freedom of expression
cases operates to conceal and to further power imbalances – in fact holds
great truth. Given this, the state is not and cannot ever be neutral. It is
always exercising its power in the speech acts taking place in its judicial
decisions. If this is the case, egalitarian liberals can, without violating
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their other key commitment to equal concern and respect, abandon
their claims to neutrality. Indeed, they ought to, because the claim 
to neutrality is in fact pernicious and allows for rights violations to go
unnoticed by the state. 
Taking speech act theory on board in this argument shows how the
state is always already implicated in power relations, and is thus never
neutral. While this is in some ways a radical reconceptualization of the
state from that of traditional liberalism’s idea of state neutrality, I want
to argue that it is not incompatible with the fundamental tenets of lib-
eralism, and indeed can provide for a more robust, and ultimately
more just, conception of the state. However, there is still much elab-
oration needed on the nature of state power, and I will turn now to a
discussion of the leading theories of state power, which will come from
outside of the liberal tradition and from contemporary continental polit-
ical theorists. It is my contention that these theorists, while not usually
invoked in liberal debates, can offer a much more nuanced view of the
role of state power, and one which liberals would be well served to accept
if the liberal state is to be successful in undoing the harms of cultural
oppression. Given that, I will turn in Chapters 5 and 6 to a discussion of
Foucault’s and Butler’s conception of state power.




Foucault: Power, Discourse, and
the State
5.1 Foucault and the nature of power
Michel Foucault’s insights into the nature and mechanisms of power
have been among the most persuasive and inﬂuential of the last
century, though his account has been almost universally overlooked in
debates about liberalism. Foucault’s exclusion from the discourse may
be owed partly to the fact of his own hostility toward liberalism, and
partly to the fact that analytic and continental philosophy have a long
history of antagonism and thus a propensity to talk past each other.
One of my chief aims in this book is to show how the insights into the
relationship between power and speech of continental thinkers, such
as Foucault, can inform current debates in analytic liberal philosophy,
particularly those debates about the scope and limits of egalitarianism.
The ﬁrst three chapters of this book discussed those liberal debates,
with particular emphasis on the North American debates over porno-
graphy and hate speech. The discussion of speech act theory in the pre-
vious chapter, Foucault in this one, and Judith Butler in the next, will
ﬁnish laying the foundation of the continental positions, which I hope
will inform the debates addressed in the ﬁrst half of the book.
Foucault’s theory of power is central to my account not only because
its inﬂuence demands that it be addressed in any discussion of power
and politics, but because he makes the crucial point that power is not a
matter of obvious physical coercive force by the state, but is more
subtly operative through language. The connection between power and
language was made by Austin in the preceding chapter, but Foucault
takes this point a pivotal step further in arguing that it is not through
language per se, but rather through discourse – particular organized
bodies of knowledge – that power operates. This point underlines my
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contention that the body of jurisprudence itself, combined with the acad-
emic body of work surrounding it, is a discourse in the Foucauldian sense,
and as such an important site of power. Even further, the discourse 
surrounding freedom of expression in particular operates at a meta-level,
on a Foucauldian reading, since it governs the scope and limits of all
further discourse.
It is the idea of discourse as a function of power that the liberal 
discussion – through its claims to state neutrality – denies. I will argue
that Foucault’s contention that discourse is anything other than neutral,
coupled with Butler’s novel arguments about the nature of censorship
that I will introduce in the next chapter, decisively entails that the
liberal idea of state neutrality is false and must be abandoned. Once
the state abandons neutrality, the way is paved for an activist egalitar-
ian liberal state to take shape, since all that impeded the latter was the
idea that any speech or resources provided by the state for the protec-
tion of women and minorities would be a violation of its central com-
mitment to neutrality. If neutrality never existed, as the arguments of
Foucault and Butler have it, then of course this obstacle disappears.
However, in order to be able to advance this chain of reasoning convin-
cingly, I must in this chapter address those parts of Foucault’s account
that are less compatible with this view – namely, that Foucault, famously,
did not view state power as central to his account. I will attempt to show 
that while this is the case, it does not undercut my use of Foucault in 
the context of my argument that state discourse is a vital instrument of
power.
Foucault’s account of power is counterintuitive to commonsense
accounts of power that would understand it as top-down – concentrated
in the hands of the political elite, centrally concerned with physical
force or the threat of such force, and repressive to the masses. Instead,
for Foucault, power is diffuse, decentralized, and creative, as much as 
it is repressive. Foucault’s account is particularly noteworthy for my
discussion of the hard cases of freedom of expression, such as porno-
graphy and hate speech. Foucault maintains that the chief creative
functioning of power occurs through discourse, and I will show through
an examination of what he means by these terms – power and discourse
– that like Austin, Foucault implicates the state, rather than the indi-
vidual, in discourse production. 
The conclusion that we must turn to the state to analyze its power
and rethink its stance on neutrality, however, has not been accepted
by Judith Butler, in her book on freedom of expression, Excitable Speech
(1997). Since Butler is working in the Foucauldian tradition, and
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addresses the silencing and subordination arguments directly, it is impor-
tant to examine her arguments. In Excitable Speech she concludes that
individual speakers sometimes hold the power to perform efﬁcacious and
novel speech acts, and that this power alone – without reference to 
the state – is sufﬁcient to ground a liberatory politics. However, as I 
will demonstrate in Chapter 6, an adequate liberatory politics must also
include an interrogation of state power. I will show how she and Foucault
– although at times against their own understanding of their work – com-
bined with the speech act theorists examined in Chapter 4, lead to a
reconceptualization of the state as a very powerful speech actor. If egal-
itarian liberalism can incorporate this conception of the state – and I will
argue in Chapters 7 and 8 that it can and it ought to – then liberals will
ﬁnally be in a position to end their insistence on a futile conception of
neutrality, and to take up, fully and fruitfully, their commitment to treat
all citizens with equal concern and respect by acting to end cultural
oppression.
The silencing and subordination arguments, while raising important
issues of power imbalances between speakers and the targets of their
speech, nevertheless make use of an idea of power that does not square
entirely with the Foucauldian picture. The silencing and subordination
arguments either locate the site of power in the individual porno-
grapher or hate speaker, which thus far seems implausible, or, seem-
ingly more plausibly, they gesture towards the idea that the state is the
obvious site of omnipotent and thoroughgoing power, which it wields
in favor of majority interests, and against women and minorities. In
either case, these formulations are at odds with Foucault’s understand-
ing of the operation of power, which maintains that power is not located
centrally either in individuals or in the state. Thus, a central question
for the remainder of this book will be to resolve the state’s role in the
operation of power – on the one hand, incorporating the important
insight of the silencing and subordination arguments holding that
liberal accounts of rights elide what ought to be central issues of state
power, while, on the other hand, maintaining a faithfulness to what 
I feel is Foucault’s more nuanced and more insightful understanding of
power as decentralized. 
While Foucault wants to maintain that power is not concentrated 
in the hands of the state, the account of speech act theory given in
Chapter 4 has suggested that the role of the state is more central, 
perhaps, than Foucault imagined. If the state’s speech acts are by deﬁn-
ition authoritative, as I have argued follows from Austin, then this gives 
the state a lot more power in its speech acts than private actors, or
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non-state institutions, have, at least on the surface. I will aim in this
chapter to combine Foucault’s insights about power and discourse, includ-
ing state power and state discourse, with the insights of speech act theory
and the silencing and subordination arguments. The result shows, follow-
ing Foucault, that while the state is not the only important site of power,
nevertheless, in legal discourse – as the silencing and subordination argu-
ments gesture towards but do not ﬂesh out – the state’s discursive power
is seminal and unacknowledged in liberal theory in general, and in the
discourse surrounding freedom of expression in particular. Indeed, the
discourse around freedom of expression takes its place at the pinnacle 
of the state discourses because it sets the rules for all further discourse 
– which speech will be allowed and which speech disallowed, both by
individuals and by the state itself. Thus, the unexamined effects of the
power embedded in the freedom of expression discourse are particularly
pernicious. The silencing and subordination arguments point to this per-
niciousness but leave major theoretical gaps regarding the unexamined
effects of the state’s discursive power.
Key to my understanding of power is Foucault’s insight – also adopted
by Foucault’s contemporary intellectual heir, Judith Butler – that power
runs through discourse, rather than through individuals. This conception
of power challenges the notion of power, offered in the silencing and
subordination arguments, as being centered in individuals – and it per-
suasively demonstrates that the latter arguments should not be accepted
as they stand. At the same time that Foucault and Butler demonstrate the
limitations of the silencing and subordination arguments’ understanding
of power, Foucault and Butler also indicate, albeit to some degree unwit-
tingly, that a more nuanced understanding of power leads to an inquiry
into state power. While Foucault and Butler do not themselves undertake
this inquiry in their own work, I will attempt to begin it, in Chapters 7
and 8, especially with reference to how we should understand the role 
of state power and state speech in cases of hate speech and pornography 
– cases that reveal the workings of unexamined state power operating 
at the margins of freedom of expression discourse. This is the extent to
which I feel my account departs from a Foucauldian account, and I will
attempt to show in this chapter that while this is indeed a departure, it is
nevertheless not a pernicious one.
After deﬁning Foucault’s notion of power in detail in Section 5.2 below,
I will aim later in this chapter to make three points about the implica-
tions of Foucault’s position with respect to the nature and role of the
liberal state. First, Foucault’s comments about the state are supportive of
my claim that state speech is a primary locus of power, even given that
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his understanding of power is not state-centered. Second, I will argue that
Foucault’s conception of power as located in discourse not only strength-
ens the claims of speech act theorists such as Austin, who maintains that
speech is not only a function of power, but also provides a way to under-
stand both the nature of the body of jurisprudence surrounding freedom
of expression as well as the resistance to that discourse. The latter, I will
argue, is exempliﬁed in the silencing and subordination arguments.
Finally, I will argue that Foucault’s conception of power as residing in dis-
course, rather than in individuals, decisively turns the issue of respons-
ibility for pornography and hate speech away from the individual speaker
and towards the state. After making these three points, I conclude that
together they entail that the liberal myth of state neutrality must be aban-
doned, as it functions only to conceal state power. This concealment 
of state power results in exactly the effects that proponents of the silen-
cing and subordination arguments maintain, even if the mechanisms 
by which those effects are achieved are not entirely consistent with the
proponents’ accounts. 
Taking the ﬁrst three chapters of this book as establishing the pro-
position that there is conceptual space within egalitarian liberalism for
an activist state, and taking the second three chapters as demonstrating
that there is a relationship between state speech and state power that
has not been fully explored by liberal theory, I will be able to turn in
Chapters 7 and 8 to argue for an activist egalitarian liberal state that
seeks to end cultural oppression in order to meet its core commitment
of treating each citizen with equal concern and respect.
5.2 Discourse and counter-discourse
For Foucault, power is the overarching idea through which to under-
stand all human enterprise. More speciﬁcally, he claims that power 
– operating through discourse – is responsible for the creation of human
subjects as we have come to know them. In this formulation we begin
to see how power is understood by Foucault as productive of subjects,
rather than merely repressive of them:
The notion of repression is quite inadequate for capturing what is
precisely the productive aspect of power. In deﬁning the effects 
of power as repression, one adopts a purely juridical conception of
such power; one identiﬁes power with a law which says no; power is
taken above all as carrying the force of prohibition. Now I believe
that this is a wholly negative, narrow, skeletal conception of power,
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one which has been curiously widespread. If power were never any-
thing but repressive, if it never did anything but to say no, do you
really think one would be brought to obey it? What makes power
hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it doesn’t
only weigh on us as a force that says no, but that it traverses and
produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces dis-
course. It needs to be considered as a productive network which
runs through the whole social body, much more than as a negative
instance whose function is repression. (Foucault 1984a: 61) 
Two ideas emerge here: that Foucault identiﬁes merely repressive power
with law and juridical discourse (a formulation that I will discuss at much
greater length later in this chapter), and that in opposition to this, he sees
power as not only occasionally productive and creative, but rather as 
fundamentally so. It is the ‘yes’ of power that makes power enticing and
thus self-perpetuating. 
So what, exactly, is this ‘yes’? The central ‘yes’ is the formation of
subjects through power. But in what sense can we say that subjects are
formed through power? Foucault famously maintains that power oper-
ates centrally through the production of discourse – organized bodies
of knowledge – and discourses create human subjects as we have come
to know them. One paradigmatic example would be the discourse of
psychiatry, which began in the nineteenth century. Through that organ-
ized body of knowledge, we derive such subjects as the hysteric, the
narcissist, and others thus labeled by their mental disorders. These
kinds of people were produced by the discourse of psychiatry and could
not be said to exist without that discourse, according to Foucault. He
writes:
In any society, there are manifold relations of power which per-
meate, characterize and constitute the social body, and these rela-
tions of power cannot themselves be established, consolidated nor
implemented without the production, accumulation, circulation
and functioning of a discourse. There can be no possible exercise of
power without a certain economy of discourses of truth which oper-
ates through and on the basis of this association. We are subjected
to the production of truth through power and we cannot exercise
power except through the production of truth. (Foucault 1980a: 83)
For Foucault, then, power is operationalized through discourse, and dis-
course is a necessary and crucial condition of power. Even more radically,
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for Foucault, truth itself is produced by discourse, which means that it is
produced by power. The idea of truth as produced by power is radically 
at odds with commonsense ideas of truth, which see truth as that which
liberates us from power. For Foucault, instead, truth is a function of power
and keeps its actual workings in disguise. Foucault’s question, then, is 
not only what the discourses of truth teach us, but, more profoundly,
how they create us and rule us. Thus, a thorough interrogation of power
involves interrogation of discourse, and to interrogate discourse is to
reveal the myths, disguised as truths, that we have taken up as key aspects
of our very identities. 
What we accept as truth, then, for Foucault, is thoroughgoingly a
matter of power and politics, as it plays out in discourses. Foucault
employs war imagery again in this regard (1984a: 74): ‘It’s a battle
about the status of truth and the economic and political role it plays.’
This war imagery is apt because for Foucault, power necessarily pro-
duces resistance, and since power operates through discourse, resist-
ance to power, too, operates through discourse. Foucault calls these
resistant discourses ‘counter-discourses,’ and he feels that it is very
important to examine and bring to light these counter-discourses, lest
the more dominant discourses be seen uncritically as truth. 
Foucault calls the methodology for identifying resistance to power
‘genealogy.’ His idea here is to uncover the discourses that have been
hidden by the workings of the dominant power structure, thus shifting
the relations of power by exposing the dominant discourse as discourse,
rather than as truth in an objective sense. He describes the notion this
way:
Let us give the term genealogy to the union of erudite knowledge and
local memories which allows us to establish a historical knowledge 
of struggles and to make use of this knowledge tactically today….
What it really does is to entertain the claims to attention of local, dis-
continuous, disqualiﬁed, illegitimate knowledges against the claims 
of a unitary body of theory which would ﬁlter, hierarchize and order
them in the name of some true knowledge and some arbitrary idea of
what constitutes a science and its objects. (Foucault 1980a: 83)
The idea at play here is that these local, underground, or subverted know-
ledges, if uncovered by the genealogical process, would provide a counter-
force to hegemonic and unilateral streams of power, exposing them as
fraudulent in their claims to universality and primacy. Foucault claims
that the dominant discourses are those asserting their own scientiﬁc
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status, and he maintains that the revolutionary aspect of the genea-
logical project is in its ability to challenge these notions:
It is really against the effects of the power of a discourse that is con-
sidered to be scientiﬁc that the genealogy must wage its struggle….
By comparison, then, and in contrast to the various projects which
aim to inscribe knowledges in the hierarchical order of power associ-
ated with science, a genealogy should be seen as a kind of attempt
to emancipate historical knowledges from that subjection, to render
them, that is, capable of opposition and of struggle against the coer-
cion of a theoretical, unitary, formal and scientiﬁc discourse. (Foucault
1980a: 84–5)
It is here that the core of Foucault’s liberatory politics is revealed – he
wants to undertake the genealogical enterprise because he wants the
relations of power to be tipped differently from how they have been
thus far. 
These ideas of genealogy, counter-discourse, and resistance are very
important for my purposes. I want to argue that there ought to be 
attention paid to the ‘local knowledge’ of the lived experiences of 
sexism, racism, and homophobia. This type of lived experience – of being
silenced and of being subordinated as a consequence of racism, sexism,
and homophobia – is exactly what the feminists and critical race theorists
who have advanced the silencing and subordination arguments aim to
reveal. The authors of these arguments attempt to express a revolt against
the dominant discourse maintaining that law is a science and that rights
are being distributed in an egalitarian fashion. Foucault, it seems, would
concur with the silencing and subordination arguments being considered
counter-discourse, given his description of the genealogical project:
It is through revolt that subjectivity…introduces itself into history
and gives it the breath of life…. One does not have to maintain that
these confused voices sound better than the others and express the
ultimate truth…. It is sufﬁcient that they exist and they have
against them so much which is set up to silence them…. [I]t is due
to such voices that the time of men does not have the form of an
evolution, but precisely that of a history. (Foucault 1981a: 8)
For Foucault, the very fact that the silencing and subordination argu-
ments exist and offer different and opposing points of view to the dom-
inant discourse is itself revolutionary, and it is revolutionary regardless of
126 The Cost of Free Speech
abbie.levin@gmail.com
whether we ultimately accept those arguments in their entirety as they
stand. 
For my purpose of trying to offer a more tenable reading of the claims
behind the silencing and subordination arguments, it will prove useful to
consider the freedom of expression literature – both the jurisprudence
and the philosophical arguments presenting theoretical support for that
jurisprudence – as part of this apparatus of truth/power. This literature
is hence problematic at least for being not what it appears on its face, 
and rather, for being yet another conduit of power. This is what I think
the proponents of the silencing and subordination arguments meant 
to suggest in claiming that the state privileges the discourse of the dom-
inant culture in its pornography and hate speech decisions, while still
proclaiming its own neutrality. 
Foucault calls these formative or dominant discourses ‘the human
sciences’ – the humanities and social science disciplines – and he claims
that they are each a function of power:
[W]hat struck me, in observing the human sciences, was that the
development of all these branches of knowledge can in no way be
dissociated from the exercise of power…. Generally speaking, the
fact that societies can become the object of scientiﬁc observ-
ation, that human behavior became, from a certain point on, a
problem to be analyzed and resolved, all that is bound up, I believe,
with mechanisms of power – which, at a given moment, indeed, 
analyzed that object (society, man, etc) and presented it as a problem
to be resolved. So the birth of the human sciences goes hand in 
hand with the installation of new mechanisms of power. (Foucault
1988a: 106)
If human behavior at a certain point became a problem to be analyzed
and resolved, and thus the human sciences arose to tackle this pro-
ject, it is difﬁcult to see how law should not be included with these 
discourses and perhaps be chief among them, since law is obviously
regulative of human behavior. Laws – both prohibitive and permissive
– deﬁne the scope of our conduct, and the scope of our conduct is
exactly what interests Foucault when he speaks about power as pro-
ductive of subjects. Further, law is heavily reliant on the human 
sciences to produce evidence for its decisions and policies, and, reci-
procally, such reliance becomes an important piece of the power of
these sciences, giving them more power by virtue of the legitimacy
conferred upon them by their adoption into legal decisions. Such a
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relationship would seem to make law the human science par excellence,
in its capacity as the arbiter of the other human sciences. 
If this is correct, and law is indeed a powerful discourse within the
human sciences, then why does Foucault explicitly characterize his
project as deeper than what he calls ‘juridical’ – meaning those forms of
power produced by the state in order to prohibit certain behavior? The
most obvious example of juridical power in Foucault’s sense of the term is
the criminal law, since of course it is the function of the criminal law to
prohibit certain kinds of behavior and impose sanctions to back those
prohibitions. However, contrary to Foucault’s rather circumscribed under-
standing, law can more plausibly be seen as both productive and repres-
sive in that laws are permissive as well as prohibitive. A permissive law
about a particular behavior, such as marriage, can importantly be said to
be productive of that behavior. That Foucault relies on such a narrow
view of the law so as not to recognize this point is, in my view, a sig-
niﬁcant weakness of his account. I believe that my account, which reads
Foucault more expansively, offers a more faithful account of the nature of
law, while at the same time illuminating Foucault’s portrayal of how the
law operates as a conduit of power.
5.3 Power, the state, and the law
As I have noted, the idea of power as delocalized, and running through-
out the entire social body, is contrary to commonsense understandings of
the notion of power, which would locate it paradigmatically in the state.
Foucault, famously, resists this idea (1984a: 63): ‘What we need…is a
political philosophy that isn’t erected around the problem of sovereignty,
nor therefore around the problems of law and prohibition. We need to
cut off the king’s head.’ For Foucault, focusing the issue of power around
statehood, law, or prohibition implies that power is localized in the state,
ﬁxed through law, and repressive through prohibition. Foucault strongly
resists all three of these ideas because, as I have shown, he sees power as
the dynamic producer of truth and discourse, in all its varied forms, and
thus neither ﬁxed, repressive, nor localized. 
My project, however, needs to make use of the idea of state power on at
least three fronts: state power as manifest in the upholding of hate speech
and pornography as protected speech under the First Amendment; state
power as manifest in the line of cases that privilege the First Amendment
over the Fourteenth Amendment; and the enactment and limitation of
rights in general as state speech acts, which as such are paradigmatically
powerful. Each of these three sets of speech acts requires the power of the
128 The Cost of Free Speech
abbie.levin@gmail.com
state to produce and to regulate the discourse around freedom of expres-
sion, understood, as I have argued, as a master discourse controlling 
all other discourses. Because state power plays such a central role in my
argument, further exploration of Foucault’s understanding of the way in
which power is manifest in the state is required if my account is to be
faithful to the Foucauldian corpus as a whole. This further exploration
will reveal that my understanding of state power is legitimate on Fou-
cauldian terms, even though many parts of his ouvre would seem to be at
odds with such a reading. 
He sets out his understanding of the nature of power and the state as
follows:
To pose the problem in terms of the state means to continue posing
it in terms of sovereign and sovereignty, that is to say, in terms of
law. If one describes all these phenomena of power as dependent on
the state apparatus, this means grasping them as essentially repres-
sive: the army as a power of death, police and justice as punitive
instances, etc. I don’t want to say that the state isn’t important;
what I want to say is that relations of power, and hence the analysis
that must be made of them, necessarily extend beyond the limits of
the state. In two senses: ﬁrst of all because the state, for all the
omnipotence of its apparatuses, is far from being able to occupy the
whole ﬁeld of actual power relations, and further because the state
can only operate on the basis of other, already existing power rela-
tions. The state is superstructural in relation to a whole series of
power networks that invest the body, sexuality, the family, kinship,
knowledge, technology, and so forth. (Foucault 1984a: 64)
Here Foucault certainly afﬁrms that the state is an important site of 
the operations of power, but he denies that it is prior or central to 
the functioning of power in all of its guises. Rather, the state is pos-
terior to other forms of power that must be operative in order for 
the state to exist in the ﬁrst place. Thus the state cannot be entirely
efﬁcacious in establishing and regulating all operations of power. 
That said, Foucault of course acknowledges the state’s obvious and
important role in the unfolding and manufacture of power, especially
in its function of formalizing power relations through law. I want to
maintain that law is among our most powerful discourses; Foucault’s
writing supports my claim, even though he does not focus particularly
on law. In a 1971 essay entitled ‘The Order of Discourse,’ Foucault
asserts that the truth of law is not to be deemed a source of power on
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its own, but rather seen in a larger context in order that we may fully
understand it: ‘[I]t is as if even the word of the law could no longer be
authorized, in our society, except by a discourse of truth.’ (1981b
[1971]: 55) Understanding the discourse of law means recognizing it as
a part of a regime of discourses that authorize what is to be taken as
truth. Law thus conceived is precisely what I am attempting to advo-
cate: law, and state discourse generally, is by no means the neutral,
interest-blind matter that mainstream analytic political philosophy or
philosophy of law want to maintain. It is instead always embedded
with power – the power of producing the knowledge that we take to be
truth, and the power of endowing with legitimacy and rights some
individuals and institutions and not others. 
Perhaps more than any other discourse in the human sciences, law
in particular has its claim to truth built into it: its rules are self-validating
and its effect on our behavior instantly binding. Foucault coins an apt
term for the close relationship between law and the powerful discourse
it manifests: the ‘juridico-discursive.’1 The law is, consistently with 
our commonsense understanding, ‘laid down’ in discourse. Phrasing
this insight in the language of this book’s previous chapter, then, law
produces felicitous illocutionary speech acts. 
Even further, Foucault notes, law, alongside science, is a privileged
source of truth: ‘It’s the characteristic of our Western societies that 
the language of power is law, not magic, religion, or anything else.’
(1980b: 201). So though Foucault does not focus on law, but rather on
the more decentralized locations of power, such as schools, prisons,
and the military, it is nevertheless clearly the case that he grants law’s
discursive efﬁcacy in the production of truth.
All of this is perfectly consistent with my account of state speech acts as
being embedded with power. Indeed, once we adopt Foucault’s notion
that power runs principally through discourse, my account is strength-
ened by the understanding of jurisprudence as a discursive production.
However, Foucault is notably uninterested in the law as a site for his
research, and if the account of Foucault offered here is a faithful one, it
thus becomes important to inquire why he is so uninterested. Foucault’s
focus is on discipline – brieﬂy, techniques of controlling individual bodies
and beliefs – and he believes that discipline occurs most interestingly 
in sites that are removed, to some degree or another, from the law 
– places such as schools, prisons, and psychiatric hospitals. Thus these
places, and not law, become the sites he investigates. Foucault writes
(1980a: 102): ‘We must eschew the model of Leviathan in the study 
of power. We must escape from the limited ﬁeld of juridical sovereignty
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and state institutions, and instead base our analysis of power on the
study of the techniques and tactics of domination.’ Foucault is cor-
rect in maintaining that the law alone would be an insufﬁcient site 
of investigation into the techniques and tactics of domination, but 
I maintain that even granting him this point does not deny that 
the law is particularly efﬁcacious in becoming a paradigmatically 
sovereign site of power, out of which techniques of discipline are
developed. 
The preceding discussion has shown that Foucault acknowledges this
relationship between law and discipline. Sporadically he writes less of 
a dichotomy between law and discipline, and of more of a continuum
between them:
I do not mean to say that law fades into the background or that
institutions of justice tend to disappear, but rather that the law
operates more and more as a norm, and the judicial institution is
increasingly incorporated into a continuum of apparatuses (medical,
administrative, and so on) whose functions are for the most part
regulatory. (Foucault 1980d: 144)
Again, this formulation concurs with my account of the state – in its
judicial function – as an efﬁcacious speech actor whose actions create
one of the most powerful discourses we have, even while day-to-day
discipline functions through apparatuses to some degree removed from
the state. 
Foucault’s model appears to suggest an undertaking of a two-tiered
analysis of power – ﬁrst, power in its more formal guise, which is played
out in the discourses of law and rights, and secondly, power manifest-
ing as the result of that ﬁrst formal understanding, which Foucault
describes as the discourses of ‘knowledge’ or ‘truth.’ Thus, the formal
establishment of power in law and rights facilitates the operation of
power in the discourses of truth. Such a formulation is highly compat-
ible with my understanding of the role of law as central in the web of
power, even if not originary in that web.
Foucault’s discussion of ‘right’ and ‘rights’ is often ambiguous. Fre-
quently, he seems to conﬂate the two terms; sometimes ‘right’ means 
the divine right – or authority – of the sovereign, and sometimes it evokes
the notion of rights, namely interests deemed worthy enough to be pro-
tected by the state, to employ Mill’s formulation. It is worth distinguish-
ing these two very different ideas, even if Foucault at times does not.
Perhaps Foucault does not distinguish the two terms because he wants to
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point out, rather cynically, the great extent to which rights, in the latter
sense, are tied to the discourse of sovereignty, or right. 
Foucault acknowledges that the egalitarian discourse of state-
sanctioned rights of course exists as the dominant discourse, but that
underlying that discourse is the highly inegalitarian discourse of 
discipline, or what he calls ‘micro-power’:
Historically, the process by which the bourgeoisie became in the
course of the eighteenth century the politically dominant class was
masked by the establishment of an explicit, coded and formally
egalitarian juridical framework, made possible by the organization
of a parliamentary, representative regime. But the development and
generalization of disciplinary mechanisms constituted the other,
dark side of these processes. The general juridical form that guar-
anteed a system of rights that were egalitarian in principle was 
supported by these tiny, everyday, physical mechanisms, by all
those systems of micro-power that are essentially non-egalitarian
and asymmetrical that we call the disciplines…. The real, corpor-
eal disciplines constituted the foundation of the formal, juridical
liberties. (Foucault 1977: 222)
For Foucault, there is a counterintuitive relationship between law and
the disciplines – it is the disciplines that are ‘the foundation of the
formal, juridical liberties.’ Seeing the relationship between law and dis-
cipline in this way explains why Foucault is reluctant to focus on the
juridical aspect of this relationship, but the direction of causality is not
at all obvious.
For my purposes, however, the question of causality can be left open.
What is interesting is that Foucault is certainly not in thrall to the
concept of rights, in marked contrast to liberal discourse’s focus on them.
In Foucault’s view, the discourse of rights only serves to mask the inegal-
itarian mechanisms of power that exist ‘on the underside of the law’
(1977: 223). It is this lack of respect for rights as the only – and thor-
oughly authoritative – discourse, to which proponents of the silencing
and subordination arguments at times allude. Such proponents are 
discontented with the mainstream liberal idea that because women and
minorities have the same formal rights as other citizens, equality exists,
and no further state measures are called for to secure its realization. Such
proponents would ﬁnd an ally in Foucault, who feels similarly:
Liberty is a practice…. The liberty of men is never assured by the
institutions of law that are intended to guarantee them. This is why
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almost all of these laws and institutions are quite capable of being
turned around. Not because they are ambiguous, but simply because
‘liberty’ is what must be exercised…. I think it can never be inherent
in the structure of things to guarantee the exercise of freedom. The
guarantee of freedom is freedom. (Foucault 1984b: 245)
For Foucault and for the proponents of the subordination and silencing
arguments – contrary to mainstream liberal discourse – merely granting
formal rights is insufﬁcient to guarantee actual liberties on the ground,
and this is where I think mainstream liberalism has much to learn from
both Foucault’s work and the subordination and silencing arguments. I
believe, and will argue in Chapters 7 and 8, that these insights are not 
at all antithetical to the liberal state’s core commitment to treating its 
citizens with equal concern and respect. Indeed, these oft-diverging view-
points can inform each other.
However, there is one crucial respect in which Foucault and liberalism
are at odds, and that concerns state neutrality. The notion of power
running through discourse and producing what we take to be truth
would preclude neutrality at every level. The state is a discourse producer,
and as such it is always implicated in power relations, rather than 
being somehow exempt from them, as liberal discourse would suggest.
My claim – that Foucault’s analysis of power ought to lead to the end of
insistence on liberal neutrality – will be further reinforced in the next
chapter, when I examine Butler’s persuasive arguments that state speech
necessarily regulates discourse – in other words, that the liberal state is
always already guilty of its own worst fear: censorship. Neither Foucault’s
account of power, nor Butler’s account of censorship, ought to be taken
as devastating to liberal discourse. I will maintain in Chapter 7 that these
insights are not antithetical to liberalism’s core commitment – insofar 
as its core commitment is seen as the treatment of all citizens with equal
concern and respect – and can be accommodated by an enlightened 
egalitarian activist liberal state.
5.4 The silencing and subordination arguments, revisited
Having examined Foucault’s notion of power as diffuse and operative
through discourse, it is time to bring these insights to bear on the
silencing and subordination arguments, as well as on the charges of
culturally oppressive speech that the arguments have brought to light.
Analysis of Foucault’s ouvre has at least these important implications
for these arguments. First, his insistence on the historicity of subjects
will prove to echo and buttress the concerns of the proponents of the
Foucault: Power, Discourse, and the State 133
abbie.levin@gmail.com
silencing and subordination arguments. Second, Foucault’s idea of
power as decentralized and not centered in the individual subject 
will challenge the idea, advanced by most proponents of the silencing
and subordination arguments, that power resides in the individual
pornographer or hate speaker. Finally, Foucault’s ideas of genealogy
and counter-discourse will reinforce the silencing and subordination
arguments’ point that the discourses about silencing and subordina-
tion offered by women and minorities are fruitfully understood as
counter-discourses. I explore each of these implications in this section.
First, with respect to historicity, Foucault’s conception of discourse
explodes the very idea of neutrality even further than have the speech
acts theorists canvassed in Chapter 4. Instead of positing ahistorical
subjects who live amid the backdrop of a neutral state, as liberalism
would have it, we have instead a very different formulation:
The history which bears and determines us has the form of a war
rather than that of a language; relations of power, not relations of
meaning. History has no ‘meaning,’ which is not to say that it is
absurd or incoherent. On the contrary, it is intelligible and should
be susceptible to analysis down to the smallest detail – but this 
in accordance with the intelligibility of struggles, of strategies and
tactics. Neither the dialectic, as logic of contradictions, nor semiotics,
as the structure of communication, can account for the intrinsic 
intelligibility of conﬂicts. (Foucault 1984a: 56)
Foucault here afﬁrms the intelligibility of history and its efﬁcacy in
forming human subjects, and claims that the key to comprehending
the unfolding of human history is to focus on, and illuminate, the history
of power relations. Understanding what is meant by the idea that history
‘bears and determines us’ goes far towards appreciating an important idea
that liberalism has failed to take into account, which is the notion of an
historical, rather than an ahistorical, subject. The idea of an historical
subject implicitly lies behind the silencing and subordination arguments,
and we can see this when returning to these arguments in light of
Foucault’s understanding of power and discourse.
Foucault’s critique of the ahistoricity of subjects is an important part
of what critical race theorists identify as crucial to understanding the
nature of the injustice in leading hate speech decisions, such as the
1992 United States Supreme Court decision in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,2
which allowed the white plaintiffs to burn a cross on the lawn of a
black family on First Amendment grounds. Foucault’s understanding of
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power as producing particular kinds of subjects, depending on the 
historical situation, and the discourses operative in that situation, can
perhaps best be seen by way of the compelling example that is the
decision in R.A.V. The best way, I believe, to make sense of the judg-
ment in R.A.V. is to say that the Court decided to protect this speech
by decontextualizing the history of cross burning, and by portraying
the cross-burners as an unpopular minority whose speech the Court
must defend against the state’s power of censorship. The majority
opinion, written by Justice Scalia, illustrates the results of ignoring the
historicity of power relations while deciding whose interests deserve
state protection. This demonstrates the legal system’s gross inadequacies
in upholding the rights of a minority group. As critical race theorist 
Mari Matsuda poses the problem:
In effect, the opinion proceeds as though we know nothing about
the origins of the practice of cross burning or about the meaning
that a burning cross carries both for those who use it and those
whom it terrorizes. What we do learn from the opinion is that cross
burning is not a ‘majority preference’ and that the ordinance [which
would have not protected the speech] reﬂects inappropriate ‘special
hostility’ against ‘particular biases.’ The cross burners are portrayed
as an unpopular minority that the Supreme Court must defend
against the power of the state…. The reality of ongoing racism and
exclusion is erased and bigotry is redeﬁned as majoritarian condem-
nation of racist views. The powerful impact of the burning cross 
– the assault, the terror – is also inverted. The power is replaced in
the hands of those who oppose racism. The powerful antiracists
have captured the state and will use the state to oppress powerless
racists. (Matsuda and Lawrence 1993: 135)
In light of the preceding discussion of Foucault’s understanding of
power and historicity, it becomes clear that R.A.V. was wrongly decided,
and taking Matsuda’s and Foucault’s comments together, we can begin
to see why. What is wrong with the decision in R.A.V. is mainstream
liberalism’s failure to account for the operation of power and histor-
icity in its decisions of when to apply and how to deﬁne rights. The
decision was, instead, governed by the Court’s ahistorical – in other
words, ﬁctional – discussion of the power relations between black and
white people. Foucault’s insistence on historically constituted subjects
adds further weight to the viewpoint of critical race theorists that fully
understanding a hate speech situation means understanding the 
Foucault: Power, Discourse, and the State 135
abbie.levin@gmail.com
historicity of the utterance. Critical race theorists contend that the
liberal state is guilty of insisting that its subjects are ahistorical.
Perhaps the state’s insistence on ahistoricity signals a blind attempt 
to ensure the vaunted goal of neutrality: if the state pretends that all
citizens are homogenous and applies blanket policies to everyone, then
the state will have met its neutrality requirements. 
However, the conﬂation of neutrality with ahistoricity does not seem
to be a necessary move; certainly we can conceive of situations where the
liberal state could recognize the historicity of its subjects, and right his-
torical wrongs, without violating neutrality. For instance, the Canadian
state could, and indeed did, compensate its First Nations citizens who 
suffered physical and sexual abuse in the state’s residential schools for
over a half century without making any claims about preferring the First
Nations’conception of the good life over any other competing concep-
tion. This example demonstrates that the liberal state need not be com-
mitted to the ahistoricity of its subjects in order to maintain neutrality.
When historicity is overlooked by legislators and judges, as is often the
case, dangerous decisions, such as that in R.A.V., can result.
Not only does Foucault see history as determinative of subjects, but
he also suggests that history is itself the history of power. If this is 
the case, then it follows that power is to be understood as existing
prior to selfhood. Foucault wants to claim that power is the primary
and formative element of human life and experience, and this claim
entails subscribing to the quite radical notion of subjects as effects,
rather than creators, of power. He writes:
The individual is not to be conceived as a sort of elementary
nucleus…on which power comes to fasten…. In fact, it is already
one of the prime effects of power that certain bodies, certain ges-
tures, certain discourses, certain desires, come to be identiﬁed and
constituted as individuals. (Foucault 1980a: 98) 
Thus, individuals cease to be the primary locales of power and instead
become mere functions of it. This has devastating implications for the
silencing and subordination arguments to the extent that these argu-
ments make use of the idea of the hate speakers and pornographers as
themselves the instruments of power exerted upon powerless minor-
ities and women. A Foucauldian analysis would resist such a view, since
it makes individuals too central and obvious a site of power to account
plausibly for power’s diffuse and decentralized operations.
As was shown earlier in this chapter, Foucault argues that the dominant
mode for thinking about power, which he often calls ‘sovereign power,’ is
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inadequate. Oppression is thus not what the silencing and subordination
arguments deﬁne it as being – a global constraint that one person, or one
group, exercises over another. Foucault feels that such a construction
must be false, both because the subject is not the extreme of power’s 
exercise and because power is not merely repressive but fundamentally
creative as well. For Foucault, the shift from thinking about subjects as
having power, to thinking about a set of practices in which power is act-
ualized in the practices’ effects, signals a departure from the conceptual
model of sovereignty that dominates thinking on politics and law. 
The discussion in this chapter has revealed that Foucault understands
the relationship between power and the state to be more complicated
than it initially appears, but that his understanding of the individual in
relation to power is simpler. For Foucault, the individual is very clearly
not the primary site of power, and individuals are not understood as
bearers of power, but rather the very creation of subjects is itself a func-
tion of power. Subjects are certainly an important part of the operation of
power, for Foucault, but they are not located at the apex of power. 
However, even though the silencing and subordination arguments
cannot be accepted as they stand, given that they rely on an untenable
account of power in the individual subject, these arguments serve another
very important function on a Foucauldian understanding, bringing to
light a counter-discourse in which women and minorities express their
frustration at having been silenced and subordinated by the dominant dis-
course. Before the authors of the silencing and subordination arguments
published these ideas, this discourse was even more underground than it is
today. At present, as a result of the discourse surrounding the silencing
and subordination arguments, there exists a ﬂourishing academic and
jurisprudential discourse inﬂuenced by these arguments’ overarching
concern: that liberalism’s rights discourse operates to obscure the power
relations embedded in the allocation and delineation of rights. This is a
powerful idea that, as I maintain, leads to the undermining of liberalism’s
neutral pretensions. Such an undermining, I will hold in Chapters 7 and 8,
signals not the end of liberalism but rather an opportunity for a reinvigor-
ated and self-consciously powerful liberal state that would be – for the ﬁrst
time – equipped with the resources to understand its own power and wield
it in the interests of advancing equality.
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has aimed to make three points about Foucault that demon-
strate how his theory about the nature of power is relevant to the dis-
cussion of whether and how the liberal state should actively work to end
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cultural oppression in order to treat its citizens with equal concern and
respect.
First, Foucault’s notion of power as operative through discourse greatly
strengthens my case that speech and power are intimately linked. Having
demonstrated that, we can no longer return to the liberal myth that 
the state’s speech is outside of power; the idea of state neutrality in the
marketplace of ideas is ﬁnally laid to rest by Foucault’s theory. In the next
chapter, I will begin to explore a further reason, offered by Judith Butler,
why the liberal claim to neutrality is fatally ﬂawed. In contrast to one of
the chief reasons offered by liberals for state neutrality – the avoidance of
censorship by the state – Butler contends that censorship operates quite
differently from how liberals envision it does, and that this difference
again implicates the state in non-neutrality, as well as showing, from ano-
ther angle, how neutrality is impossible in principle. Again, my critique 
of state neutrality, informed by the arguments of Foucault and Butler, is
not meant to be hostile to liberalism. I will argue in Chapters 7 and 8 that
the liberal state, untethered from the bonds of its claims to neutrality,
will be able to speak freely – for the ﬁrst time – in the service of equality. 
Second, Foucault’s claims about the nature of state power, while not
central to his account, are nonetheless supportive of my central claim
that state power in the form of juridical discourse needs to be both admit-
ted by the liberal state and interrogated by the state if we are to realize
ﬁnally the central liberal goal of the treatment of all citizens with equal
concern and respect. Without such an admission, the discourse around
freedom of expression operates, as I have shown throughout these pages,
as an extremely powerful and dangerous discourse that dictates the terms
of subsequent discourse. Since the freedom of expression discourse oper-
ates at a meta-level among discourses, getting to the root of its workings
is key to the goal of enhancing the opportunities for equality in the
liberal state. 
Finally, examining Foucault’s account of power, discourse, and genea-
logy reveals that, contrary to some formulations of the silencing and sub-
ordination arguments, individual citizens such as pornographers and hate
speakers do not wield enough power to effect successful illocutionary
speech acts. That said, the voices of women and minorities, coalescing 
in the silencing and subordination arguments themselves, may in fact 
be powerful enough to constitute a genealogy or counter-discourse to the
mainstream discourse that has rights distribution as an egalitarian and
neutral allocation.





6.1 Introduction: Post-sovereign speakers in a 
post-sovereign state
In her book Excitable Speech, Judith Butler attempts to take on board
Foucault’s idea of post-sovereign power and meld it with the ideas of
performative speech acts and Derrida’s idea of citationality to create
what she calls ‘a politics of the performative.’ Butler proposes that the
combination of post-sovereignty and speech act theory affords, for
perhaps the ﬁrst time in history, the possibility that a previously dis-
empowered speaker can resignify a previously injurious speech act. 
If she is correct, this offers a powerful challenge to my view that the
liberal state needs to be engaged in its own speech on behalf of the dis-
empowered (that is, the silenced or subordinated) speakers, since,
according to Butler, such speakers are not disempowered after all. I will
argue that Butler’s attempt to ground a liberatory politics out of the
bare fact of post-sovereignty is ultimately unsuccessful because post-
sovereignty, even when combined, as she has it, with speech act theory
and Derrida’s idea of citationality, can in no way guarantee the efﬁcacy
of the disempowered speaker’s ability to resignify speech. At most, the
marketplace of ideas is more egalitarian on Butler’s account than it is
for the proponents of the silencing and subordination arguments, or
on Foucault’s and Austin’s accounts, but it is not egalitarian enough to
provide sufﬁcient opportunities for speech acts that will guarantee that
the state’s treatment all of its citizens with equal concern and respect.
Thus, state intervention is still vitally needed to meet this demand.
That said, Butler’s account does offer a very interesting, and I think
correct, view of the nature of censorship. Many liberal thinkers have
defended what I contend is the obfuscating and deeply problematic
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idea of state neutrality because of the fear that in the absence of 
neutrality, censorship would result. This is far from an implausible
worry, and indeed, as Chapter 2 has demonstrated, stems from as
canonical and inﬂuential a thinker as J. S. Mill. Butler’s view will cast
very serious doubt on this orthodox liberal view, and in so doing, I will
argue, she provides the decisive argument against the need for, and the
desirability or possibility of, state neutrality.
In what follows in this chapter, then, I will ﬁrst take up Butler’s politics
of the performative and show that it does not achieve the level of pro-
tection for historically disempowered speakers that an egalitarian liberal
state would need to provide to all of its citizens. However, Butler’s account
of censorship does provide a very powerful idea of the nature of censor-
ship and one that implicates the state at such a primary level that state
avoidance of censorship is untenable. Butler’s account demonstrates the
futility of the classical liberal objective of state neutrality.
6.2 Excitable speech: Judith Butler’s politics of 
performativity
In her book Excitable Speech, Judith Butler offers a novel take on the
freedom of expression debate that is informed by Foucault, Derrida,
and speech act theory. In introducing the issue of state power as mani-
fested in state speech acts, she says (1997: 62): ‘It will be necessary to
distinguish between those kinds of violence that are the necessary con-
ditions of the binding character of legal language, and those kinds
which exploit that very necessity in order to redouble that injury in
the service of injustice.’ In other words, while state speech is of neces-
sity powerful, it remains imperative to make the distinction between
benign and pernicious state speech. Making this distinction, through
examining state judicial discourse, will be the concern of Chapters 7
and 8. Butler’s account offers a good starting point for this inquiry.
I suggest that the authoritative nature of state speech is paradigmat-
ically realized in its decisions to enact and to limit rights, and that this
power and authority is problematically ignored in mainstream liberal
accounts of the state, where the state is seen as the neutral arbiter of com-
peting private interests. Foucault’s analysis of the nature of power, dis-
course, and the state demonstrates that the liberal view is not only naïve
but dangerously false. It is dangerous, I believe, because such a misleading
view of state action (or more aptly, non-action) serves to elide the power
of the state and obscure its real operations. Butler’s point above – regard-
ing the issue of state power as manifested through state speech acts – is
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that it is worthwhile to determine which state actions in particular make
use of this eliding of the operation of power in order to further injustice,
and which instead are simply powerful qua state action. Not only is this
distinction worthwhile, but it is crucial if the state is going to fulﬁll its
commitment to treating all of its citizens with equal concern and respect. 
Butler claims that we understandably want accountability for racist,
sexist, and homophobic speech, and so the liberal state posits a subject
to bear that responsibility. The problem with positing a subject to bear
responsibility is that such a subject is a mere grammatical ﬁction,
according to the Foucauldian tradition, in which Butler situates herself.
Subjecthood in what Butler, following Foucault, calls the ‘juridical’
sense does not exist in reality because the view of subjects as agents of
power rather than as instruments of it is, as I have shown in the previous
chapter, false. For Butler, ignoring the fact that sovereign or juridical sub-
jectivity of private subjects is a legal ﬁction – which liberal discourse
insists on ignoring – stalls the analysis of how discourse (legal, porno-
graphic, or otherwise) produces injury, by taking the subject and the
spoken action as the uncontroversial point of departure for the 
analysis, rather than as the subject of the analysis itself (1997: 47). 
According to Butler, proponents of the silencing and subordination
arguments make precisely this mistake – they assume that power resides
in the speakers of hate speech and pornography, then conclude that the
responsibility must simply lie with these speakers as well. These assump-
tions operate according to a commonsense view of power, what Butler
and Foucault call the ‘sovereign’ sense, in which the subject’s power is
assumed to be as thoroughgoing as that of the sovereign. However, this
view has been shown to be simplistic on the Foucauldian account. 
Contrary to the silencing and subordination arguments, Butler argues
that the power of racist, sexist, and homophobic utterances does not derive
from the speakers’ independent power and social standing. Butler stands
with Foucault and Derrida in understanding, rather, that the power derives
from the citationality and historicity of the actual words uttered. She
maintains that it is only because racist epithets, for example, have a parti-
cular history in a painful racist past that they are able to inﬂict the injury
that they do. Racial slurs have their painful effects to an important degree
because they recall times when the racist label was literally fatal; porno-
graphy has its painful effects because of times when women had even less
protection from rape than they have presently. This seems an important
insight, and an insight that relocates the question of the efﬁcacy of racist,
sexist, and homophobic speech back towards the speech and the speech
situation – as per Austin – rather than towards the individual speaker.
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Butler’s resituating the power of speech acts in language and history
has important and far-reaching ramiﬁcations for my discussion. First, it
suggests that policies that entail strictly individual liability for racist or
sexist utterances fail to address the real chain of responsibility at play
in such utterances. This evokes the Foucauldian idea that a juridical
notion of subjecthood and responsibility is inadequate to the task of a
proper understanding of speech acts and power. While it is tempting
here to mobilize our familiar assignments of blame and responsibility,
Butler makes it clear that to do so would perpetuate a ﬁction, causing
us to fail to grasp what is truly at stake. Instead, if the power of a speech
act derives from historicity of language itself, language’s power exceeds
merely that particular iteration and draws its force instead from the
history of its meanings. Veering away from the perspective of the silen-
cing and subordination arguments, Butler proposes another way to view
hate speech and pornography, a view that she feels incorporates the best
of Austin and Foucault. 
Butler’s account relies on the insights of Derrida as well as the above
thinkers, in particular his view that the meaning of utterances funda-
mentally cannot be determined in advance of the utterance by the
speaker herself. Derrida points out the necessary indeterminacies of
language, a project that would, if successful, serve to demonstrate pre-
cisely why the speaker is not, and can never be, sovereign. While a full
account of Derrida’s argument would take us too far aﬁeld, a discussion
of his notion of citationality will provide the relevant aspects of his
account that Butler employs. 
6.3 Speech, citationality, and the politics of the 
performative
Derrida introduces his arguments about the citationality of language as
evidence of its mutability and its indeterminacy. He writes:
Every sign, linguistic or nonlinguistic, spoken or written, in a small
or large unit, can be cited, put between quotation marks; in so
doing it can break with every given context, engendering an inﬁnity
of new contexts in a manner which is absolutely illimitable. This
does not imply that the mark is valid outside of a context, but on
the contrary that there are only contexts without any center or
absolute anchoring. (Derrida 1988: 12)
In other words, the ability to cite a sign is an ability to recontextual-
ize it, and the ability to do this is limitless. Because of the power of
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citationality to reconﬁgure the meaning of the sign for any new con-
text, Derrida thinks that the citationality of signs establishes language’s
indeterminacy of meaning, rather than continuity of meaning as had
been previously assumed in other theories. 
Derrida sees citationality as heralding the end of thinking about lan-
guage in terms of ﬁxed meanings, and maintains that Austin’s account
of speech acts opens the door to this new way of thinking by eliminat-
ing the view that language merely reports states of affairs in the world,
and thus has meanings that are ﬁxed insofar as they must correspond
to these states of affairs (Derrida 1988: 13). Since the performative is by
deﬁnition about creating its own, brand-new state of affairs, it cannot
be thought of simply as a tool for describing a world already given to
us, as merely locutionary sentences are understood. 
However, Austin’s view isn’t radical enough, according to Derrida,
because it presupposes the efﬁcacy of the speaker’s intent in deter-
mining meaning, rather than interrogating that very efﬁcacy. In dis-
cussing the speaker’s intent in uttering a performative, Austin simply
assumes that there is an obvious correspondence between such intent
and the deciphering of the content of the performative. Such a picture
is altogether too tidy for Derrida, as it disallows for the existence of the
radical discontinuity of meaning that he insists is to be found in all
communication, including performative communication.
Where Derrida uses the notion of citationality primarily to demonstrate
an absence of the speaker’s total control over the meaning and context 
of the performative, Butler takes this result a step further and shows 
that there are deep political consequences for this fact. Derrida’s account
demonstrates that we do not have total control over the meaning of 
our speech acts, due to their citational nature, and Butler goes one step
further to argue that this ‘out of controlness’ of our speech means that
there is a possibility to reformulate the meaning of a speech act through
its very citationality, and reformulate the meaning to be more politically
favorable to the interests of the speaker.
Butler begins Excitable Speech by adopting Foucault’s insights that lan-
guage is intimately tied to the creation of subjecthood. She notes that
perhaps the reason why words can indeed wound, as the proponents 
of the silencing and subordination arguments maintain, is that we are 
linguistic beings, created by language. We are called into being through
language, and following Foucault, the identity that we acquire through
language has everything to do with the discourse that makes such an
identity meaningful, which in turn has everything to do with power.
Butler concurs with Derrida’s claim that no term or statement can
function performatively without its accumulated historicity. Butler
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claims, for example, that this is how racist injury works. The speaker
who utters a racist slur is citing the slur, and the injury is due to the
recollection of times throughout that minority’s history when use of
that phrase had explicitly deadly consequences. So far, then, Butler has
not departed to any great extent from the other thinkers I have been
considering with respect to hate speech. 
Butler truly departs from all of the thinkers on speech acts and power 
I have thus far examined when she determines that Derrida’s notion of
citationality has liberatory potential – potential that she thinks sug-
gests that the state regulation of hateful speech is as unnecessary as it 
is wrongheaded, and that subjects themselves should instead employ
what she calls ‘counter-speech’ as a way of positively transforming these
Derridean gaps in language’s meaning.
Butler maintains that the nature of language as – importantly – out of
the speaker’s control means that words do not necessarily have to wound,
because speech can have a future not dependent on the words themselves
or the speaker’s intention. There is, then, a possibility of a resignifying,
liberatory counter-speech, which recasts previously injurious language in
a liberatory vein. To this end, she invokes Derrida’s idea of the citational
nature of speech and argues that because speech indeed can be cited, and
hence be given a new context and meaning, we can resignify words that
once wounded in order to deny them their ability to hurt us. For Butler,
classic examples of this operation in action include the gay community’s
resignifying of the formerly injurious words ‘fag’ or ‘queer,’ and the black
hip-hop community’s resignifying of such slurs as ‘nigger.’
Butler follows the Foucauldian idea that the contemporary political 
situation is ‘post-sovereign,’ meaning that we cannot look to a single
source of uncontested political power, to a single person or body whose
command is absolute. The post-sovereign age heralds the beginning of
the diffuse and decentralized power that was Foucault’s project to inter-
rogate. Since power is no longer embodied in individuals in the way 
that it was in the time of sovereign power, Butler maintains, speech 
acts are no longer capable of wielding the force that they were once 
able to claim. Once we untether the speech act from the sovereign
subject, which Butler’s account of the nature of speech effects, we can
begin to theorize about the possibility of counter-speech that holds the
potential for liberation from cultural oppression.
Butler, then, wants to question the view that hate speech or porno-
graphy enacts subordination or silencing with power that would be
sovereign in its efﬁcacy. She doubts that hate speech or pornography
really are as felicitous as they appear on the implicitly sovereign account
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of speech acts that the authors of the silencing and subordination argu-
ments posit. On Matsuda’s account, according to Butler (1977: 18), hate
speech is the linguistic re-articulation of social subordination and thus
reproduces the status quo of power relations. As opposed to this retro-
grade sovereign account of the efﬁcacy of the speech act, Butler wants 
to argue that, just as gender norms are dependent upon their daily re-
enactment in order to be continued (as Butler maintained in Gender
Trouble), so too the social structure of power that speech acts effect and
reinforce is dependent upon such speech acts’ regular enunciation for
that social order’s continuation.1
It is here that Butler believes she has pinpointed a ﬁssure in the chain
of efﬁcacy – or sovereignty, to use her term – where such reiﬁcation can
be undermined. She contends that if this system of power, along with the
oppression that it produces and to which proponents of the silencing and
subordination arguments object, needs constant re-enactment in order to
be effective, then
[i]t is at the site of enunciation that the question of its continuity is
to be posed…. As an invocation, hate speech is an act that recalls
prior acts, requiring future repetitions to endure. Is there a repeti-
tion that might disjoin the speech-act from its supporting conven-
tions such that its repetition confounds rather than consolidates its
injurious effects? (Butler 1997: 19–20)
Butler wants to answer ‘yes’ to this rhetorical question. She believes
that this afﬁrmative answer is implicitly supported by Austin because
on his account, the speech act proceeds at least in part by way of con-
vention or ritual. Because of the malleability of convention – and
because of our contemporary post-sovereign condition – the speaker
gains an opportunity to break with the convention, cite the previously
injurious speech, and resignify its meaning.
One of the acts in which power clearly functions is that of naming, as
Althusser famously noted (Althusser 1971), and the name is understood
as ‘having a historicity, a way that it carries with it internally, all of the
history and contexts of the past use of the name. Racism works through
this operation.’ (Butler 1997: 36). This is exactly what the proponents 
of the silencing and subordination arguments point out. However, for
Butler, it is only half the truth, and it is the other half that primarily
interests her. She claims that this repetition of injurious historical phrases
is how trauma, history, and memory are repeated, but also our way to
break with this chain of historicity.
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Butler maintains that because speech is to an important degree out
of the subject’s control, the subject’s sovereignty and agency are
eroded to a signiﬁcant degree. Thus, individuals speak with something
less than sovereign force, which if true entails that they have less than
full agency with respect to their speech acts (Butler 1997: 39). This harks
back to the notion that it misses the mark to imagine the responsibility
for hate speech and pornography as lying in the hands of the indi-
vidual speakers. When we examine hate speech and pornography, we
ought always to consider the extent to which we can legitimately focus
our attention on the offenders rather than on the state, whose speech
is in fact sovereign and whose performatives are always felicitous.
Butler grants the felicity of the state’s speech, but she doubts that 
we can look to the state to remedy the injustice that hate speech and
pornography may produce. Whether the state may be an appropriate
place to look for reforms in the name of equality is the topic of
Chapters 7 and 8.
Instead of looking to the state, Butler insists on a local, individual,
and performative remedy for the injustice produced by oppressive
speech, through exploiting the lack of sovereignty involved in the
speech acts of private speakers:
These terms we never really choose are the occasion for some-
thing we might still call agency, the repetition of an originary sub-
ordination for another purpose, one whose future is partially open….
Understanding performativity as a renewable action without clear
origin or end suggests that speech is ﬁnally constrained neither by
its speciﬁc speaker nor its originating context. Not only deﬁned by
social context, such speech is also marked by its capacity to break
with context. Thus, performativity has its own social temporality in
which it remains enabled precisely by the contexts from which it
breaks. (Butler 1997: 38–40)
Butler urges that we, as individuals, ﬁnd the liberatory potential to resig-
nify injurious speech through the post-sovereign absences that charac-
terize contemporary communication, as remarked upon by Foucault and
Derrida. 
However, I maintain that Butler wants it both ways – she wants to say
both that presumably authoritative speakers are not in fact authoritative,
and that presumably disempowered speakers are in fact empowered. But
this does not seem intuitively true, especially when we examine the lived
experience of the attempted speech acts of historically disempowered
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groups. Surely if speech is out of control, then this must be true for
both the oppressed and the oppressors. Surely if speech has liberatory
potential in its re-signiﬁability, then that power exists for oppressors to
resignify injuriously as well. If this is the case – and I cannot see how it
could be otherwise – Butler’s account fails to guarantee that Dworkin’s
criterion of egalitarianism – that the state treat all of its citizens with
equal concern and respect – will be met. Of course, Butler is not writing
within the liberal tradition, so this criticism does not pose a direct prob-
lem to her. Nonetheless, the limitations of Butler’s account pose a very
serious problem for anyone who wishes to have a politics of genuine
equality, in any tradition – liberal or otherwise. While Butler is correct to
note that there are indeed ‘ﬁssures’ in language, these ﬁssures are by no
means guarantees of efﬁcacious speech acts, and it is hard to see why we
should settle for anything less.
Though Butler is correct to point out that a speech act can go both
ways – either as oppressive or as resigniﬁcatory – such an admission
must be taken to its ultimate, and ambiguous, conclusion: speech is
out of control in ways that may be either injurious or liberatory. But
such a conclusion is not very reassuring for a society committed to
treating its citizens with equal concern and respect and committed to
elimination of cultural oppression. I insist that we need to go to where
speech can be reliably efﬁcacious and sovereign – to the state – if we
are really committed to using the power of speech to restore the enact-
ment of these principles in contemporary egalitarian liberal society.
While I think that Butler is ultimately overstating the strength of her
conclusions, nevertheless the insight that speech acts have liberatory
as well as oppressive potential is a useful one. Its implications for the
silencing and subordination arguments should be quite straightfor-
ward. To the extent that these arguments rely on thinking of the actors
themselves as those who hold the power to wound, qua powerful
majority, Butler would say that they are mistaken. 
Not only are the silencing and subordination arguments guilty of a
misguided view of individual agency, so too, and more importantly, is
all of liberal theory. Butler writes:
One ought to be in a position to utter words in such a way that the
meaning of those words coincides with the intention with which
they are uttered, and that the performative dimension of that uttering
works to support and further that intended meaning…. Presupposed
by this conception of the utterance is a normative view of a person
with the ability and power to exercise speech in a straightforward
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way. This is conceived by Langton as essential to the operation and
agency of a rights-bearing person. (Butler 1997: 84)
Here Butler raises quite a serious challenge to some of the most basic
tenets of liberalism – in that she is claiming that the autonomy and
agency that liberalism posits is dubious – if speech is not as sovereign
as thinkers like the proponents of the silencing and subordination
arguments maintain. She claims that their accounts of pornography
‘…exploit a certain notion of liberal sovereignty to further [their] own
aims, insisting that consent always and only constitutes the subject’
(1997: 85). A serious question that I will address in Chapters 7 and 8 is
whether or not Butler’s concerns can be met by liberalism, or whether
they are hostile to its very foundation. I will argue that these concerns
can, and must, be met by an activist egalitarian liberal state.
In Excitable Speech, Butler makes a great deal of the idea that speech’s
being out of control should be considered liberatory, in that it contains
resigniﬁcatory possibilities for the speaker. Because we are living in a
post-sovereign age, according to Butler, speech is not the stable and
authoritative force it once was, but rather it is marked by its ability to
be reconﬁgured in ways that are new and heretofore unspeakable.
While I agree with Butler about this new-found potential for dynamic
and resigniﬁcatory speech, she fails to discuss the all-important question
of which speakers – and at what times, and under what circumstances
– can perform a resigniﬁcatory, or for that matter even an illocutionary,
speech act. It is this question that I will now address, and the discussion
in the preceding two chapters and this one has made clear that our
answer will be found through reference to the power relations present
when a speaker speaks. While this power is indeed not nearly as strong as
sovereign in the individual case, and while power is more ﬂuid and
diffuse than it has been in the past, it is still due to power’s functioning
that one is either able or unable to effect the speech acts that one wishes
to effect. If this is the case, and speech acts still are a function of power,
then we should think of resigniﬁcatory speech acts neither as avail-
able to all nor as necessarily truly revolutionary, in that they may reify,
rather than question, the very power structure that has oppressed us. If
resigniﬁcatory or illocutionary speech acts are a function of power, as the
preceding two chapters and this one have demonstrated they are, then
the best characterization of the resigniﬁcatory or illocutionary act is that
through such, a person or group has been granted more power than she
or it had held previously, rather than that person’s or group’s speech
having called the very framework of power into question.
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The real site of power to interrogate with respect to these questions is
the state in its speech acts concerning freedom of expression. What
Austin, Foucault, and Butler make clear is the idea that speech is never
neutral and has everything to do with power. Closely related to this 
is the notion that the state is not innocent in its own speech. We 
can, given the ideas of the theorists canvassed in these last three chap-
ters, view the freedom of expression discourse as itself an operation 
of power – and perhaps the most powerful of all performative speech 
– in that it is the discourse which sets the limits for all future discourse.
The theories I’ve investigated in the two preceding chapters and this
one change the classical liberal story of freedom of expression by
making explicit the fact of power and its pervasive operation, where
liberal accounts occlude them. The real force of this insight is evid-
ent in what follows here, where I will conclude, in opposition to the
classical liberal account, that ‘subjects’ aren’t acted upon through 
‘censorship’ in quite the way that liberals imagine, and that this has
important consequences for thinking about the freedom of expression
debate.
Thus far, I’ve attempted to lay the groundwork for theorizing quite dif-
ferently about the role of the liberal state in hard cases of freedom of
expression. What I have been arguing is the result of Austin’s, Foucault’s,
and Butler’s accounts is that it is not individual actors (for example,
pornographers or hate speakers) who should be at the focus of the free-
dom of expression debate, but rather the state itself. The state is of central
importance when it issues an authoritative speech act, as through such 
it grants or denies rights in general, and more speciﬁcally it delimits the
right to freedom of expression. It is the latter state role that has the largest
impact on the scope of subsequent discourse. 
Such a shift in focus leads us away from the whole problem of
whether the state ought to censor private actors involved in free
speech. We ask instead whether the state itself, now conscious of 
its role in the web of power relations, should delimit a particular right
differently in order to promote equality. Of course, this still leaves
open the possibility that this latter question will still yield results 
that are interpretable as censorship according to the classical liberal
account, the most inﬂuential example of which is Mill’s On Liberty,
which I examined at length in Chapter 2. To address these Millian 
concerns, I will discuss a novel analysis of censorship offered by 
Judith Butler and Fred Schauer, which holds that censorship oper-
ates quite differently than the classical liberal account has thus far
imagined.
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6.4 Censorship reconsidered
The schema I’ve sketched so far, which implicates state power in the
creation and remedying of cultural oppression, certainly seems much
more plausible than the bald formulation of pornographers and hate
speakers as the wielders of power. In adopting this schema, however, I
must address the issues that such an account raises in terms of state
power and agency, and the nature of censorship. First, it should be
noted that my formulation provides that individuals are not the only,
or even the primary, wielders of power, but also, and as importantly,
are constrained by state power. As Foucault insisted, power is not only
restrictive but also, and more importantly, productive, and this is just
what Butler’s formulation suggests. The subjects produced by the ‘don’t
ask, don’t tell’ policy of the United States military re gays in uniform,
for example, she suggests, are importantly censored before they ever
speak (restricted), but are also given a new identity (produced) as a par-
ticular kind of homosexual, namely, one who is forced to deny that
sexuality.
One very important implication of this formulation is that censor-
ship does not, and indeed cannot, operate in anything like the way that
classical Millian liberal accounts suppose – that is, contrary to Mill’s
account, subjects are not potentially censored by the state after speaking
or after forming an intention to speak. They are ‘censored,’ if the term
even makes any sense, well before they start to speak, and they are 
censored by repressive discourse itself, much of which is state driven. 
On the classical liberal conception of censorship, ‘censorship is an act 
of external interference with the internally generated communicative,
expressive, artistic, or informational preferences of some agent’ (Schauer
1998: 150). This view takes for granted the traditional liberal account of
subjectivity, where a subject is uncontroversially endowed, or deemed to
be endowed, with the privacy and autonomy to formulate her own pref-
erences, thoughts, and feelings. This picture takes the distinction between
the internal – the realm of the agent – and the external – the realm of the
other, usually the state – for granted. On the other hand, a Foucauldian
account, including Butler’s, would problematize this distinction: if sub-
jects are a production of power that is to some degree external to them, it
would follow that there is no sharp distinction between the private,
autonomous subject and the external world, composed of forces that act
upon such subjects.
According to the ‘new’ censorship to which Butler and Schauer sub-
scribe, however, it is a serious mistake to think of interior expressive or
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communicative forces of subjects as prior to or immune from external
inﬂuence. Instead, external forces of censorship come into play at the
level of preference formation, not simply at the level of ‘preference
frustration,’ the latter being what Schauer identiﬁes as the moment of
censorship on the traditional picture. Since the preferences of subjects
are at least in part determined externally – through cultural pressures,
through the nature of language itself as a system of constraints on
what is speakable, through artistic discourse deﬁning the limits of what
is art, as well as through state speech – it becomes reasonable to think
of these antecedent limiting events as themselves a part of censorship,
and indeed a more crucial part, than the ‘subsequent’ censorship of the
classical Millian liberal view. As Schauer describes it:
[O]ur communicative existence is dependent on the rules, con-
ventions, and understandings over which we as individual com-
municators have only the smallest amount of control…. With our
communicative capacities so much out of our control, the idea of
communicative preferences as overwhelmingly endogenous seems
strained, and that makes the idea of identifying censorship with the
exogenous seem equally strained. Without an idea of the internal
there seems little point in talking about the external, and without
the idea of the external, the idea of censorship seems fragile. (Schauer
1998: 159) 
Given that this ‘new’ censorship picture maintains that censorship 
is occurring both necessarily and prior to the speaker’s formulation of
the intent to speak, Schauer concludes that the phrase ‘censorship’ 
is not useful as a descriptive category of an act, but is useful, rather, 
as an ascriptive category stating a conclusion about which kinds of 
censorship we ﬁnd objectionable. 
The further details of Schauer’s view are not particularly important 
for my purposes, but what is important is that subscribing to this view 
– which seems quite intuitively plausible, the more we examine how rule-
based systems like language and social convention operate in forming 
our preferences – entails that the classical liberal view of censorship, as 
external and after the fact, as well as the classical liberal view of individual
agency, as presumptively autonomous, are inadequate descriptions of
both the operation of subjects and the operation of censorship. This inad-
equacy provides a crucial step in arguing for state regulation of certain
forms of speech in the name of equal concern and respect, since one can
no longer convincingly argue that such regulation is anathema to the
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liberal state, as it appears, on Schauer’s analysis, to occur necessarily
and at the behest of the state, among other sources.
Butler accepts Schauer’s distinction between external and internal
censorship, though she terms the former ‘explicit’ and the latter
‘implicit.’ Butler is much more interested in the implicit form, as the
explicit form sees power as merely repressive, rather than productive,
and sees the subject as having complete control over her speech, at
least up until the moment of explicit censorship, both of which are
unacceptable on a Foucauldian or Derridean framework. Regarding
implicit censorship, which she later calls ‘foreclosure’ in order to call
attention to the fact that it is unclear whether we should be using the
word ‘censorship’ for this kind of operation at all, Butler says that it
…refers to implicit operations of power that rule out in unspoken ways
what will remain unspeakable. In such cases, no explicit regulation 
is needed in which to articulate this constraint, and the operation 
of implicit censorship suggests that there are powerful operations of 
censorship that are not based in explicit state policy or regulation.
(Butler 1998: 249) 
So far, this formulation is akin to Schauer’s in that it afﬁrms the idea that
we ought to examine the work done by the censorship that takes place
well before the subject actually speaks. However, Butler does not take this
insight in the direction that Schauer does – towards reconﬁguring the
concept of censorship altogether and engaging in an inquiry about why
some forms of censorship are more egregious than others. 
Instead, Butler uses this insight to form the basis of her notion of
resigniﬁcatory, liberatory, counter-speech. Since foreclosure must para-
doxically speak the unspeakable utterance in order for that utterance’s
unspeakability to be effected – a law must name the speech it wants to
prohibit – and since the power that forecloses speech is post-sovereign,
and hence incomplete, there is room carved out for resigniﬁcatory
counter-speech, since both of these facts leave ﬁssures in both the
speakability and the power of the forbidden utterance.
Another important implication of this thinking about speech acts
that foreclose or restrict subsequent speech is that it forces us to see the
freedom of expression literature – both the jurisprudence and the acad-
emic discourse – as having, of necessity, a triple meaning. First, we
have the meaning of the words taken at face value, including the force
they convey due to the circumstances of their utterance. Second, words
can be understood as part of the apparatus of truth/power, over and
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above their literal meaning. For example, if there were a court decision
that favored giving hate speakers the right to burn a cross on a black
family’s lawn, to cite the earlier example of R. A. V. v. City of St. Paul, 
we would on the one hand say that this decision does just that, but 
on another level we would implicate this decision as part of state-
sponsored speech that gives more power to hate speakers – who, qua
white, are members of the dominant group – than it does to minorities.
Moreover, the decision projects state power behind the idea that speech
recalling the racist violence of an earlier era is by no means unspeakable,
thereby offering encouragement for more similar utterances in the
future. 
Third, Butler’s notion of implicit censorship or foreclosure has the
consequence that the speech in R. A. V., for example, names the speech
act of cross- burning as permissible and thereby deﬁnes the scope of
future speech acts both by individuals and by the state. The decision in
R. A. V., for example, deﬁnes the scope of the state’s future speech acts
insofar as the decision, qua precedent, operates as restrictive speech for
future judicial state speech acts. It also deﬁnes the scope of individuals’
future speech acts in that legal decisions operate to delimit the range of
state-sanctioned and state-prohibited actions, and thus to delimit the
range of acceptable and unacceptable individual behavior. The classical
liberal accounts only acknowledge the ﬁrst of these three levels. I am
arguing that the liberal state would be well served to acknowledge the
other two, as doing so would allow the state to reﬂect on its own
speech, with all its implications, and come to be able to ask the ques-
tion of whether any particular state speech act furthers or hinders the
liberal state’s goal of treating all its citizens with equal concern and
respect.
Acknowledging these three levels of the operation of speech means
that a large number of texts that were heretofore unchallengeable – due
to their utterance by parties who were considered to be beyond scrutiny,
and due to the fact that we were habituated, prior to speech act theory
and Foucauldian power analysis, to look only at one level of the meaning
of utterances – have suddenly become problematized. In my view, scru-
tinizing discourse through the lens of all three levels of speech would be a
welcome change – and one that we can make within the conﬁnes of the
liberal state. 
A further implication of this triple meaning of texts is that not only
must we interrogate texts from the ‘top’ of power – such as texts by the
state and by academics – but further, this understanding of text as power
will enable us to focus on a heretofore hidden set of discourses, those
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which Foucault terms ‘counter-discourse,’ the texts of the relatively
powerless. If we are interested in a post-sovereign understanding of
power, one seeking to expose the discourse of the powerful as powerful,
and one seeking to reveal the hidden discourses of the less powerful,
then we must look to both state and counter-discourses to do this. In
the case of the discourse of the powerful, the method is to deconstruct
the hidden power beneath the text; in the case of the discourse of 
the powerless, the task is ﬁrst to ﬁnd the texts, and then to show how
they speak of a reality that was denied by the discourse of the power-
ful. For our purposes, then, we can see the silencing and subordination
discourses as instances of the discourse of the powerless, and their
recounting of the lived experiences of sexism and racism as something
that the discourse of the powerful elides. 
Yet another implication of this way of viewing the state as a key pro-
ducer of the dominant discourse is that though the state is never to be
seen as neutral, due to its relationship to the workings of power, we can
nevertheless distinguish between instances when the state’s enactments
are in excess of its legitimate power and when they are not. When we
look at the jurisprudence surrounding hate speech and pornography in
Chapter 8, this will become one key indicator as to whether the state’s
judicial pronouncements reﬂect the exercise of state power to the detri-
ment of the state’s commitment to equal concern and respect for its 
citizens – or to the furtherance of it.
6.5 Conclusion
In other words, I am interested in what might be termed ‘post-sovereign
liberalism.’ The idea here is that, given the state’s implication in power
relations, there is still, nonetheless, room for a self-conscious state to
take on the process of self-correction. The process would include con-
sideration of when the state has spoken and wielded its power in ways
that cause silencing and subordination and when it has not, as well as
conscious attempts by the state to monitor and achieve its commit-
ment to equal concern and respect for its citizens. There is every reason
to imagine that this process is possible in principle, and there is even
evidence that some liberal states, such as Canada, may be on their way
to enacting it, as I will examine in Chapter 8.
What I want to know is simply when power is operating in the service
of equality and when it is not. Given this, my focus on the state becomes
quite reasonable, especially in light of the degree to which a focus on the
individual appears to be untenable. The discussion of state power offered
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thus far, as well as the critique of traditional notions of censorship,
have served to call into question the legitimacy of the liberal state in
refusing an activist role. 
Before concluding, it is crucial to note that while I believe that the
‘new censorship’ articulated by Schauer and Butler is correctly observed
– and gives the lie to the naïve liberal idea of censorship as existing
strictly after ideas have been formed and speech expressing those ideas
has been uttered – it is nevertheless still evident that censorship in the
liberal sense clearly exists and that the liberal state is still justiﬁed in
being concerned about it. In other words, there is no contradiction
between implicit and explicit censorship – both can and do operate
alongside each other. This point has been elided by Butler and Schauer,
but it is important for my purposes, since my project is not at all to 
dismantle liberalism’s core commitments but rather to show that the
insights of continental theories of power and language can help to resolve
puzzles in the issue of freedom of expression.
That said, Mill’s concerns in On Liberty remain valid, even in light of
the new censorship, but they become only half of the story. The other
half of the story entails that if implicit censorship exists – and it appears,
given the workings of language and power that I have articulated over
the last three chapters, that it does – then liberals have more to worry
about in terms of their response to censorship – state neutrality in the
marketplace of ideas – and less to worry about in terms of their respons-
ibility for censorship itself. What I mean by the state having less to worry
about in terms of its own responsibility for censorship is not that the state
does not cause censorship, but rather that it unavoidably causes censor-
ship in the implicit sense. This implicit causation is evident particularly
in the state’s freedom of expression decisions: the role of these decisions
is to delimit the scope of future discourse, and this act of delimitation 
has now been revealed as censorship in the form of foreclosure. If this 
is correct, the question becomes: What follows in terms of the state’s
responses or remedies for this? 
I want to suggest that if the state is always already implicated in implicit
censorship, then its preoccupation with explicit censorship, and in parti-
cular with its remedy for explicit censorship – neutrality – should abate.
While explicit censorship remains a live problem that the liberal state
should take pains to avoid, as Mill suggests, I want to argue that if 
the unavoidable fact of implicit censorship is occurring all the time and
alongside the mere potentiality for explicit censorship, then the state’s
remedy for explicit censorship – neutrality – makes no sense in light of
this interplay between implicit and explicit censorship. This is because
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the fact of implicit censorship entails that the state is never neutral, even
in principle. The state must always speak – and in particular, speak with
respect to freedom of expression cases. In the very act of speaking, the
state loses its neutrality and becomes implicated in the workings of power
and implicit censorship.
If this is the case, then the state is never neutral, and so the effort to
maintain neutrality in order to remedy the possibility of explicit cen-
sorship is futile. I believe that this is a crucial point for the liberal state
to acknowledge and transcend. Once the liberal state no longer feels
bound to the idea of neutrality, which a Foucauldian analysis of power,
together with the points made by the new censorship theorists, have
demonstrated is impossible anyway, the state can then use its admitted
and now fully self-conscious non-neutrality in order to speak in ways
that further its commitment to treating its citizens with equal concern
and respect.




The Liberal State Reconceived:
Advocacy and Jurisprudence in 
the Service of Equality
7.1 Introduction
Thus far I have argued that the liberal state ought to depart from its
neutral stance in order to uphold its core commitment of treating its
citizens with equal concern and respect, and that the liberal state can
be relied upon to remedy its own failures to protect this core commit-
ment. I will now discuss how this may be achieved in practice by
examining, in this chapter, academic literature on activist states, and
in the next chapter, how Canada and the European Union effectively
model this activist, non-neutral, liberal state through their hate speech
and obscenity jurisprudence. 
A central prerequisite to establishing that an activist liberal state is
feasible is demonstrating that a shift in understanding of the nature of
rights is possible. I have argued that such a shift – from viewing rights
as ends in themselves and protective of the individual, to seeing rights
as instrumental and protective of the group – is not only possible, but
of a piece with the thinking of the founding and leading liberal
thinkers I have canvassed in the ﬁrst three chapters of this work. A
return to the spirit of their work will help solve the problem I have
identiﬁed in Chapters 2 and 3: that the United States’ constitutional
protection of hate speech and pornography violates the core commit-
ment of egalitarian liberalism because such protection entails that all
citizens are not, in fact, being treated with equal concern and respect
by the state. Further discussion of that problem in Chapters 4 and 5
suggested that its resolution may lie in an interrogation of the nature
of speech itself; such an investigation reveals a relationship between
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speech and the social power of the speaker that is overlooked in main-
stream liberal discourse. The idea of speech as always implicated in
power relations entails that it is state speech at the level of adjudicating
hate speech and pornography cases, rather than hate speech and
pornography themselves, that ought to be of paramount concern when
we consider the state’s commitment to treatment of all of its citizens
with equal concern and respect. I believe that this insight is not at all a
threat to liberalism but rather an opportunity for the egalitarian liberal
state ﬁnally to depart from neutrality and use its power to work for
equality.
My idea of an activist liberal state requires both that the state come to
understand itself as implicated in the injustice caused by unregulated
speech, and further, that it respond to this insight by taking an active role
in righting the wrongs that it has set in motion. One signiﬁcant objection
to my project will come from those – including, notably, Foucault and
Butler – who feel that the state, however implicated it is in injustice (and
they of course would say ‘very’), is not necessarily to be trusted to take
part in its own self-correction. Thus, a major task of this chapter and the
next is to demonstrate that the state is able to undertake the process of its
own self-examination and reworking. I will argue that this is possible, ﬁrst
by recalling how claims about the nature of rights that I have canvassed
so far are consistent with the idea that the state can and must correct its
own illiberalities, and second by showing, in the next chapter, through
the US, European, and Canadian jurisprudence, that Canada and Europe
are already in the business of engaging in such a project. While the US
jurisprudence can be seen to mark a strong departure from the Canadian
and European jurisdictions, there is nevertheless a strand of academic
liberal thought – found in recent works by Owen Fiss and Cass Sunstein 
– that reads the US decisions compatibly with the activist state that I have
been advocating. I will brieﬂy discuss their work in this chapter as well.
Another objection to the idea of an activist egalitarian liberal state
comes not from a suspicion of the state but from a critique of the nature
of the harms of pornography and hate speech. How is the violation of
equal concern and respect evidenced? How do we know when it has
occurred? In other words, how is even a well-intentioned state to iden-
tify and remedy such nebulous harms? To answer this question, I will
discuss Andrew Kernohan’s notions of cultural oppression and accu-
mulative harms in order to characterize more ﬁrmly the nature of the
harms involved in hate speech and pornography. Here we can also recall
Mill’s arguments in The Subjection of Women, which were considered in
Chapter 2. In Subjection, Mill argues that the subordination of women
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to men is so thoroughgoingly normalized by various cultural forces as
to ensure that women never become aware of their own preferences,
desires, or conceptions of the good life in any authentic way. Rather,
women living under such conditions are the victims of a profound 
cultural conditioning which teaches that autonomy is distasteful and
undesirable for them. 
Mill’s view is of a piece with Kernohan’s characterization of the nature
of cultural oppression – that views about the unequal moral worth of
women and minorities are in such wide and diffuse circulation as to
impede women and minorities from being able to formulate a conception
of the good life that does not incorporate those oppressive views in a fun-
damental way. Thus it seems that the Mill of Subjection would take the
contemporary idea of cultural oppression quite seriously and sympathe-
tically. I will now turn to an examination of Kernohan’s work in order 
to develop a more robust vocabulary about the nature of the harms of
racist, sexist, and homophobic speech, as well as how an activist state
may appropriately tailor its response to these harms.
7.2 Cultural oppression, accumulative harms, and 
advocacy
Cultural oppression, according to Kernohan, arises when a society permits
the unchecked cultural formation of attitudes and beliefs about inequality
to such a degree that these beliefs infuse the lives of those who are deemed
to be unequal, such that they are no longer able to formulate authen-
tically their own conceptions of their moral worth and their own concep-
tion of the good. If this in fact characterizes contemporary American
society, there is a crisis in liberalism, since liberalism draws its justiﬁ-
cation and appeal through facilitating citizens’ abilities to formulate their
own good. Given that the charge from cultural oppression is so funda-
mental, much more needs to be said about cultural oppression’s work-
ings in order to demonstrate that this is an apt characterization of our 
contemporary situation.
The ﬁrst step in examining cultural oppression is to ask how it is pro-
duced. The silencing and subordination arguments hold that cultural
oppression is produced by the speech acts of pornographers and hate
speakers, but these arguments prove problematic in light of speech act
theory: in order for a speech act to be efﬁcacious, it must be backed by
the appropriate social authority of the speaker. Pornographers and hate
speakers are on the very margins of society, and thus would be among
the last people to claim such authority. If this is the case, it is difﬁcult
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to assign responsibility to them for the culturally oppressive effects of
their speech.
However, Kernohan more plausibly contends that cultural oppression
may act as cumulatively and nebulously as air pollution. It is what he calls
an ‘accumulative harm’ – a harm ‘…done by a group, not to a group. It is a
harm to another person brought about by the actions of a group of people
where the action of no single member of that group can be seen, by itself,
to cause the harm.’ (Kernohan 1998: 72; emphasis as in the original). He
gives an example of pornography as an accumulative harm, as follows:
Pornography, as a cultural practice, reinforces men’s false beliefs
about sex and male dominance. It contributes to eroticizing the 
submission of women, and incidentally to women’s beliefs about
their own self-worth. Yet the solitary consumption of pornography
by one individual man may be totally harmless. It is the accumu-
lative power of the whole system of production, distribution, and
consumption which does the harm, a system of which the solitary
consumer is but a small part. But if a culture of pornography is to 
be understood as a harm to both men and women, it will be an
accumulative harm, not an individual one. (Kernohan 1998: 84–5) 
Therefore, although pornographers, or the average male consumer of
pornography, may lack the social authority to enact an efﬁcacious
speech act, they certainly could still be viewed as having at least as
much role in cultural oppression as the average automobile driver has
in air pollution. In other words, saying that pornographers or con-
sumers lack the social authority for efﬁcacious speech acts is not to say
that they are not causing harm. Indeed, collectively, the harm is griev-
ous. This harm does not seem to stem, however, from an illocutionary
speech act – given that its speakers lack the requisite social power to
perform one – nor does it seem to be the kind of harm for which the
state might seek to prosecute individual offenders. 
This second point is clearer when we return to the air pollution
analogy. Though every individual driver of a car is indeed contributing to
the air pollution that in its totality is no doubt a great harm to others,
and each driver is at least in some sense responsible for that harm, never-
theless, no single driver’s contribution is efﬁcacious enough to the overall
total that we could be justiﬁed in assigning legal blame to each driver for
the effects of the whole. Instead, the state ought to regulate the emissions
of new cars produced and ﬁne only those individual drivers whose emis-
sions exceed some standard allowable levels. Accordingly, the silencing
and subordination arguments’ discussion of the harms of pornography
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and hate speech may be better cast as accumulative harms, so long as
we are speaking of the harms caused by individual producers of porno-
graphy or hate speech. To prosecute individual speakers would be to
miss seeing, crucially, where the responsibility for these actions really
lies. The important sense of responsibility, I want to maintain, lies with
the state, and a characterization in terms of speech acts remains an
appropriate conceptual model for analysis on that level.
It would miss the mark to blame each individual speaker for the overall
atmosphere of cultural oppression, for the reason that any individual act
is not equal to the cumulative harm, which is harmful only in its cumu-
lative state and not necessarily on an individual level. When we inquire
as to how we reached this cumulative state of cultural oppression, how-
ever, we ﬁnd that the answer refers not only to the cumulative actions 
of every individual utterance of racist, sexist, or homophobic speech 
from time zero, but also – and more importantly – to the state, whose
ineffective regulation of such speech or altogether lack thereof caused the
preconditions for what resulted in a culturally oppressive culture. And
indeed, the efforts of the international community have been focused on
having states sign and abide by anti-pollution treaties for just this reason.
Examining cultural oppression as an accumulative harm, then, leads back
yet again to investigating the state’s role in the proliferation of hate
speech and pornography. 
Further, to deny that individual private actors ought to be prosecuted
for accumulative harms in certain instances is in no way to suggest that
accumulative harms ought to go unaddressed by the state. On the con-
trary, Kernohan suggests that accumulative harms ought to be considered
as falling within the scope of Mill’s harm principle, such that if they
harm an interest worthy of being protected by a right, then the state
should depart from its neutral stance to remedy them. However, remedies
are not limited to individual prosecutions. They may also encompass
what Kernohan calls the ‘advocacy strategy’ wherein state resources are
expended in order to advocate for the equal moral worth of citizens. The
advocacy strategy would
…act on the beliefs and attitudes of both speaker and audience. It
would endeavour to dissuade the former from the attitudes that led
to the expressive activity, and to persuade the latter that beliefs in
inequality acquired from the cultural environment are false and
should be abandoned. (Kernohan 1998: 97)
This would require the state to weigh the level of harm posed by the
speech in the particular cultural circumstances of the time. Kernohan
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maintains that, for example, racist speech in a racist culture would meet
the bar both in terms of the harm principle and as an accumulative
harm worth taking state action to remedy.
Kernohan argues that the advocacy strategy ought to replace unqual-
iﬁed state neutrality as an underpinning of egalitarian liberalism. He ties
the strategy to citizens’ highest-order interest in knowing the good:
The advocacy strategy recognizes that citizens have a highest-order
interest in knowing the good, undertakes to protect that interest from
deceptive cultural practices, and will use the economic and educational
state apparatuses to oppose inegalitarian cultural oppression. Accept-
ing the core liberal principle of the equal worth of persons, it will
oppose practices falling into the following category: cultural practices
that lead people to believe in the unequal moral worth of persons
belonging to different groups, with people relying on these false beliefs
about inequality in forming their beliefs about value. (Kernohan 1998:
100–1)
This seems of a piece with the argument of this book, as well as with
Mill’s arguments in Subjection. Importantly, it diverges from the views
of MacKinnon and others who focus on the individual user or pro-
ducer of pornography or hate speech and concentrate their critique 
of the state solely on its not prosecuting these individuals. The force 
of Kernohan’s advocacy strategy, combined with the critique of state
neutrality I have developed here, suggests that the state still needs to
play an important role – a role that departs from neutrality – whether
or not that role includes legislation that would punish individuals for
culturally oppressive views. 
The noted legal scholar Owen M. Fiss, in his book The Irony of Free
Speech, makes points that are very compatible with Kernohan’s advo-
cacy strategy. Writing within the liberal tradition, Fiss feels that the
dominant reading of the US jurisprudence as upholding state neutral-
ity to guard against state incursions on free speech is wrongheaded.
Rather, Fiss argues that the state is by no means necessarily the enemy
of free speech, and state neutrality is by no means necessarily the
means by which free speech is facilitated.
In a similar vein, Sunstein notes (1995: 251): ‘We do not have enough
substantive discussion of public issues, and we are not exposed to suf-
ﬁcient diversity of view. Democratic deliberation about remedies should
not be foreclosed by the First Amendment. Some forms of apparent gov-
ernment intervention into free speech processes can actually improve
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those processes. They should not be understood as an objectionable
intrusion into an otherwise law-free social sphere. Intervention should
not always be seen as an impermissible “abridgment” of the free speech
right.’ 
Instead of such a blanket approach, Fiss argues that we must ask on a
case by case basis whether the state’s action of limiting or facilitating
speech in a particular instance is facilitating or hindering the workings
of public debate. Facilitating public debate, going back to Mill, is of
course one of the central aims of a liberal state.
Fiss comments here on state neutrality:
The principle of content neutrality bars the state from trying to
control the people’s choice among competing viewpoints by favor-
ing or disfavoring one side in a debate. So understood, the principle
has powerful appeal and can be proﬁtably applied in many con-
texts…. On the other hand, content neutrality is not an end in itself
and should not be reiﬁed. The principle responds to some underlying
concern that the state might use its power to skew debate in order
to advance particular outcomes, and this purpose should always be
kept in mind. Accordingly the principle should not be extended to
situations like hate speech, pornography, and political expenditures,
in which private parties are skewing debate and the state regulation
promotes free and open debate. In those cases, the state may be dis-
favoring certain speakers – the cross-burner, the pornographer, or the
big spender – and make judgments based on content, but arguably
only to make certain that all sides are heard. The state is simply act-
ing as a fair-minded parliamentarian, devoted to having all views 
presented. (Fiss 1996: 21) 
While Fiss does not go as far as I have in maintaining that state neutrality
is impossible, he argues that neutrality alone is by no means sufﬁcient to
guarantee that the state is acting in the service of promoting debate.
Rather, in order to advocate for the state’s acting in the service of promot-
ing debate, Fiss invokes the ideal of the state as a ‘fair-minded parliamen-
tarian, devoted to having all views presented.’ This ideal is very much of a
piece with what Kernohan and I are calling the activist liberal state in the
service of equality. Fiss is very much in favor of an activist court in his
explicating this parliamentarian ideal as follows:
Those in charge of designing institutions should place the power to
regulate content – to act as a parliamentarian – in agencies that are
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removed from the political fray…. [A] heavy burden of scrutinizing
the state’s action should fall to the judiciary, especially because it
stands apart from the political fray…. The court must ask itself: Will
the regulation actually enhance the quality of debate, or will it have
the opposite effect? (Fiss 1996: 24)
This test question – will regulation of speech actually enhance the quality
of debate? – is exactly the way that he feels judges ought to proceed 
in adjudicating free speech cases, and during the tenure of the Warren
Court, they did. Fiss asserts that under the Warren Court, the key decisions
of New York Times v. Sullivan1 – which protected freedom of the press by
limiting the ability of public ﬁgures to sue for defamation and libel – and
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC2 – which allowed the FCC to regulate
private broadcasting in order to ensure that these companies carry on a
discussion of public issues, and that such discussion present each side of
those issues – were correctly decided according to this principle, even
though superﬁcially the decisions appear to stand in opposition to one
another.
While a surface, and dominant, reading of the two decisions would
see Sullivan as the state being, correctly, hands-off – in disallowing
causes of action which would inhibit free speech – and see Red Lion as
the state being, incorrectly, hands-on and attempting to regulate the
free speech decisions of television broadcasters, Fiss instead sees the
decisions as both compatibly and correctly decided with reference to
the test question of whether or not regulation would enhance debate.
In the case of Sullivan, the decision was made that would best enhance
debate – by disallowing most libel and defamation suits, the decision
ensured that the press would be able to achieve fuller reporting with-
out fear of legal action. In the case of Red Lion, while the active, hands-on
regulation of broadcasters by the FCC would constitute a limitation 
of the free speech of the broadcasters, it would nonetheless facilitate 
a more robust public debate because the decision ensured that all sides
of the debate be presented.
In conclusion, Fiss writes (1996: 26), quite radically for a writer in
the liberal tradition: ‘We should never forget the potential of the state
for oppression, never, but at the same time, we must contemplate the
possibility that the state will use its considerable powers to promote
goals that lie at the core of a democratic society – equality and perhaps
free speech itself.’ It is exactly this possibility that this book hopes to
render plausible. Fiss’s reading of the Warren Court jurisprudence and
of the ideals of a liberal state, while far from mainstream and far from
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having been adopted in more recent US court decisions, nevertheless
offers hope for the possibility of a functioning activist liberal state in
the service of equality.
Political thinkers outside of liberalism, however, including Foucault
and Butler, tend to be even more deeply suspicious than most liberal
thinkers about the state’s ability to act as anything but an agent of
unexamined power. I want to argue that while we cannot, and ought
not, return to the traditional liberal view of the state as innocent 
in power relations and neutral about the content of speech, there is
reason – as Fiss has shown and the Canadian and European juris-
prudence on hate speech and pornography will show – not to go as far
as Butler and Foucault have gone in denying the possibility of the
state’s protection of equality. On my view of the activist state, the state
is able to take its own complicity into account in the operation of
power, both productive and repressive, and to respond to its short-
comings through more egalitarian, and truly public debate-enhancing,
jurisprudence going forward.
Further, Foucault and Butler not only doubt that the state is well-
intentioned enough to correct its own wrongs, but they also doubt that
the state is powerful enough to do so. For both thinkers, the modern
state is by no means a sovereign power in the traditional sense. Even if
I grant this point, however, we are dealing not with the question of
whether the state has absolute power, but rather only with the ques-
tion of whether it has enough power to produce efﬁcacious speech acts
when enacting laws. It seems uncontroversial that the state does. Thus,
I can accept at face value Foucault and Butler’s point that we are living
in a post-sovereign age, with its limited application to the state in this
context, and focus instead on Foucault’s discussion of the relationship
between power and discourse. It is the production of knowledge/dis-
course that establishes, produces, and reiﬁes power. In this regard, the
state is certainly a noteworthy discourse producer, especially in its
enactments of laws and the jurisprudence of its courts, each considered
as discourses. 
To put the role of the state in Foucauldian terms, these two powerful
sites of law and jurisprudence play a large role in the enactment of the
moral norms of our culture. Certainly, as Foucault well knew, the enforce-
ment of these norms is carried out at other sites to a greater or lesser
degree removed from the state – such as schools or prisons. Additionally,
the state in its judicial role can be seen as having a crucial part in dis-
course production, with all of the attendant implications for power that
this entails. 
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The efﬁcacy of state speech offers an even stronger reason to support
Kernohan’s advocacy strategy. Kernohan maintains:
In an inegalitarian and oppressive culture, the egalitarian liberal
state should take an active role opposing inegalitarian beliefs in
public forums. Such opposition should involve vigorous educational
efforts and active ﬁnancial support for associations and groups striv-
ing to combat inegalitarian cultural practices…. Instead of coercing
people, the advocacy state would persuade them. Final evaluation of
ideas would be left to the public, in forums of deliberation outside
the state. The state should not be impartial in these forums, but
instead should be the major participant on the side of equality.
(Kernohan 1998: 102–3)
The advocacy strategy, then, would necessarily involve the state ﬁrst
taking an active and conscious role in correcting the failures of the
marketplace that arise in culturally oppressive cultures, and then put-
ting resources behind its speech in advocating equality. Such speech, 
it is important to note, is not sovereign – it is not the binding, and
necessarily efﬁcacious, illocutionary speech that we see in the state’s
judicial decisions. Nevertheless, advocacy speech is an important adjunct
to that illocutionary speech.
Kernohan’s advocacy strategy initially sounds radical, but it increases in
force and persuasiveness when we recall that the state is already a power-
ful speech actor, whose voice in a debate necessarily carries authoritative,
and, depending on the context, illocutionary, weight. Advocacy speech,
by virtue of its albeit post-sovereign state authority, would still stand a
great chance of being persuasive to the private citizen whose collective
acts, sanctioned by the state, result in accumulative harms. 
It is here that the notion of accumulative harms, along with its remedy
of the advocacy strategy, dovetails quite nicely with the analysis of
speech act theory and Foucauldian power developed in Chapters 4 and
5. It is only with an understanding of the nature of state speech, even
outside of its lawmaking function, that we can begin to see how the
advocacy strategy may prove to be effective. The state’s speech and
resources directed towards egalitarian ends have much greater weight
than does the speech of private speakers, or even of non-governmental
groups. Using the advocacy strategy in particular, then, to chip away 
at the accumulative harm of a culturally oppressive environment 
may greatly expedite the task of becoming a more truly egalitarian
society.
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One reason that liberals have traditionally feared state activism is its
potential, they feel, for arbitrary enforcement: the state would simply
choose to regulate, or to impose its advocacy strategy on, just those ideas
of which it disapproved. I would like to suggest that such a problem at
the operational level should not be confused with the theoretical issues
that exist prior to any operational considerations. If it turns out that, in
practice, the state is acting in an unprincipled way, there is no reason to
believe a priori that it cannot correct its own failures. 
Kernohan argues that the advocacy strategy delineates fairly strict
criteria for when the state’s activism should be triggered – when expres-
sive activities contribute to an inegalitarian cultural environment. Since
there is a certain amount of ambiguity in this formulation, the state
should ﬁrst deploy its resources towards challenging its audience’s atti-
tudes and only secondly target the expressive acts themselves (Kernohan
1998: 107). Prioritizing in that way ought to minimize the concerns of
those who fear the slippery slope effects made possible by placing this
matter in the state’s hands.
The advocacy strategy also has the crucial beneﬁt of sidestepping
many of the traditional liberal concerns with censorship, though it
too, along with activist judicial speech, requires a move away from
state neutrality in cases of cultural oppression. The only difference is
that the move required is not directly towards regulation of speech, but
rather primarily towards the expenditure of state resources on counter-
speech. I want to maintain that this move away from neutrality is
much more important than the more speciﬁc and operational question
of what actions the state makes after it commits to its departure from
neutrality. The departure from neutrality is the moment when the state
truly commits to equality, and it is this commitment and this move away
from neutrality that I have argued is requisite for a truly egalitarian liberal
state. Again, the advocacy strategy may go hand-in-hand with explicit,
legally binding regulation of speech if necessary; it is my view that such
a two-pronged approach is desirable. What matters, ultimately, is that 
as long as there is a serious commitment to advocacy, the neutrality
criterion has been compromised, which leads us to rethink the character
of liberalism.
The advocacy strategy overcomes a number of problems raised by
liberals who are wary of censorship as a remedy, and thus challenges
these liberals to clarify whether their problem lies at the level of remedy
(and thus opposed to censorship) or more deeply at the level of neutrality
(and thus opposed to advocacy). For example, one issue that arises, espe-
cially in the US context, is the idea that hate speech (as opposed to
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pornography) is political speech and thus much more closely tied to
the fundamental values of freedom of expression that we as a culture
want to protect. Insofar as this Millian argument is compelling, it is
compelling only as an argument against the remedy of censorship and
not at the level of departure from neutrality. Indeed, the advocacy
strategy operates on the very same Millian principles as the hate-
speech-as-political-speech argument does, but from the counter-speech
end. On the advocacy view, it is the state that will become active in the
counter-speech, and such counter-speech is seen as a Millian remedy to
inegalitarian speech.
Similarly, the advocacy view meets another objection that is really
only an objection at the level of remedy, rather than an objection
brought in favor of state neutrality. This objection notes that culturally
oppressive speech occurs in far-ranging venues – from fashion maga-
zines (especially with regards to subordinating views of women) to 
academic journals (especially with regards to racist and homophobic
speech) – and to censor these venues would be absurd. This objection 
is sound, as far as it goes, but the question remains: would the same
objector be averse to state-funded counter-speech aimed at readers of
these publications? If state funding of counter-speech is unobjection-
able, then all parties agree on a state departure from neutrality in order
to promote speech afﬁrming the equal moral worth of subjects, and
this departure is far more crucial than a debate about censorship versus
advocacy strategies to achieve those aims. 
It has been the aim of this book to demonstrate that the liberal state’s
departure from neutrality is key to operationalizing the commitment
to equality that the liberal state claims to have. I have introduced
speech act analysis in order to show that the state, and not individual
speakers, has the power to effect speech that will decisively advocate in
favor of equality. The idea of cultural oppression has been introduced
to demonstrate that notions of harm and evidence of harm need to 
be problematized. Taking these two frameworks of cultural oppression
and speech act theory together, then, ﬁnally creates the space to inves-
tigate what the state can do – namely, utter efﬁcacious illocutionary
speech acts – in order to remedy cultural oppression. Kernohan’s activism
strategy appears to be a good ﬁrst line of action in this regard, and ought
to assuage many of the fears that plague traditional liberals about
unprincipled state activism. 
However, I depart from Kernohan insofar as I wish to consider state
speech in the form of laws that may prosecute individuals for con-
tributing to cultural oppression, as well as state speech invoked in the
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name of non-binding advocacy towards the elimination of cultural
oppression. My focus lies not on prosecuting particular individuals for
their parts in cultural oppression, but rather on aiming to change the
individuals’ opinions in a less direct and less coercive way. There seems
on the surface to be a tension within my two-pronged approach, in
that the judicial arm aims to prosecute individuals, while the advocacy
arm is concerned with using speech to reach a wider group without the
use of the legal system as such. More strongly, the tension may be
highlighted by the fact that the advocacy strategy, at least implicitly,
rejects the prosecution of individuals for a situation to which each
individual contributed only slightly. 
How can I advocate both strategies simultaneously? These two routes
can indeed be compatible, in much the same way that many crimes are
also, or even primarily, social problems, requiring a two-tiered struc-
ture of remedies – criminalization as well as advocacy. This can be seen
clearly, for example, in the state’s handling of illegal drugs, which 
may involve both public education campaigns and prosecutions in
some cases. This is indeed the approach of the Canadian Court, which
remarked in Butler:
It should be emphasized that this [criminalization of pornography] is
in no way intended to deny the value of other educational and coun-
seling measures to deal with the roots and the effects of negative 
attitudes. Rather, it is only to stress the arbitrariness and unaccept-
ability of the claim that such measures represent the sole legitimate
means of addressing the phenomenon. Serious social problems such as
violence against women require multi-pronged approaches by govern-
ment. Education and legislation are not alternatives but complements
in addressing such problems. [Butler (1992), 509] 
It is possible, as with illegal drugs, that prosecutions are wrongheaded in
that they have unacceptably high levels of recidivism, as well as yield-
ing unmanageably high levels of incarcerations. It is nevertheless the
case that, as a culture, we frequently employ both criminalization and
advocacy simultaneously. If empirical data shows that either strategy is
not working, then we can readjust the plan, but at the outset, a two-
tiered approach seems best suited to capture the dual character of hate
speech and pornography.
Further, the deterrent function of criminalization needs to be more
fully considered in determining whether criminalization is justiﬁed. It
is certainly true, as proponents of the advocacy strategy maintain, that
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an individual is not solely responsible for a culturally oppressive envi-
ronment. However, punishment might be justiﬁable if the deterrent
function to others of having laws restricting culturally oppressive
speech is such that these laws provide more overall utility for ﬁghting
cultural oppression than would advocacy strategies alone. Further, the
state in its judicial function is operating at the pinnacle of its sovereign
power, as each speech act in this forum has the force of law. Thus, to
employ merely the advocacy strategy – which only invokes non-binding,
non-judicial speech – is to fail to use the most powerful weapon in our
arsenal: state advocacy of egalitarianism, which has the force of law. That
said, I will now consider whether and how judicial speech might func-
tion effectively as an instrument of state power used to further the core
egalitarian liberal goal of treating citizens with equal concern and respect.
In the next chapter I will turn to a brief examination of the leading
US, European, and Canadian hate speech and pornography cases to see
how a legal system might succeed or fail to use its judicial speech in
the service of equality. Prior to case discussion, Section 7.3 will provide
a brief overview of the Canadian constitutional adjudication frame-
work, as familiarity with this will be necessary in order to understand
ﬁrst, the reasoning in the Canadian cases, and secondly, how they depart
from the framework established in the US. I will argue that the Canadian
framework allows the liberal state to interrogate its own speech and
ensure that it is in fact acting in the service of equality. Chapter 8 
will provide a brief overview of the hate speech and pornography 
decisions in all three of these jurisdictions, and conclude that the Euro-
pean and Canadian courts provide real-life models of effective activist,
post-sovereign liberal states.
7.3 The Canadian Charter’s rights-balancing approach
Viewing rights as instrumental, reciprocal, and protective of the common
good – which Chapters 1 and 2 suggested as a viable strand of egalitarian
liberal thought3 – comes into play in a very practical sense when we
examine the Canadian Charter jurisprudential framework (see Appendix A
for the text of relevant sections of the Charter ). All of the Charter’s enu-
merated rights are subject to limitation under section 1 (hereinafter s.1),
which provides: ‘The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees
the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justiﬁed in a free and demo-
cratic society.’4 In other words, if a limitation on a right has been validly
enacted as a law and can be demonstrably justiﬁed in a free and demo-
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cratic society, then the right will be so limited and the law limiting it
will be upheld as constitutional. There is thus a two-tiered test for an
impugned piece of legislation in any Charter case: ﬁrst, has the enumer-
ated right been violated, and, if so, is the violation permissible under 
s. 1? Impugned legislation can be upheld under either of two ways: the
court may hold that the legislation does not in fact violate the enumer-
ated right, or that it did violate the enumerated right but that such 
violation was justiﬁed under s.1. 
The very fact that a rights limitations clause exists already distinguishes
the Canadian Charter from many other rights-granting instruments,
including, notably, that of the United States. A limitations clause entails
that the state views rights not as absolute or inviolable. Rather, they exist
in order to protect instrumentally the important interests of a democratic
culture up to the point when protecting those interests is less in the 
interest of the common good – what the words of the Charter call a ‘free
and democratic society’– than limiting those interests is. In other words,
it seems that the s. 1 clause is consistent with the idea that rights are to 
be seen as instrumental, reciprocal, and in the service of the common
good. That this is indeed the case will become clearer as I examine what is
known as the ‘balancing framework’ for adjudication of s. 1. 
The balancing framework was developed by the Supreme Court in 
R v. Oakes to determine whether or not a limit on a right is ‘demon-
strably justiﬁed in a free and democratic society.’5 Known now as 
‘the Oakes test,’ this balancing framework sets out a two-part test for
adjudication under s.1. The Oakes test is as follows:
1. Legislative objective: The purpose of the legislation must be suf-
ﬁciently ‘pressing and substantial’ to justify limiting the right.
2. Proportionality: The means employed by the legislation must be
proportional to the objective to be achieved. The proportionality
test subdivides in turn into three parts:
(a) Rational connection: There must be reasonable grounds for
expecting the legislation to be effective in achieving its 
objective.
(b) Minimal impairment: The legislation must limit the right no
more than is necessary in order to achieve its objective.
(c) Proportional effects: The costs of the limitation must not
exceed the beneﬁts to be gained from achieving the objective.6
A piece of legislation must ﬁrst pass step 1 of the Oakes test, which 
is usually understood as a low threshold to pass. In other words, if a
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government has succeeded thus far in enacting a controversial and
potentially unconstitutional law, it likely has what it, and probably 
the Court, feels is a good reason for doing so. Once the legislation has
passed step 1, it moves on to the three proportionality tests, all of
which aim to make sure that the law is narrowly tailored to effect its
pressing and substantial objective with minimal infringement to the
right in question. The law must be rationally connected to the objec-
tive, such that it is reasonable to expect that it will have some degree 
of success in meeting that objective; it must minimally impair the right;
and the cost of the limitation of the right must not exceed the beneﬁts
to be gained from reaching the objective of the law. A law must pass all
three subsections of step 2 of the Oakes test in order to be upheld as
constitutional.
In The Hateful and the Obscene, Wayne Sumner suggests that step 2 of
the test, with its three subsections, is best considered as a ‘balancing
act,’ in which the expected beneﬁts of the impugned legislation are
weighed against its expected costs. He writes:
Once the government’s objective has been deemed sufﬁciently weighty,
the ﬁrst two proportionality requirements focus respectively on the
beneﬁt and the cost sides of the equation, in order to ensure that 
the intended beneﬁts can be rationally expected and that the costs (to
free expression) have been minimized. But only at the last step are the
cost and beneﬁt sides brought together and compared in a calculation
meant to determine whether the government’s objective is worth pur-
suing in this particular way, in the face of its predictable costs. The 
previous steps have the function of feeding necessary information 
into the ﬁnal cost-beneﬁt balancing, but they do not conduct that 
balancing. It is only at the ﬁnal step that it can be determined whe-
ther a limit to free expression is ‘demonstrably justiﬁed,’ all things
considered. (Sumner 2004: 66)
While the overall Oakes scheme facilitates rights-balancing, the scheme
only crystallizes, and the rights only truly get balanced, at the last step.
The ﬁne-grained character of this framework insists that each case is con-
sidered on its very particular set of circumstances, rather than abstractly.
Sumner cites numerous examples of the Canadian Supreme Court
justices themselves characterizing the Oakes test in this way. What 
is being balanced, of course, are rights – for our purposes, the right to
freedom of expression versus the right to equality. The Supreme Court
stops short of calling the Oakes test ‘rights-balancing’ and instead uses
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terms such as ‘values’ or ‘interests’ to describe what the process balances.
At root, however, this seems tantamount to rights-balancing, with a
marked emphasis on the particularity of the facts of the case and the
nature of the rights at play in it. For instance, Justice McLachlin in
Keegstra, a leading Canadian hate speech case, held: ‘[T]he judge must
situate the analysis in the facts of the particular case, weighing the dif-
ferent values represented in that context.’7 Indeed, Justice McLachlin 
recognizes that having a rights-balancing, or cost-beneﬁt, approach at all
necessarily entails context-speciﬁcity – costs and beneﬁts of course depend
on the speciﬁc facts of the matter at issue, and cannot be measured
abstractly. This approach can be contrasted with an approach that looks
at the issue simply based, for example, on the abstract principles of the
right to freedom of expression versus the right to equality, as in US juris-
prudence. Instead, the Canadian approach is nuanced enough to weigh
the particular kind of expression at issue against the particular harms that
the restriction on the expression was designed to protect. This approach
is much more in keeping with a view that rights are not absolute since
they are explicitly limitable by s. 1. Rather, rights are instrumental and
capable of being overridden by the common good – the democratic
society itself – that s. 1 is designed to protect. 
If this is the case, it follows that the Canadian Supreme Court is sub-
scribing to an instrumentalist view of rights: since the Canadian Charter
has a limitations cause at all – which necessarily entails that rights are not
inviolable – and the limitations clause is about rights-balancing, such a
framework would preclude rights being viewed as constitutive. Further,
the Court is arguably subscribing to a view of rights as in the common
interest, since the idea behind s. 1 clearly indicates that the interests of a
‘free and democratic society’ may trump the interests of the individual, or
in fact be shared by the individual and the larger society. If this is correct,
and indeed it seems that the jurisprudence supports this instrumentalist
reading, then the Charter is an ideal testing ground for the liberal state to
act in the interests of equality in a principled way. The structure of s. 1 is
consistent with the idea that Dworkin and I have been maintaining: that
the interest in equality to a free and democratic society is paramount. The
logic of s. 1 is such that it would preserve that key interest in equality
over other, lesser, interests. Indeed, this is exactly how then Chief Justice
Dickson framed the role of s. 1 in Oakes:
The Court must be guided by the values and principles essential to a
free and democratic society which I believe embody, to name a few,
respect for the inherent dignity of the human person, commitment
The Liberal State Reconceived 173
abbie.levin@gmail.com
to social justice and equality, accommodation of a wide variety of
beliefs, respect for cultural and group identity, and faith in social and
political institutions which enhance the participation of individuals
and groups in society. The underlying values and principles of a free
and democratic society are the genesis of the rights and freedoms 
guaranteed by the Charter and the ultimate standard against which 
a limit on a right or freedom must be shown, despite its effect, to be 
reasonable and demonstrably justiﬁed. [Oakes (1986), 136] 
This formulation not only clearly identiﬁes equality as a key value to a
free and democratic society, but it also states unequivocally that the
enumerated Charter rights are logically posterior to the values under-
lying those of the free and democratic society that gave them birth.
Again, then, the Canadian Charter and its jurisprudence hold the poten-
tial to realize the notion that I have been trying to advance – state com-
mitment to and advocacy of equality as a central value in its judicial
speech. 
Even more speciﬁcally, Sumner suggests that the Oakes test, and in
particular the ﬁnal proportionality requirement, bears resemblance to
the kind of test invoked by Mill in articulating the test for the harm
principle. The second step of the harm principle requires that curtail-
ing a right due to a harm must produce an outcome with more utility 
– that is, beneﬁts over costs – than not curtailing the right would have
yielded. This is exactly what the proportionality component of the Oakes
test requires. Again, while such a balancing framework does not commit
us, or the Canadian Supreme Court, to an overall utilitarian framework, it
certainly seems to commit us to the idea of rights treated instrumentally
and in the service of the common good, rather than conceiving of rights
as in the service of the individual right-holder. That the Oakes test has
this Millian element, and that the Oakes test has been adopted by a pro-
gressive democracy like Canada, provides reason for optimism that egal-
itarian liberal principles can be enshrined and acted upon in an actual
democracy. Whether or not such principles produce more egalitarian
results than are found in a jurisdiction such as the United States, which
has no such enshrined principles, is the topic of investigation in the next
chapter. 
The contrasting view – of rights treated abstractly, rather than being
subjected to a balancing approach – can be seen more clearly in the
jurisprudence of the United States, which takes the approach that rights
in general are presumptively absolute. The language of the US Consti-
tution offers no hints of a rights-balancing approach, let alone anything
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as explicit as that offered by Canada’s s. 1. This lack of a rights-balancing
preamble to guide judicial interpretation has led to an approach that sees
rights as absolute, which thus means that any governmental infringe-
ment upon rights is taken to be presumptively unjustiﬁed. This is to be
contrasted with the two-step approach of the Canadian Court, which
holds that identiﬁcation of an infringement is only the ﬁrst step in 
the inquiry to determine whether legislation violates the Charter. Here,
the second step is the s. 1 analysis of reasonable limitation, which is
where the rights-balancing takes place.
Because the US doctrine of absolutist rights interpretation suggested
in the preamble to the Bill of Rights is too rigid to be workable in prac-
tice, the First Amendment jurisprudence in the US has worked out a
hierarchy of values that freedom of expression is supposed to protect;
the likelihood of a particular piece of impugned speech’s protection
depends on where in the hierarchy it has been deemed by the court to
fall. Political speech – taken to be at the pinnacle of democratic values
– traditionally receives the highest level of protection. Obscenity and
defamation, on the other hand, traditionally receive no protection, as
they are seen to fall quite far from the values that freedom of expression
is held to protect. This hierarchical approach, however, should not be
mistaken for a rights-balancing approach. There is nothing about the
practice of identifying where speech ﬁts into a hierarchy of values that
suggests that that speech is to be weighed against other rights.
In the next chapter, I will offer but a brief sketch of the kinds of
questions that rights-balancing and speech acts frameworks, taken
together and in the service of equality, raise, and perhaps resolve,
when looking at the leading hate speech and obscenity decisions in the
United States and Canada. Here I will argue that the jurisprudence in
the US, Europe, and Canada reveal that a rights-balancing approach,
combined with a state commitment to equal concern and respect 
that acknowledges the role of its own power in its judicial speech acts,
produces more egalitarian results than approaches that seem to lack
either or both of these components.




The Courts and the Constitution:
Hate Speech and Pornography in
the United States, Canada, and
Europe
8.1 The hate speech jurisprudence
8.1.1 The US decisions
In the landmark 1969 case of Brandenburg v. Ohio,1 the United States
Supreme Court upheld the right of the Ku Klux Klan to advocate at
rallies for the return of all Jews to Israel and all African-Americans to
Africa, a result appearing to privilege the liberty of the speakers at the
expense of the equality of their targets. The Court held that since 
the advocacy was not intended to incite direct action towards those
ends – and thus did not trigger a ‘ﬁghting words’ exemption from First
Amendment protection – it must be protected as political speech, the
most protected class of speech in the US First Amendment framework. 
If, however, that same content included a direct incitement to riot
on behalf of its aims, then the speech, presumably, would not be pro-
tected. Brandenburg thus stands for the American Court’s application of
a strict ‘time, manner, and circumstance’ restriction on political
speech, originally advocated by Mill, which holds that content per se is
not to be restricted. Rather, only the time, manner, and circumstance
of the utterance – provided that these latter considerations cause some
compelling risk of harm to the public, such as if the words in question
are deemed to be ‘ﬁghting’ – can face curtailment by the state. Such an
approach, whatever its merits, certainly does not balance the right to
freedom of expression with the imperative to treat all citizens with
equal concern and respect. Such a balancing could come either from a
consideration of the targets’ Fourteenth Amendment rights under the
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Equal Protection Clause, or from a consideration of how the speakers’
words undermine the speech of the targets, thus vitiating the First
Amendment rights of the targets. Neither analysis was undertaken in
Brandenburg, and thus this leading US decision is at odds with the
approach I am advocating ought to be taken by an egalitarian liberal
state. 
Further, the decision in Brandenburg fails to take the historical context
of the utterances into consideration: these statements were uttered during
the height of the civil rights movement in the US and hence had greater
force. Thus, Brandenburg must be read as an inegalitarian decision that
privileges the liberty of the speakers at the complete expense of even a
discussion of the equality owed by the state to all of its citizens.
However, even though hate speech is political speech according to
the US Court, it may alternatively be construed as ‘ﬁghting words,’ or
words that can reasonably be taken to be incitements to violence, and
in that case be deemed unworthy of constitutional protection. In 1992, in
R. A. V. v. City of St. Paul,2 the Court was confronted with such a potential
scenario. In this case, a group of teenagers had burned a cross on a black
family’s lawn. The perpetrators of the act, who were juveniles at the time,
were charged under a city hate crimes ordinance, which explicitly prohib-
ited the display of any symbol ‘which one knows or has reasonable
grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the
basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender.’3 The ordinance’s wording
aimed to frame hate speech as falling within the ambit of the unprotected
‘ﬁghting words’ doctrine, rather than under the protected political speech
jurisprudence, which only allowed time, manner, and circumstance
restrictions on political speech. However, the Court decided that even
though the ordinance indeed applied only to ﬁghting words and was
thus not over-broad in its reach, the wording was not viewpoint-neutral
in that it prohibited speech targeting certain groups and not others.
Because of the ordinance’s particular prohibitions, the Court held, the
legislation was imposing a content restriction on the speech and must be
struck down.
Reading Brandenburg and R. A. V. together, then, reveals that the US
jurisprudence with respect to hate speech is dominated by the view
that hate speech, qua political speech, is to have no content restrictions
whatsoever. Further, when political speech and ﬁghting words exist 
side by side, the rules governing political speech – that is, not to employ
any content restrictions – are read into the ﬁghting words doctrine 
in order to ensure that the ﬁghting words doctrine cannot be used to
protect minorities in particular. Again, this approach does not entertain a
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rights-balancing framework, nor does it give any meaningful mention
to the potentially conﬂicting compelling state interest in equal concern
and respect. Finally, with respect to speech acts and the related topic 
of state power, neither case gives any indication that the state in its
decision was itself acting as an instrument of power – either in the
service of equality or in any other way. 
Further, the tests employed by the US Court do not take rights to be
instrumental for the preservation of a democratic culture, which is
contrary to Mill’s view, but rather to be constitutive of such a culture,
as per Dworkin. For any case involving freedom of expression, the
Court asks whether and to what extent the particular kind of speech at
issue exempliﬁes the values central to a well-functioning democracy 
– political speech being understood as paramount. To the extent that
the speech does exemplify prioritized values, it will enjoy constitutional
protection. However, for the US Court, freedom of expression is not to
be seen as instrumental for the cause of protecting and upholding demo-
cratic values; rather, the right to freedom of expression and democracy go
hand in hand, rights forming a crucial part of a larger whole that is demo-
cracy. Sumner, in The Hateful and the Obscene, describes the relationship
as follows:
If we focus again on free speech rights, the larger whole of which
they are an indispensable component is usually taken to be demo-
cracy itself. On this view, a well-ordered democracy is not a further
end to which various rights, including freedom of expression, con-
tribute as means. Rather, it is a political system which consists essen-
tially in those rights: a system lacking them simply does not count as
democratic. (Sumner 2004: 73)
However, as Sumner notes, such an approach is incomplete if it fails to
account for the fact that rights other than freedom of expression – such
as rights to equality – also constitute essential components of democracy.
Once this is granted, and I have argued in the preceding chapters that it
must be, we need some way of adjudicating between rights. If all rights
bear such a close relationship to democracy, and if any two are in conﬂict
in a particular case, how can we limit one in favor of the other without
doing violence to the fabric of democracy itself? Here, an appeal to the
underlying values that the rights serve, like the Canadian instrumentalist
approach contemplates, may facilitate such an adjudication better than
the American approach, which elides the problem by merely stipulating
which rights are more central than others.
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8.1.2 The Canadian decisions 
We cannot conclude, however, that the American constitutive approach
will always produce results that favor the upholding of rights to freedom
of expression, while the Canadian instrumentalist approach will always
favor the limitation of that right, at least in the context of hate speech.
Notably, the two Canadian leading cases on hate speech, Keegstra and
Zundel,4 were decided in opposite ways and in very close votes. In Keegstra,
a 4-3 Court decided to uphold Criminal Code of Canada hate speech legis-
lation, which criminalized the ‘willful promotion of hatred against an
identiﬁable group.’5 Yet two years later in Zundel, a 4-3 Court struck down
a different section of the Criminal Code, which criminalized the ‘spreading
of false news.’6 Sumner notes that these differing results suggest that there
is nothing in an instrumentalist approach per se that would guarantee
that freedom of expression rights in a hate speech context will be curtailed
in the light of some other value, such as equality. 
While there need not be any single, or even any principled, answer,
to the differences between the US and Canadian jurisprudence, the
spirit of s. 1 of the Canadian Charter makes clear that rights are not
inviolable, which is exactly what a constitutive approach must deny.
This in turn allows the Canadian Court the freedom to adjudicate
between rights in a principled way and without the worry about viol-
ating rights that a court governed by a constitutive approach must
have. Further, the Canadian Court is characterized by the fundamental
idea, granted in s. 1, that what are to be upheld are whatever rights or
whatever lawful limitations of those rights in a particular instance best
facilitate the functioning of a democratic society. The American Court,
which must protect political speech regardless of the social context in
which it is uttered, seems to lack this ﬂexibility. 
Keegstra (1990) had facts similar to R. A. V. in that both cases dealt
with the constitutionality of a statute intended to prohibit hate crimes
against minority groups; the courts in the two jurisdictions, however,
treated the issue very differently. Neither Brandenburg nor R. A. V. read
the issue as one of rights-balancing between liberty and equality, but
rather, both were wholly concerned with whether hate speech ought 
or ought not to fall within the categories of protected expression, qua
political speech. Keegstra, on the other hand, treated the issue as a rights-
balancing issue and arrived at quite a different result than did its American
counterparts. In Keegstra, the facts involved a high-school teacher in
Eckville, Alberta, who espoused anti-Semitic views in his classroom as part
of the graded curriculum. When his classroom practices were brought to
light, Keegstra was charged with the ‘willful promotion of hatred’ under
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the hate propaganda statute then in place. The Court, by a narrow 
4-3 margin, ultimately upheld the hate propaganda law. The majority 
reasoned that though the statute, like any other imposing a content
restriction on speech, infringed on the Canadian Charter’s section 2(b)’s
guarantee of freedom of expression, such an infringement was justiﬁed
under s. 1 (see Appendix A for the elaboration of the ‘Fundamental
Freedoms’ under the Charter).
In applying the s. 1 analysis to the facts in Keegstra, both the majority
and minority agreed that the ﬁrst step of the Oakes test, the pressing and
substantial objective of the legislation, was met by the legislature in its
efforts to promote the values of equality and multiculturalism, which are
themselves important enough to be enshrined in the Charter. However,
the majority and minority differed with respect to the ﬁrst two steps of
the proportionality tests. Justice Beverley McLachlin, writing the minority
opinion in Keegstra, held that the legislation failed both the rational 
connection and minimal impairment conditions. 
In terms of rational connection between the intended outcome of
promotion of equality for minorities and the actual effect of the legis-
lation, McLachlin held that such a connection could not be found.
Paradoxically, prosecutions under the impugned legislation would have
the perverse effect of giving racist speech a more prominent voice than 
it otherwise would have had, especially given all of the publicity sur-
rounding a high-proﬁle Charter case. With respect to minimal impair-
ment, she found that the law was over-broad because of the wide range 
of speech that could be considered hateful, and thus the law would 
likely have a chilling effect on legitimate forms of expression, whose
speakers would fear prosecution under the impugned legislation. Further-
more, human rights legislation, which imposes remedies for hate 
speech that fall short of criminalization, may be as effective and less 
invasive on free speech than the legislation in question. Thus, the 
legislation in question was deemed not to be minimally intrusive by 
the Court. 
The majority in Keegstra found that the rational connection test was
met because the prosecution of hate speakers was more likely to have
the beneﬁcial effect of promoting the values of diversity and equality,
and showing that the state is taking an active stand against racism,
than it was to have the negative effect of promoting racist speech. This
approach dovetails impeccably with my idea of the power involved in
state speech. Then Chief Justice Brian Dickson, writing for the majority
here, seems very aware of the state’s exercise of power in making this
decision. He sees himself as choosing to deploy this power in a way
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that will uphold the values that he feels to be central to a liberal
society:
It is undeniable that media attention has been extensive on those
occasions when s. 319(2) has been used. Yet from my perspective, 
s. 319(2) serves to illustrate to the public the severe disapprobation
with which society holds messages of hate directed towards racial
and religious groups. The existence of a particular criminal law, and
the process of holding a trial when that law is used, is thus itself 
a form of expression, and the message sent out is that hate propa-
ganda is harmful to target group members and threatening to a 
harmonious society. [Keegstra (1990), 769]
This statement makes apparent the majority’s recognition of the efﬁcacy
of the speech acts of the Court and of the media coverage of the Court’s
decision, and makes clear that this fact of state power exercised through
state speech ought to be recognized by the Court and used in the self-
conscious service of equality, rather than be shied away from. In this
respect, Dickson’s decision is a prime example of the kind of egalitarian
jurisprudence I am advocating.
With respect to minimal impairment, Dickson held that the law’s
deﬁnition of hatred was narrow enough – given its insistence that the
promotion of hatred be ‘willful’ – to be considered minimally intrusive.
The availability of other, non-criminal remedies, such as human rights
legislation, did not preclude the legislature from also employing a crim-
inal remedy. The majority opinion in Keegstra stands for the kind of
jurisprudence I am advocating – actively in favor of using the courts 
to promote equality, and having a self-conscious awareness of the power
of state speech in making decisions that affect the way that democracy
functions. 
This approach is not, however, necessitated by the Canadian frame-
work, as Zundel, decided on the same framework only two years later,
amply demonstrates. In Zundel, the Court was considering a different
provision used to regulate hate speech, the provision criminalizing the
‘spreading of false news,’ in the case of the false news of a Holocaust
denier. In this case, the 4-3 majority found that the provision was out-
dated and failed to impair minimally the Charter right to freedom of
expression. It was outdated because at the time the impugned pro-
vision was enacted, the stated legislative objective was to facilitate ‘pre-
vention of deliberate slanderous statements against the nobles of the
realm to preserve political harmony in the state’ [Zundel (1992), 733].
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The Canadian Court had previously held that a new objective, such as
the prevention of racism in the instant case, cannot be added in an 
ad hoc way.
Further, even if the Court were to allow that promoting racial toler-
ance was a pressing and substantial objective, the impugned provision
would still fail to meet the proportionality test, due to its being over-
broad: ‘The phrase “statement, tale or news,” while it may not extend
to the realm of true opinion, obviously encompasses a broad range of
historical and social speech, going well beyond what is patent or prov-
able to the senses as a matter of “pure fact.”’ [Zundel (1992), 733]. In
conclusion, the Court held that ‘the value of liberty of speech, one 
of the most fundamental freedoms protected by the Charter, needs no
elaboration. By contrast, the objective of s. 181, in so far as an objec-
tive can be ascribed, falls short of constituting a countervailing interest
of the most compelling nature.’ [Zundel (1992), 735].
Thus, the reasoning in Zundel demonstrates that the Canadian Court,
at the very least, respects the s. 1 analysis enough so as not to use it dis-
ingenuously to justify its aims for the promotion of equality. Instead 
of being discouraged by the conﬂicting verdicts in Keegstra and Zundel, we
can view these decisions with optimism that the Court will only use its
voice for the promotion of equality if it can do so on facts that them-
selves support such a voice. This should serve to reassure those who are
wary that an activist state will promote too zealous a state activism; the
Canadian Court, at least, seems not to have gone this route. 
As seen in these leading US and Canadian hate speech decisions,
then, an instrumental, rights-balancing approach employed by a Court
that is conscious of its power and is acting in the service of equality
can produce results that uphold the liberal state’s core commitment to
treat its citizens with equal concern and respect. I will turn now to the
European jurisprudence, which also evidences an activist state in the
service of equality.
8.1.3 The European decisions
The atrocities of the Nazi Holocaust did much to shape European hate
speech jurisprudence, which is the most obviously activist of the three
jurisdictions considered here. That this historical event ﬁgures so pro-
minently as motivation for the European jurisprudence is, importantly,
in line with Foucault’s prescient observation that understanding the
historicity of a situation is crucial in accurately viewing the power rela-
tions embedded in it. European countries, at the international level of
the European Union and of various treaty-making bodies, as well as at
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the state level, are epitomes of activist liberal states, explicitly prioritizing
‘dignity’ over freedom of expression. I will argue that this privileging of
dignity is conceptually synonymous to the fundamental liberal idea 
of treating all citizens with equal concern and respect. Though every
European nation recognizes a fundamental right to freedom of expres-
sion, each has been receptive to content-based regulation of that right in
the case of hate speech. 
The earliest and perhaps most inﬂuential international treaty to address
the issue of hate speech explicitly is the International Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD),7 which
entered into force by the United Nations in 1969 and was ratiﬁed by over
150 nations. Article 4 of the ICERD contains the hate speech provision
and mandates that all signatories shall criminalize the ‘dissemination of
ideas based on racial superiority or hatred’. Although the US has ratiﬁed
the ICERD, it has notably ﬁled a reservation to the effect that it will not
enact any laws violating its First Amendment. Thus, the US stands as an
outlier amongst the other signatories in privileging freedom of expression
over dignity.
Another important international treaty concerning hate speech is the
2002 Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime, Concerning
the Criminalisation of Acts of a Racist and Xenophobic Nature Com-
mitted through Computer Systems. This treaty originated in the Council
of Europe and was signed by twenty-three of its forty-seven member
nations. The treaty enjoins its signatories to criminalize ‘distributing or
otherwise making available, racist and xenophobic materials to the public
through a computer system.’8
At the state level, the signatories of the ICERD and the Additional
Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime have enacted criminal laws
as mandated by these treaties, which have led to some quite strong
speech regulations, particularly in Germany. Article 5 of the Basic Law
of Germany provides that every individual has the right to freedom 
of expression, but then it states that ‘these rights shall ﬁnd their limits
in…the right to personal honor.’9 Article 1 declares that ‘human
dignity’ is of the utmost value and article 18 allows for the forfeiture of
other rights when the right to dignity is abused.10 These ideas of honor
and dignity resonate with the Dworkinian invocation of each citizen’s
entitlement to equal concern and respect, and, given that they are in
practice invoked as trumps on hate speech, indicate that Germany
operates within a rights-balancing framework very similar to that of
Canada. Further, the German use of language like ‘honor’ and ‘dignity’
resonates with the comments from critical race theorists examined in
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Chapter 2: hate speech is received by minorities as an assault on their
dignity, and the German legislation attempts acknowledge and protect
that dignity. 
The most recent piece of relevant European legislation is the European
Union’s passage of the Framework Decision on Racism and Xenophobia
in 2007. While the Framework Decision does not have direct effect on the
EU member states, and the European Commission, the enacting body,
does not act as an enforcement body, the Framework Decision asks EU
member states to enact legislation against various forms of hate speech,
most notably against speech that is ‘publicly condoning, denying or
grossly trivializing…crimes deﬁned by the Tribunal of Nuremberg.’11
Though the Framework Decision cannot be said to be illocutionary, in
that it is non-binding, it is likely to inspire illocutionary, binding, legis-
lation by the EU member states. Further, because of its direct reference 
to Nuremberg, this state speech is exemplary of my assertion that a self-
conscious activist liberal state would be mindful of the historicity of its
decisions and of the fact situations that come before its courts. 
From this brief canvassing of the European hate speech legislation, at
both the state and international levels, it is apparent that the EU and
its member countries – Germany in particular – serve as prime exem-
plars of the activist liberal state in the service of equality. However,
most European countries only regulate child pornography, rather than
regulating other forms of pornography. The United Kingdom legis-
lation on pornography is perhaps the most restrictive in Europe, and 
I will argue that although it has egalitarian aims, weaknesses in the
drafting of the legislation have led to a lack of prosecutions. In the
realm of pornography, it is clear that Canada is the most activist egal-
itarian state of the three jurisdictions.
8.2 The obscenity jurisprudence
On the surface, the leading obscenity decisions in the US, Canada, and
the UK appear to take a similar approach: all three attempt to ﬁnd a
community standard of tolerance beyond which pornographic mat-
erials are considered obscene and thus not constitutionally protected.
However, the rationale for this test is quite different in each country.
In the US, obscene speech is seen as having limited relevance to the
values that the First Amendment is intended to protect – values going
to the heart of a democratic system, such as political speech. According
to the US Court, obscene speech is as far as possible from political
speech, and is thus worthy of little, if any, protection. 
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While the Canadian Court in its leading decision in Butler also observes
the low value of obscene speech to a democratic culture, most of its
justiﬁcation for its decision rests on balancing the rights to freedom of
expression of the pornographer with the harm that pornography causes
women, where the harm is understood as stemming from the idea that
degrading or dehumanizing representations of women cause reiﬁcation
of oppressive stereotypes.
In the UK, obscenity legislation is informed by the rights-balancing
framework of the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (also known as the ‘European Con-
vention on Human Rights’ and ‘ECHR.’ Hereinafter, I will refer to this
treaty as the ECHR).12 In sum, then, the US Court takes a constitutive
view of rights, and the Canadian and UK courts embrace a rights-
balancing approach. This latter approach, as I have argued, facilitates a
self-conscious liberal state acting in the service of equality.
8.2.1 The US decisions
In the leading US case of Miller v. California,13 the Court formulated its
three-part obscenity test that is still in use today. Under the Miller test,
a work is deemed to be obscene if it: (1) would be found appealing to 
the prurient interest by an average person applying contemporary com-
munity standards, (2) depicts sexual conduct in a patently offensive way,
and (3) has no serious literary, artistic, political, or scientiﬁc value. The
equality rights of women were never even mentioned in this case’s 
reasoning, and the three-step test is formulated solely in order to deter-
mine how far away a particular expressive instance strays from the core
freedom of expression values. The Miller test’s reasoning, then, is con-
sistent with the American Court’s constitutive view of rights and the
Court’s reluctance, given that approach, to engage in rights-balancing. 
8.2.2 The Canadian decisions
In the leading Canadian decision of R. v. Butler (1992), decided almost
twenty years after Miller, the Court adopted a similar test. The defend-
ant, Donald Butler, had opened a store in Winnipeg that sold sex toys
and videos. Butler was charged with, and convicted in the lower courts,
on the following counts: possessing obscene material for the purpose
of sale, selling obscene material, and exposing obscene material to the
public view. At the time of hearing, the Supreme Court did not have 
a standard test for obscenity, and here it became the Court’s task to
develop one. Previous decisions had left three distinct tests competing
with each other: the community standards test, wherein it would be up
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to the community to determine whether a work was obscene; the harm
test, under which material would fail to enjoy constitutional protec-
tion if it was deemed to be harmful to others; and the internal necess-
ities test, under which a work would not be deemed to be obscene if its
creators could establish that the work needed its graphic content for
the sake of another, artistic, purpose. 
The Court in Butler adopted a version of the community standards
test that subsumed the harm test. Justice Sopinka, writing for the 7-2
majority, held as follows:
The courts must determine as best they can what the community
would tolerate others being exposed to on the basis of the degree of
harm that may ﬂow from such exposure. Harm in this context
means that it predisposes persons to act in an anti-social manner as,
for example, the physical or mental mistreatment of women by
men, or, what is perhaps debatable, the reverse. Anti-social conduct
for this purpose is conduct which society formally recognizes as
incompatible with its proper functioning. The stronger the infer-
ence of a risk of harm the lesser the likelihood of tolerance. The
inference may be drawn from the material itself or from the material
and other evidence. [Butler (1992), 485]
In other words, the way to determine whether material is harmful is to
determine whether the community would tolerate that material being
consumed by others. This approach appears to be beneﬁcial by min-
imizing the risk that the decision would be made by judges acting in 
a vacuum and applying their own standards of morality to the public 
at large. 
However, the community standards test has two serious and related
drawbacks. First, there does not seem to be any kind of national consen-
sus on what the community’s level of tolerance in fact is, and thus we are
left effectively with a standard of what the majority’s level might be. This
is obviously problematic because, as Dworkin mentions, one important
function of rights is to trump majoritarian interests, not to reinforce
them. Second, if we indeed live in a culturally oppressive society, the
public, or at least the majority, may not necessarily be in a position to
judge what is harmful to others – either the harm will have been so nor-
malized and naturalized as not to appear harmful at all, or what is in fact
innocent may appear harmful, due to culturally oppressive programming.
One need only look to situations of domestic abuse for an example of the
former, or to religious intolerance for an example of the latter.
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The Court in Butler, without the aid of an actual empirical study of
what most Canadians felt to be harmful, nevertheless concluded in 
the face of only inconclusive, equivocal, social science evidence on the
related, though by no means equivalent, question of whether porno-
graphy does in fact lead to increased violence against women, that it
would follow the decision in Irwin Toy.14 This latter case found that in
situations of inconclusive empirical data, the Court must maintain a
high level of legislative deference and conclude that as long as the legis-
lature acted with a ‘reasonable basis’ in assessing that evidence, the 
legislature’s decision should stand [Butler (1992), 502–3] .
In Butler, the Court proceeded to ﬁnd that regardless of the tenuous
link between pornography and violence:
[t]he clear and unquestionable danger of this type of material is that
it reinforces some unhealthy tendencies in Canadian society. The
effect of this type of material is to reinforce male–female stereotypes
to the detriment of both sexes. It attempts to make degradation,
humiliation, victimization, and violence in human relationships
appear normal and acceptable. A society which holds that egalitar-
ianism, non-violence, consensualism, and mutuality are basic to any
human interaction, whether sexual or other, is clearly justiﬁed in
controlling and prohibiting any medium of depiction, description,
or advocacy which violates these principles. [Butler (1992), 493]
This statement is alarming in two ways. It seems to gloss over the fact
that the Court is switching focus from the harm of violence to the harm
of stereotyping, and it concludes that because there was no conclusive
proof for the former, the truth of the latter was simply obvious. This shift
enables the Court to get around its evidentiary burden of harm: in shift-
ing from violence to stereotyping, the Court moves from a well-mined
and equivocal body of social science evidence to a much murkier, much
less developed, and possibly – in principle – unempirical realm.
Further, the Court makes the equally bold move of concluding that
since there is a clear connection between pornography and stereotyping,
it is obvious that an egalitarian court is justiﬁed in prohibiting such
expression. Is there anything that can be considered sound in this rea-
soning, from my perspective of advocating self-reﬂective state speech 
in the service of equality? I will address this question shortly after ﬁrst
continuing to outline the basics of the Court’s decision in Butler. 
The Court then provided three-tiered criteria for what material would
be too harmful, on the level of stereotypes or any other considerations, to
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be tolerated. Justice Sopinka maintained that explicit sex with violence
would almost always be obscene and hence prohibited; explicit sex with-
out violence but which subjects people to treatment that is degrading 
or dehumanizing may be obscene if the risk of harm is substantial; and
explicit sex without violence which is neither degrading or dehumanizing
will not be obscene unless children are employed in the production [Butler
(1992), 484–5]. While the Court was ostensibly guided by the desire to
curtail the putative harm to women that it believed pornography brings,
it nevertheless seems to have been guided not by evidence of that harm,
since no such evidence was actually adopted by the Court, but rather by
its own opinions on what the community ought to tolerate. 
What should we make of Butler, in terms of our discussion of cultural
oppression and state speech? On its face, the decision seems glaringly
paternalistic and undemocratic – with judges effectively legislating the
community’s morality for the community itself, while denying that they
were doing so. However, the logic of cultural oppression, like Mill’s logic
in Subjection, raises the difﬁcult problem of what to do in circumstances
where ﬁrst-hand reports of harm or well-being may be unreliable. Whe-
ther pornography is harmful to women, on the level of contributing to
cultural oppression in general and to stereotypes in particular, might not
be a question that the public can answer correctly or about which acad-
emic social science can devise a well-constructed experiment. Accord-
ingly, the question of whether autonomy was desirable for women in
Mill’s time may not have been correctly answerable by the women them-
selves, nor could social scientists have necessarily gauged cultural oppres-
sion – at that time or any other. In other words, that there was no
independent empirical evidence – any kind of academic study or public
opinion survey – adopted by the Butler Court to support its conclusions
need not be prohibitive if we are in a cultural environment that, because
of its deeply oppressive views on the unequal moral worth of some of its
members, could not produce such evidence for the reason that such views
have been thoroughgoingly normalized.
Further, the vast majority of studies have investigated male responses
to pornography – both in terms of violence, and less frequently, in terms
of male attitudes towards women – and have produced inconclusive
results on these questions. It is entirely possible, however, to conceive of a
case where pornography has failed to produce any kind of negative effect
on men but still produces negative effects on the women who view it
themselves, encounter it in the marketplace, or know their male partners
view it. The effects on women of pornography have been quite under-
investigated – itself a sexist fact – and it would only further this sexism to
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conclude that because the male studies were inconclusive, pornography
is safe enough to be decriminalized in the absence of better, non-sexist,
egalitarian research.
In a similar vein, while an activist egalitarian approach such as the one
I am advancing would shun a court acting, even in the name of equality,
against established empirical evidence, the question of what a court
should do in the absence of insufﬁcient, or equivocal, evidence is by no
means obvious. To hold that the right, say, to freedom of expression
should be upheld until such time as decisive evidence is produced in the
other direction is to beg the question – why is it any more obvious that
we should lean in this direction in the interim than to lean in the direc-
tion that would favor, say, the right to equality, if only until such time 
as decisive evidence is produced? This returns to our primary question 
– how to respond when liberty and equality are in tension?
In other words, in my view, the fact that the Court made a unilateral,
and non-empirically based, pronouncement in the name of equality was
not in itself problematic under circumstances of cultural oppression, for
all of the above reasons. What was problematic, however, was its dis-
ingenuousness in doing so. The Court should have honestly discussed
that it was making this move in an activist way, in the name of egalitar-
ian liberal values, rather than hide behind the thin veil of community
standards that the Court itself enacted.
Many critics have attempted to discount the reasoning in Butler
in its entirety by seizing on the point that the Court was telling the
community what and what not to ﬁnd obscene, and indeed doing so
without any external evidence to support its ruling. In my view, the
Court may be excused for ruling in the absence of external evidence,
but only in either of two cases, as discussed above: First, if the absence
of external evidence in principle or in practice results from a culturally
oppressive scenario that precludes fair studies from taking place. An
example of such a scenario is one in which a community is so pro-
grammed to believe in women’s unequal moral worth that studies are
biased to consider only men’s views on the question, or biased in some
other way that makes proper data difﬁcult or impossible to obtain. A
second case rendering excusable the Court’s absence of external evid-
ence is when research results are inconclusive and the Court deter-
mines that in such a situation, it would better serve the interests of
equality to err on the side of the equality-preserving option – rather
than on the side of the liberty-preserving option – while waiting for
conclusive research to be produced. In either situation, the Court, in
my view, would be performing its job in ﬁghting cultural oppression
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by erring on the side of equality until the time that new data tilts the
scale decisively toward freedom of expression.
To this extent, the Court could be excused from Sumner’s require-
ment (Sumner 2004: 181) that ‘[g]iven the importance of the values, both
personal and social, advanced by freedom of expression, the default pre-
sumption for any form of expression must be free circulation rather than
suppression. Overcoming this presumption will require reliable evidence
of harm.’ Sumner’s statement, however, pointedly fails to give considera-
tion to the importance of the values – personal, societal, social – of equal-
ity itself. In the absence of reliable evidence of harm, from my point of
view, the Court should ask: First, is there reliable evidence of cultural
oppression whose harm may be difﬁcult or impossible to ferret out? And
second, given equal evidence on both sides, which value is most impor-
tant to promote? In a committed egalitarian culture, we ought to answer
‘yes’ to the ﬁrst question and ‘equality’ to the second, given the present
social circumstances of pervasive racism, sexism, and homophobia.
The evidence for saying ‘yes’ to the ﬁrst question comes from the
multitude of media – advertising in print and on television, movies,
and video games that portray women and minorities as subordinate, 
to name a few – that seem unlikely, given their vast proliferation, to 
be benign in their inﬂuence on cultural attitudes towards women and
minorities. Interestingly, the media that liberals frequently offer as a
reductio argument against the censorship of pornography can now be
harnessed to advance an argument for the existence of cultural oppres-
sion and an activist liberal state to ﬁght it on all fronts. Since an effec-
tive ﬁght against inequality through censorship would mean engaging
on this multitude of fronts – an absurd prospect, they claim – it would
be arbitrary to ﬁght it on just one front, pornography. While criminal-
ization of video games is likely untenable, here the state can use its less
authoritative speech, as per the advocacy strategy, to encourage other
forms of entertainment.
Further, as I have argued in various instances throughout this study,
the idea of cultural oppression has support from Mill’s writings in Sub-
jection, as liberal theory can accommodate the notion that ﬁrst-hand
accounts of preferences may not be the end of our inquiries into the 
good life. 
However, while the Butler Court may appear to be activist in the name
of equality when it effectively answered ‘yes’ and ‘equality’ in its result, it
cannot be seen as an exemplar of the approach I am advocating, because
it answered these questions on the so-called behalf of the community
itself. Failing to speak in its own voice as the Court, and instead claiming
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to speak for the Canadian public, is deeply problematic given my argu-
ment that state speech is necessarily the voice of state power. Since the
state did its bidding not through its own mouth, the state to some
degree subverted the legitimate authority that that state speech should
convey. Since the Court supposedly acted in the name of the com-
munity, the Butler decision had the effect of the public resenting being
told backhandedly what it found to be offensive. This, I believe, was
the fault of the decision’s wording, which reads as anything but a trans-
parent effort by the Court to prescribe standards for obscenity that
would have upheld the values of egalitarian liberalism. To be sure, such
an effort would also have had many detractors, but there would, most
likely, have been some who would have welcomed the effort, and still
others who would have been persuaded by the court’s reasoning 
over time. 
The point, though, from the viewpoint of speech act theory and
Foucauldian power analysis, is that for state speech to have the desired
effect – of promoting equality – it must be imparted transparently by
the state as speaker. For all of the reasons that Austin provided about
the relevance of social position and power to the kinds of speech acts
that will prove to be effective, the state must speak as the state to avoid
undercutting the power of its speech. The Court in Butler gave a hint of
this direct and powerful state speech in the service of egalitarianism in
the passage quoted above, when declaring that an egalitarian society 
is justiﬁed in taking action against inegalitarian speech; however, that
sentiment was undercut by the Court’s claim to express the feeling 
of the public, rather than by simply issuing the mandate from the
Court itself. 
Again, then, we can learn a great deal by paying attention to the notion
of state power and state speech when investigating rights jurisprudence 
as a discourse. From this brief look at the leading obscenity decisions, 
we learn a cautionary lesson in both the US and Canadian cases. The 
US Court in Miller suffered for its failure to incorporate the notion of
equality, as a rights-balancing approach would have, in creating its
obscenity test, and the Canadian Court in Butler, while informed by a
rights-balancing approach, nevertheless failed to produce a truly just
result because it failed to take proper ownership of its own speech acts.
8.2.3 The UK decisions
While most of Europe has very permissive legislation with respect to
pornography that is both produced and consumed by persons over 
the age of 18, the UK is an exception in that it has legislation for the
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regulation of obscenity based on a community standards of tolerance
test. I will focus on this legislation because of its egalitarian content.
The UK obscenity legislation must of course remain consistent with 
the ECHR and the Constitution of the European Union, both of which
prioritize the dignity of the human person and provide for rights-
balancing frameworks similar to that of Canada.
The UK’s statute on the regulation of pornography is the Obscene
Publications Act of 1959,15 which establishes a community standards
test for determining whether speech is obscene and therefore subject to
regulation. Article 1 of the Act lays out this community standards test
as follows:
For the purposes of this Act an article shall be deemed to be obscene
if its effect or…the effect of any one of its items is, if taken as a
whole, such as to tend to deprave and corrupt persons who are
likely, having regard to all relevant circumstances, to read, see or
hear the matter contained or embodied in it.
This test, understandably, has proven difﬁcult to utilize, since it is dif-
ﬁcult to determine what would ‘tend to deprave and corrupt’ persons. As
a result, the Act has not given rise to many prosecutions, and those that
have arisen tended to be exonerated by the defense that the impugned
work has literary merit.16
It is a stretch, though not an impossible one, to view the desire to pre-
vent moral corruption of the consumers of pornography as egalitarian in
its morality, rather than merely Victorian. However, the language of the
Act leaves open the clear possibility that the Act could be used by an egal-
itarian state that interprets ‘corruption’ as meaning the fostering of cul-
turally oppressive attitudes. However, this interpretation is hypothetical
at this point.
A more compelling argument for the UK, and Europe as a whole, as
an activist egalitarian state comes from the two central human rights
statutes governing Europe, the ECHR, adopted by the Council of Europe
in 1950, and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union
(hereinafter, the CFREU),17 which came into force as law concurrently
with the entering into force of the Treaty of Lisbon,18 on December 1,
2009. The CFREU explicitly provides that it does not supersede any of
the provisions of the ECHR, though it may in some cases provide more
human rights protection than the earlier statute.
What is notable in both statutes is that each contains rights-balancing
language, and the CFREU contains prominent and central reference to
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the primacy of human dignity within the scheme of enumerated rights.
The ECHR is one of the most stringently enforced international treaties,
as it enacted the European Court of Human Rights as a tribunal to adjudi-
cate claims under the ECHR.19 That a court was formed to enforce this
treaty ought to impact the way that the illocutionary and sovereign nature
of state judicial speech is viewed – the ECHR makes more of a claim to
illocutionary force the closer it comes to being law in the paradigmatic
case of the indisputably binding nature of law enacted at a national level.
The founding of the European Court of Human Rights ensures that the
ECHR will not be toothless in the event that member states fail to enact
compatible legislation, and thus, I would argue, the very founding of the
Court gives the ECHR binding illocutionary force.
The freedom of expression provisions of the ECHR, contained in
Article 10, contain explicit limitation provisions, and are in this respect
distinct from the rest of the treaty’s enumerated rights, which contain
no such provisions. Article 10 reads as follows:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall
include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart
information and ideas without interference by public authority
and regardless of frontiers…. 
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions,
restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary
in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, ter-
ritorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or
crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection
of the reputation or the rights of others….
The language of subsection 2 is clearly egalitarian: the right to freedom 
of expression is subject to the necessary limits of a democratic society,
which entails that this right must be understood as, in most cases, instru-
mentally valuable to a democratic society, but where it is not valuable, it
is to be limited. That it is to be limited when it interferes with the rights
or reputation of others shows that there is a balancing between the right
to freedom of expression and other rights. That the ECHR exists alongside
the hate speech legislation I canvassed earlier strongly demonstrates that
hate speech is considered a case where the ‘rights or reputation of others’
can justify a limitation on freedom of expression. 
The CFREU has similar rights-balancing language, although in this
case it spans over the entire document and not just over the freedom
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of expression provisions. The rights-balancing provisions are set out in
Title VII, Article 52, Subsection1, and provide as follows:
1. Any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recog-
nised by this Charter must be provided for by law and respect the
essence of those rights and freedoms. Subject to the principle of
proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are necessary
and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the
Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others.
Here it is evident that the EU sees rights as in the general interest, as
per Raz and Mill, and that rights may need to be limited to ‘protect the
rights and freedoms of others.’ Of course, since the CFREU has yet to
come into force, as of the time of this writing, it remains to be seen
under what circumstances the EU courts will see it ﬁt to limit rights.
However, I venture to predict that they will do so in the case of hate
speech, given the hate speech statutes canvassed earlier, and given the
priority of human dignity in the drafting of the CFREU. The right to
human dignity appears in Title 1, Article 1 of the CFREU and reads as
follows: ‘Human dignity is inviolable. It must be respected and pro-
tected.’ If the right to human dignity is inviolable, it follows that any
other right curtailing it must be limited in order to preserve human
dignity. Again, following the remarks of the critical race theorists can-
vassed in Chapters 2 and 3, the very problem with hate speech is that
it is received by its targets as affronts to their dignity. 
Thus, the preceding discussion of human rights and hate speech 
legislation has shown that the EU and its member states have taken a
rights-balancing approach in their rights enacting and limiting legis-
lation, which places the EU on a solid footing to make egalitarian activist
decisions under these laws.
8.3 Conclusion 
We have seen that egalitarian liberalism and continental theories of power
and speech, taken together, provide a strong argument in favor of state
activism in the name of equality. It is important, once again, to clarify
that in my view, neither path – of legislation or of advocacy – should be
taken alone. Rather, together, they provide a persuasive justiﬁcation for
activism.
Even within the brand of egalitarian liberalism that I have sketched 
– which would allow for state activism in the name of equality and thus
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necessitate dropping the neutrality requirement in such cases – key
reservations about the desirability and feasibility of state activism remain.
Such reservations are centered on the pervasive grip of liberalism’s neu-
trality requirement: how to ensure that the state is not entrusted with too
much power in its activism decisions, and how to ensure that the state is
in fact acting in the name of equality rather than some other, less vital,
interest. The neutrality requirement was intended to guard against these
issues ever arising, but the force of arguments from theorists such as
Foucault and Butler demonstrate that the neutrality requirement does 
not necessarily provide the assumed protection. Foucault’s and Butler’s
theories, in effect, state that given that the neutrality requirement does
not keep us safe from state excesses and biases, and given the overwhelm-
ing inequalities that persist alongside liberalism, we should not be afraid
to drop the neutrality requirement as part of an activist program for
equality.
The theories of speech and power canvassed in this study, then, serve
to demonstrate that neutrality is not a salve for inequality, but rather in
many instances an enactor of it; they function to highlight the role of
state power in the hope that making the liberal state more aware of 
its own power will serve to curb its potential excesses when given the
responsibility to engage in activism on behalf of equality. Further, these
theories offer a space for the voicing of minority discourse, which the
contemporary liberal state may otherwise not hear. If the liberal state
cannot hear minority discourse, it will not fully understand the extent of
cultural oppression. Finally, these theories of speech and power offer a
view of censorship that ought to alleviate traditional liberal fears of cen-
sorship, since they locate the latter at a level necessarily implicating the
state. If the state is, of necessity, implicated in censorship, then it follows
that there is no need to attempt to avoid such implication. These views,
combined with the activist-friendly egalitarian liberalism I outlined in
the early chapters, and the advocacy strategy outlined in Chapter 7, are
sufﬁcient to justify an egalitarian activist state. 
All of the work on the theoretical side of justifying an activist, egal-
itarian liberal state is vastly enhanced if evidence can be produced that
such a state can work not only in theory but also in practice. To this end,
the brief canvassing of hate speech and pornography legislation and juris-
prudence in this chapter have shown that Europe and Canada engage 
in a self-reﬂective, rights-balancing approach that facilitates egalitarian
decisions in cases of hate speech and pornography.




An activist egalitarian liberal state is not nearly as radical a possibility
as mainstream liberal discourse supposes. Rather, as I have shown in
these pages, there is support for the idea within liberalism itself – both
implicitly, in thinkers such as Mill and Dworkin, and explicitly, in
thinkers such as Fiss and Raz. Further, there is support for an activist
state from traditions outside of liberalism, such as speech act theory,
feminism, and continental political philosophy. It has been the task of
this book to weave these strands of thought together in order to show
that criticisms of the inequitable consequences of liberal neutrality 
can in fact be adopted by the liberal state, and that such adoption will 
ultimately strengthen the liberal state and its ideals. 
This project’s novelty has in no small part arisen due to disciplinary
boundaries between contemporary Anglo-American political philo-
sophy and contemporary continental political philosophy that, in my
mind, are far too infrequently bridged. Beyond my central argument
that continental theories of speech and power can and ought to inform
the Anglo-American debate about freedom of expression, I hope that
this book is also taken as an example of the many potential problems
in political philosophy – and perhaps in other sub-ﬁelds as well – that may
be illuminated by the engagement of Anglo-American and continental
traditions.
From the premise, taken as basic, notably by Ronald Dworkin, but also
adopted by many prominent liberal thinkers, that the liberal state’s 
fundamental commitment is not to liberty, but rather to the treatment 
of its citizens with equal concern and respect, I have argued that the 
hard cases in freedom of expression – pornography and hate speech – do
well to point out the contours and ﬁssures of the liberal state’s putative
commitment to equality over liberty.
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Taking pornography and hate speech jurisprudence as test cases in
examining the nature and extent of liberalism’s commitment to equal
concern and respect for all its citizens reveals that, in the United States
and in the bulk of the contemporary academic literature, the commit-
ment to equal concern and respect is understood as having been met
so long as the state is neutral with regard to the content of speech in
enacting limits on the right to freedom of expression. It has been my
aim to show, both from within liberalism and outside of it, how and
why this dominant line of thinking is misguided and how liberalism
fails in its commitment to equal concern and respect by adhering to it.
Further, I have attempted to show that in this very failure a space is
created for liberalism ﬁnally to live up to its egalitarian core commit-
ment by abandoning its policy of content neutrality and instead using
its signiﬁcant state power to advocate for equality, both within and
outside of legally binding channels.
While Dworkin espouses equal concern and respect as the core com-
mitment of liberalism, he maintains at the same time that the state can
meet this commitment by acting neutrally with respect to the content
of speech, even in the cases of pornography and hate speech. In this
regard, he echoes the dominant strand of liberal thinking on the topic
of freedom of expression from Mill onwards. However, I have shown
that there is room, within even this line of thinking, for the activist
egalitarian state, since Mill’s Subjection of Women reveals his sensitivity
to the idea that social forces, left unchecked, can so constrain an
oppressed population even at the basic level of preference formation
that that population may not be able to formulate their own true sense
of the good life. 
If Mill in Subjection is correct in his diagnosis of the problem of what
I am calling cultural oppression, then the dominant idea governing the
policy of neutrality – the liberal state as merely passively facilitating,
through a ‘marketplace of ideas,’ the privately formed conceptions of
the good life of its citizens – becomes deeply problematic, since a cul-
turally oppressive society means that a signiﬁcant percentage of the
population – namely, women and minorities – are denied the authen-
tic opportunity to form their own good, due to dominant oppressive
views of their inferior moral worth that have ﬂooded the marketplace
of ideas. The controversy, from most quarters in the classical and con-
temporary egalitarian liberal debate, is not about whether this is the
case, but rather what the proper remedy for it ought to be.
This skewed marketplace full of culturally oppressive ideas is the ﬁrst
failure of a liberalism wedded to content neutrality. The marketplace of
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ideas facilitated by a neutral state works to fulﬁll the Millian goal of
free and wide-ranging discourse about diverse conceptions of the good
life only if people holding those diverse conceptions – women and
minorities surely among them – are allowed to participate. However,
what the silencing and subordination arguments have suggested is that
in actuality, such participation by women and minorities is precluded
in the marketplace due to the chilling effect that extremely racist and
sexist comments have upon their speech. In Mill’s vision of the market-
place, of course, subordination and silencing would not exist, no one’s
ideas would be precluded in advance of their being voiced, and open-
mindedness and a spirit of genuine inquiry would be effectively facil-
itated by state neutrality about content. The problem, as I see it, is that
our culturally oppressive society falls far short of the Millian paradigm,
and the reiﬁcation of neutrality in mainstream liberal discourse as a 
core value of the marketplace, rather than a merely instrumental means
toward achieving a diversity of voices, ties the hands of the liberal state to
do anything to remedy this failure.
A liberalism committed to content neutrality fails on two levels, then.
First, it fails when allowing for silencing and subordination to skew the
marketplace of ideas so strongly as to preclude diverse voices from speak-
ing or from being heard. Neutrality liberalism then fails in a second way,
and even more tragically, when it cannot correct for that marketplace fail-
ure by inserting its own culturally liberatory speech, or using its power to
discourage culturally oppressive speech. The liberal state wedded to con-
tent neutrality as a value, rather than as an instrument, ties its own hands
ﬁrst in allowing the production of a culturally oppressive culture to ﬂour-
ish in its neutrally facilitated marketplace of ideas, and then, having its
hands tied, is impotent to act to remedy this culturally oppressive, skewed
marketplace – because to do so would of course require a departure from
content neutrality, which this liberal state takes to be anathema.
I have argued that without some compelling reason to do so, the
liberal state ought not to tie its hands in this way, in so grave a circum-
stance: a culturally oppressive society, which is the very antithesis of
the authentically Millian marketplace of ideas. The reasons advanced
by mainstream liberalism as compelling – the need to preserve neutrality
as a check on abuse of state power, the need to preserve equality between
citizens by not favoring one person’s viewpoint over another, and the
need to avoid state censorship – have both been shown, in the preceding
pages, to be ﬂawed. 
Neutrality as justiﬁed and necessitated by its efﬁcacy in checking
state power has been undermined in three ways in this account. First,
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it has been undermined through speech act theory which, I argued,
reveals the judicial discourse of the state as an illocutionary speech act,
and as such is necessarily powerful and efﬁcacious regardless of whether
the state takes a hands-off, neutral approach (which it still must speak 
its intentions to do in its judicial decisions), or a more directly inter-
ventionist approach. In either case, the state is using its power, through
its speech, in order to enact particular circumstances which cannot help
but favor some speakers over others. Such an outcome, of course, is 
anything but neutral.
Second, examining Foucault’s thought revealed that power runs through
discourse, and though the state in modernity does not have the sov-
ereignty that it had in monarchical times, the idea that the modern
state’s discourse – whatever its content – is always the chief way in which it
wields its power exposes the freedom of expression judicial discourse as
itself the pinnacle of a power-producing discourse, because its content in
fact delimits the scope of all future state-sanctioned discourse. Again, 
if Foucault’s account is persuasive, state speech cannot ever achieve neu-
trality, and the state is always speaking, even if only to proclaim (falsely)
its own neutrality. Even if the liberal state is unaware of its own speech 
as power-producing discourse, or as efﬁcacious illocutionary speech acts,
it nevertheless operates as such. 
Third, the ‘new censorship’ theories put forward by Butler and Schauer
reveal as misguided liberalism’s frequently voiced fear that non-neutrality
would be tantamount to censorship. Censorship as liberals envision it 
– as occurring after speech has been spoken – misses the mark on how
censorship operates at a deeper level: to ‘foreclose’ speech that has yet 
to be spoken, to delimit the range of acceptable speech in advance of its
being uttered, or even, perhaps, to restrict thought. On a new censorship
perspective, then, the liberal state is, once again, acting non-neutrally in
spite of its best attempts to remain neutral. A new censorship understand-
ing of the freedom of expression judicial discourse would hold that dis-
course operates to set the boundaries of acceptable speech – permitting
some speech to be uttered in the future and foreclosing other speech 
to be uttered in the future. If this is the case, and it is hard to see how
these decisions can be seen to do otherwise, then the liberal state can-
not help but censor in this sense, by necessarily delimiting – and hence
foreclosing – some speech in advance of its utterance.
The thrust of all three lines of argument – speech act theory, Foucauld-
ian analysis of power, and the new censorship – all lead to the idea that
state neutrality is impossible in principle, rather than merely undesirable.
Thus, my account is meant as a twofold critique on neutrality – if the
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reader is unpersuaded by the three theories offered to the effect that state
neutrality is impossible in principle, she may still be persuaded that 
a marketplace so skewed by cultural oppression as to preclude Mill’s
diversity of viewpoints from being heard is undesirable enough that the
liberal state ought to depart from its otherwise tenable neutral stance in
order to remedy cultural oppression.
In either case, though, the treatment of pornography and hate speech
as constitutionally protected in the US jurisprudence and in the bulk 
of the inﬂuential academic Anglo-American literature ought to be seen 
as deeply problematic, as it both instantiates and promotes a society 
profoundly at odds with liberal goals and commitments. 
I have intended in the preceding pages to clarify the heart of liberal
commitment – the imperative to treat all citizens with equal concern and
respect and to encourage a society where diversity ﬂourishes. Further, 
I have meant to show not merely that this commitment cannot be 
met through a state that is neutral about the content of freedom of
expression, but more importantly that liberalism would beneﬁt from
insight into its own non-neutrality and the consequences of that non-
neutrality.
If I am correct in assessing that liberalism’s core commitment is 
to treatment of its citizens with equal concern and respect, and that a
well-functioning liberal state would be characterized by a fruitful and
robust debate about diverse conceptions of the good life, then the liberal
state has no inherent conﬂict with taking to heart the arguments in 
this book. Neutrality has never been at the core of liberalism, and the
liberal state’s core commitments have a much better chance of being met
without it.
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Appendix A: Relevant sections of
the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms
Being Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982 
Enacted by the Canada Act 1982 [U.K.] c.11; proclaimed in force April 17, 1982.
Amended by the Constitution Amendment Proclamation, 1983, SI/84-102,
effective June 21, 1984. Amended by the Constitution Amendment, 1993 [New
Brunswick], SI/93-54, Can. Gaz. Part II, April 7, 1993, effective March 12, 1993.] 
Whereas Canada is founded upon principles that recognize the supremacy of
God and the rule of law:
Guarantee of Rights and Freedoms 
RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS IN CANADA. 
1. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms
set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be
demonstrably justiﬁed in a free and democratic society.
Fundamental Freedoms 
FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS. 
2. Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms: 
(a) freedom of conscience and religion; 
(b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom
of the press and other media of communication; 
(c) freedom of peaceful assembly; and 
(d) freedom of association. 
Equality Rights 
EQUALITY BEFORE AND UNDER LAW AND EQUAL PROTECTION AND BENEFIT
OF LAW/Afﬁrmative action programs. 
15. (1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to
the equal protection and equal beneﬁt of the law without discrimination and,
in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin,
colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.
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(2) Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, programme or activity that has as
its object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups
including those that are disadvantaged because of race, national or ethnic origin,




Appendix B: Relevant sections 
of the Bill of Rights of the 
United States
Amendment I
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibit-
ing the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press;
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the govern-
ment for a redress of grievances.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Amendment XIV
Section 1. 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the juris-
diction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they
reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.





1 The idea behind this phrase can certainly be found in Mill’s On Liberty,
though the phrase itself is not uttered by him. The phrase dates to Oliver
Wendell Holmes’s dissent in Abrams v. U.S., 250 U.S. 616 (1919), 624. 
2 I owe the term and the above deﬁnition of ‘cultural oppression’ to Andrew
Kernohan in Liberalism, Equality, and Cultural Oppression.
3 The idea of ‘equal concern and respect’ as liberalism’s core value is Ronald
Dworkin’s. Since I agree with this very inﬂuential view, I am adopting it
throughout this study. Dworkin’s view will be discussed much more fully in
Chapters 1 and 3. Throughout this work, unless Andrea Dworkin is speciﬁed,
‘Dworkin’ refers to Ronald Dworkin.
Chapter 1
1 I am using the term ‘egalitarian liberalism’ synonymously with the idea of
social welfare liberalism – that is, in the tradition of Rawls – as opposed to
libertarian liberalism in the tradition of Nozick. 
2 The theme of neutrality is central in the work of Rawls, Raz, Nozick, Dworkin,
and Kymlicka.
3 This famous phrase is attributed to Plato but was popularized by Mill in
Chapter 1 of On Liberty.
4 Rights, and their corollary duties, are famously viewed as constraints on
freedom in Nozick’s (1974) inﬂuential libertarian account, Anarchy, State, and
Utopia.
5 Since the argument of this study can proceed with or without a utilitarian
underpinning, I will not entertain the discussion of whether or not such an
underpinning is desirable.
6 This was implicitly the approach of the majority in R. v. Keegstra, one of the
leading Canadian hate speech decisions, which I will consider in Chapter 8.
7 Hart, Raz, and Mill are all advocates of a fundamental right to liberty.
8 It is of course a possibility, though one oddly not discussed in the literature,
that rights are simply in some cases primarily about protecting choices, in other
cases primarily about protecting interests, and in still other cases about both
interests and choices equally. A proposition like this, wherein the primacy of
protecting interests versus choice in the upholding of rights can vary, seems
more plausible than there being a single overarching theory. In either case,
though, for my purposes I need only argue that rights in the case of consti-
tutional rights are about the protection of interests, rather than choices,
whatever else they may concern in other cases.
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Chapter 2
1 Here I will rely on Dyzenhaus’s arguments in (1992), ‘John Stuart Mill and
the Harms of Pornography.’
2 The notion of cultural oppression does not give rise to the need for empirical
data to the same degree as does the idea of systemic discrimination, because
cultural oppression centers on statements regarding the unequal moral
worth of subjects, rather than on how those subjects fare in the marketplace
with their moral worth thus diminished. It is uncontroversial that such cul-
turally oppressive statements abound in our culture, and that their existence
bears to some degree on the beliefs of at least some of its citizens. The exist-
ence of such statements and their resulting effects on some people’s beliefs
are all that we need to demonstrate in order to raise the issue of the utility or
disutility of such views. To calculate the degree of harm caused by cultural
oppression is admittedly a more difﬁcult task, but not more difﬁcult than
many other calculations required by utilitarianism.
3 While it is of course outside of the scope of this project to canvass the history of
censorship, a helpful text in this regard is Boyer (2000), Purity in Print.
4 Rae Langton provides this example. 
5 Dworkin draws heavily on Isaiah Berlin’s ‘Two Concepts of Liberty,’ in 
Four Essays on Liberty. Berlin claims that positive liberty is untenable because
it is more likely than negative liberty to give rise to paternalism in deter-
mining what one’s ‘real’ desires in fact are. 
6 Notable proponents of the silencing argument include Frank Michelman 
in (1989), ‘Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional Argu-
ment,’ and later, Rae Langton and Jennifer Hornsby (1998), in the context 
of speech act theory. I will discuss Langton’s and Hornsby’s arguments in
Chapter 4.
Chapter 3
1 A question arises at this point. Even if we grant that some speech causes
silencing and subordination, why believe that pornography and hate speech
are the particular culprits? Dworkin addresses this question in his (1993)
article, ‘Women and Pornography.’ Though a thorough discussion of this
question is beyond the scope of this book, Dworkin’s short answer is that
there is enough empirical evidence to suggest that pornography in particular
is efﬁcacious in producing harmful views about women’s sexuality. See espe-
cially the report of the 1986 US Attorney General’s Commission on Porno-
graphy. However, there are other studies determining otherwise. In any event,
an honest response to the data must grant that the empirical evidence is not
sufﬁcient to settle the matter on one side or the other – but that in the absence
of sufﬁcient evidence, both acting to regulate a potential harm and not
acting have political consequences. That is precisely what the silencing and 
subordination arguments attempt to demonstrate: that maintaining the status 




2 It should be noted that while MacKinnon and her allies do believe that there
is a close relationship between freedom of expression, moral agency, and
democracy, these theorists still depart from Dworkin in that they hold that
such a relationship is not constitutive, but rather strongly instrumental.
3 MacKinnon has repeatedly insisted that her arguments are for regulation of
speech, and not outright censorship. She has maintained that her 1983 anti-
pornography ordinance – drafted with Andrea Dworkin, and adopted by the
city of Indianapolis before it was ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court
– did not advocate state censorship because it did not place a prior restraint 
on pornographic materials. See MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., Rev. Ordinances, Title 7,
Chapter 139 of the Minneapolis Code of Ordinances Relating to Civil Rights
(1983).
Chapter 4
1 This was the deﬁnition employed by Schauer in ‘Causation Theory and the
Causes of Sexual Violence’ (1987: 752). Schauer credited Cartwright, in ‘Causal
Laws and Effective Strategies’ (1979), for this formulation. 
2 See Sumner, The Hateful and the Obscene (2004: 131–41), for a concise review
of the social scientiﬁc literature. 
Chapter 5
1 See Foucault (1980d), The History of Sexuality, Volume 1, for a further elaboration
of this term.
2 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
Chapter 6
1 Here, Butler’s arguments recall her earlier work on the reproduction of gender
norms in her groundbreaking (1999), Gender Trouble.
Chapter 7
1 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 US 264 (1964).
2 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Commission, 395 U.S. 367
(1969).
3 Mill, Raz and Dworkin all endorse at least some part of this view of rights.
4 The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act,
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
5 R. v. Oakes [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103.
6 The wording of this summary comes from Sumner’s The Hateful and the
Obscene (2004: 56).




1 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
2 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
3 ST. PAUL, MINN., Legis. Code, Section 292.02 (1990).
4 R. v. Zundel [1992] 2 S.C.R. 731.
5 Canada, Criminal Code, [R.S.,c.C-34, s.1].
6 Canada, Criminal Code, [R.S.,c.C-34, s.1]. Interestingly, from the point of view
of US jurisprudence, the results in Keegstra and Zundel were at odds with the
principles in Brandenburg and R.A.V. The seemingly ‘content neutral’ provision
of Zundel was struck down, while the Keegstra provision, which imposed a
content distinction, was upheld. 
7 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrim-
ination, Jan. 4, 1969, 660 U.N.T.S. 195.
8 Convention on Cybercrime, Concerning the Criminalisation of Acts of a
Racist and Xenophobic Nature Committed through Computer Systems, Coun-
cil of Europe, Additional Protocol, November 7, 2002, chapter 2, article 3.
9 Grundgesetz [GG] [Constitution] art. 5, sec. 2 (F.R.G.).
10 Grundgesetz [GG] [Constitution] art. 1 (F.R.G.).
11 Council of the European Union, Framework Decision on Racism and Xeno-
phobia, sec.2, Apr. 19, 2007.
12 Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms, ETS 5.
13 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
14 Irwin Toy Ltd.v. Quebec (Attorney General) [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927.
15 Obscene Publications Act 1959 (c.66 7 and 8 Eliz 2).
16 The most famous of these was the case against Penguin Books for the pub-
lication of D.H. Lawrence’s Lady Chatterley’s Lover. Penguin was victorious,
successfully claiming that the book’s literary merit was a defense against its
being cast as obscenity. See R. v. Penguin Books Ltd. [1961] Crim LR 176.
17 European Union, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 
7 December 2000, Ofﬁcial Journal of the European Communities, 18 December
2000 (2000/C 364/01).
18 European Union, Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and
the Treaty Establishing the European Community, 13 December 2007, 2007/C
306/01.
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